Myanmar’s Military-backed President Ticks Cambodia Off His Diplomatic Bucket List

For decades, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has put forward a face of civility, a unified approach to regional politics made up of countries that were rapidly advancing, educated, and deserved a say in global politics. It’s an image welcomed in the West and elsewhere by governments that prefer to negotiate with Southeast Asian countries through a multilateral framework with ASEAN as the central power, as opposed to bilaterally with each individual country. As a trade bloc, ASEAN is a success story, and the better face of ASEAN still holds true for the maritime countries, where democracy has at times struggled, been compromised, but also thrived. But the bloc’s moral backbone has consistently been tested by most mainland countries and the desires of their ruling elites for power and impunity, which has cemented Southeast Asia’s unsavory reputation as a land best suited for the powerful. In recent years, this has been evident in the tens of thousands of pages dished up by civil society groups linking organized crime, scam compounds, and human traffickers to tycoons, politicians, and government officials from Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. But in recent months, Chinese- and Thai-backed efforts to find a podium for Min Aung Hlaing as the legitimate president of Myanmar and as one of 11 acceptable faces for ASEAN, from whose summits he is still barred, have provided mainland Southeast Asia with another political eyesore. Since emerging as regime president from an election widely derided as rigged, Min Aung Hlaing has itemized a bucket list of friendly countries by touring Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam – its four neighbors in mainland Southeast Asia – as well as China, India, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Min Aung Hlaing’s tour was made that bit easier by the Trump administration, given its senseless decision late last year to ignore the realities of a brutal civil war and declare Burma a safe country to return to while terminating Temporary Protected Status for 4,000 people living in the United States. But before rolling out the red carpet these countries could have thought for themselves and demanded further proof of life or preferably the release of jailed elected leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who Min Aung Hlaing ousted in the 2021 coup that tipped their country into conflict. They could have shown some respect by waiting until the International Court of Justice (ICJ) delivered its verdict over the alleged genocide of the Rohingya, which according to the prosecution was carried out by Min Aung Hlaing and Myanmar’s military in 2017. Genocide is a difficult charge to prosecute, and while the judges might not deliver a guilty verdict on violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention, they could find Min Aung Hlaing and his senior brass guilty of ethnic cleansing. The military denies the charges. A verdict is expected next month. That verdict should matter in Cambodia, where politicians and historians have for decades claimed the moral high ground over the West and China – with much justification – for their belated recognition of the crimes of the genocidal Khmer Rouge. But instead of waiting on the ICJ, Cambodia followed the dubious route set by others and welcomed Min Aung Hlaing on September 11-12, announcing plans to establish “a formal cooperation framework to foster closer ties between the armed forces of both countries.” Four cooperation documents were also signed, covering double taxation, investment, culture, and media and information cooperation, with a focus on encouraging wider cooperation in education, trade, agriculture and tourism, among other areas of mutual interest. Never mind the deaths of 100,000 people since Myanmar’s civil war erupted, or that further war crimes investigations are underway and that prosecutors for the International Criminal Court have requested an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing. If Min Aung Hlaing and his fellow officers are found guilty of genocide or ethnic cleansing, their political support network will require some fancy diplomatic footwork in justifying what they have done in terms of legitimizing his regime and what the military is being held accountable for. And if the international courts cannot be respected, then Cambodia might have to rethink its own legal strategy of relying on international law to resolve its deeply troubling border issues with Thailand, which last year flared into undeclared war. That includes requests for an ICJ intervention and hearings scheduled to start on September 15 over the maritime border under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At stake is ASEAN’s legitimacy and, as always, in the wider world, its member countries will be judged by the company they keep, and that remains a problem for the maritime nations which have so far shown a reluctance to be ticked off Min Aung Hlaing’s diplomatic bucket list.