Export Bans on Diesel in the United States

By Justin James McShane 23 September 2026 Executive Orientation Diesel is not a domestic political object. It is a globally priced middle-distillate molecule that happens to be manufactured in large surplus on the U.S. Gulf Coast and then sold into a world market that has lost Russian, Middle Eastern, and some Chinese barrels. The policy question now before the White House is whether an export embargo can convert that surplus into cheaper fuel for Iowa tractors and East Coast truckers. The Energy Information Administration numbers, the Jones Act fleet constraint, joint-product refining physics, and the 1973 soybean precedent all point the same way. The first-round effect is a Gulf Coast inventory bulge. The second-round effect is lower crude runs. The third-round effect is less gasoline, less jet fuel, weaker crude offtake, and a return of price pressure once finite tankage is full. An embargo rearranges a globally priced molecule. It does not create one. This is structural analysis, not advocacy. The farm-state political pressure is real. The pump price is a record. The mechanism still has to work. TL;DR Weekly U.S. distillate exports were about 1.61 million barrels per day in the week ending 11 September 2026 and printed a record 1.935 million barrels per day in the week ending 7 August. Monthly ultra-low-sulfur distillate exports ran 1.426 million barrels per day in April, 1.538 million in May, and 1.229 million in June. Those cargoes equal roughly 29 percent to 34 percent of U.S. distillate production of 5.1 to 5.35 million barrels per day against domestic product supplied of about 3.4 to 3.6 million barrels per day. Commercial distillate stocks on 11 September stood at 107.9 million barrels, or about 29.9 days of cover, roughly 12 percent below the five-year seasonal average, with East Coast inventories especially thin. Refineries processed 17.3 million barrels per day that week at 96.8 percent utilization. The four-week utilization average was 97.5 percent. An embargo would dump the export residual onto Gulf Coast tanks first. Tankage is finite. Coastwise Jones Act capacity remains scarce even with the 2026 waiver. Once storage fills, compressed diesel cracks force run cuts. Distillate, gasoline, and jet are joint products of the same barrel. Cutting diesel output therefore cuts gasoline and kerosene-type jet fuel from plants already running near the physical ceiling. Lower runs then reduce offtake of domestic light tight oil and of the heavy sour crude those Gulf configurations need. U.S. wholesale diesel still clears against a tight world middle-distillate market after Hormuz disruption and Russian refining losses. Allies that replaced lost Russian and Middle Eastern barrels with U.S. ultra-low-sulfur diesel would bid harder for remaining cargoes and keep the world price, which still sets the U.S. floor through arbitrage. The sequence is a temporary, geographically uneven inventory bulge, then lower total refined-product output, then a return of price pressure once the storage buffer is absorbed. Bottom line: an export embargo would not create more diesel for American buyers. It would park a Gulf Coast surplus for a few weeks and then force the system to make less of everything. Paywall This is where the paywall would normally go on a Deep Dive. Today, there is no paywall so you can see the type of analysis that a paid subscription gives you and its value. The remainder of this Deep Dive is the decision stack: PADD-level stocks, joint-product yields, Jones Act coastwise limits, crack-spread mechanics, the 1973 embargo analogy, and the second-order crude and ally effects. Free readers get the outline above. Paid subscribers get the mechanism while the policy window is still open plus access to daily GeopoliticsUnplugged.com Intelligence Briefing with the Geopolitical Risk Board and other top shelf analysis. Subscribe at geopoliticsunplugged.com. Paid subscribers receive the full data stack, the second-order effects, and the market map. Free readers get the outline. Paid readers get the decision. The Political Demand and the Physical Question Senator Chuck Grassley pressed President Donald Trump to embargo diesel exports, arguing that high fuel costs are killing farm income in the same way 1970s agriculture embargoes were used when food prices soared. On the Senate floor on 22 September 2026 he renewed the call for a temporary executive embargo and for permanent year-round E15. Other farm-state Republicans, including Representative Ashley Hinson and Senator Dan Sullivan, joined the demand as national retail diesel printed successive records near $6.51 to $6.53 a gallon. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the administration is examining whether a full or partial ban is feasible given refining capacity. President Trump said he had “called for that too” and that a decision would come “fast, one way or the other.” Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Interior Secretary Doug Burgum had earlier dismissed a ban on the ground that it would not lower prices. The political timing is not subtle. Midterm elections sit six weeks out. Agriculture Secretary Brooke Rollins called diesel “a real concern” after a Monday conversation with the president. The American Petroleum Institute, speaking for the refining system that would have to execute the policy, warned that restricting exports would force lower runs and raise prices rather than cut them. The question an embargo has to answer is not whether farmers are hurting. They are. The question is whether locking roughly 1.6 million barrels a day of diesel inside the United States actually cuts what a buyer pays at the pump, or whether it merely rearranges a globally priced molecule and then forces refiners to make less of everything. The EIA numbers do not give the comforting reply. What the United States Actually Ships The United States already ships a structural surplus. This is not a wartime accident. It is the configuration of the post-2010 Gulf Coast refining system: large, complex, coking and hydrocracking plants optimized on a mix of domestic light tight oil and imported heavy sour crude, sitting next to deepwater docks, producing more middle distillate than PADD 3 can burn. Weekly distillate exports were about 1.61 million barrels per day in the week ending 11 September 2026. They hit a record 1.935 million barrels per day in the week ending 7 August. Monthly ultra-low-sulfur distillate exports, the specification that matches on-highway diesel, ran 1.426 million barrels per day in April, 1.538 million in May, and 1.229 million in June. Total distillate exports in those same months were 1.597 million, 1.655 million, and 1.432 million barrels per day. Gulf Coast plants generate most of the flow. In June, PADD 3 accounted for 39.336 million barrels of the 42.972 million barrels of U.S. distillate exported that month. Those cargoes equal roughly 29 percent to 34 percent of U.S. distillate production. Production has been running 5.1 to 5.35 million barrels per day. The four-week average through 11 September was 5.209 million barrels per day. Domestic distillate product supplied, the EIA proxy for consumption, has been about 3.4 to 3.6 million barrels per day. The four-week average through 11 September was 3.6 million barrels per day, down 3.3 percent from a year earlier. The arithmetic is not mysterious. The United States makes about 5.2 million barrels a day, burns about 3.5 to 3.6 million, and sells the residual into Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Morocco, France, the United Kingdom, and other buyers that lost Russian and Middle Eastern barrels. Kpler data cited by Reuters put August diesel exports at a record 1.6 million barrels per day, up from about 1.0 million barrels per day in February before the Iran war tightened Hormuz. Of the roughly 8 million barrels of diesel traded globally by sea each day, the United States supplies about 1.5 million, or about 20 percent. That share is why an embargo is not a closed-system domestic policy. It is a withdrawal of the single largest seaborne diesel source from a market that is already short refined barrels. Inventories, Days of Cover, and Where the Tanks Actually Sit Commercial distillate stocks on 11 September stood at 107.9 million barrels. That is about 29.9 days of cover against recent product supplied. The pile is about 12 percent below the five-year seasonal average. It is not a record low in the 44-year national series. It is tight for the calendar week, and the EIA’s September Short-Term Energy Outlook forecasts that U.S. distillate inventories will fall below 100 million barrels in September and remain below the 2021 to 2025 five-year low through the end of 2026 and most of 2027. The national number conceals the geography that an embargo cannot repeal. East Coast (PADD 1) stocks were about 21.6 million barrels on 11 September, on the order of 34 percent below the five-year seasonal norm and among the lowest readings for this week in the modern series. Gulf Coast (PADD 3) stocks were about 43.8 million barrels, near the five-year norm. Midwest (PADD 2) stocks were about 28.8 million barrels. West Coast (PADD 5) stocks were about 10.4 million barrels. Ultra-low-sulfur distillate, the road-diesel grade, was about 97.0 million barrels, or 90 percent of the national pile. Higher-sulfur heating-oil grades made up the rest. This map matters more than the headline stock figure. An embargo does not teleport a Houston barrel to a New England rack or a California terminal. It dumps export residual onto the tanks that already sit next to the plants that make the surplus. That is PADD 3. The East Coast is pipeline-constrained and import-dependent in a normal year. The West Coast has lost refining capacity and remains an energy island. The first-round physical result of an embargo is therefore a Gulf Coast glut sitting next to thin PADD 1 and PADD 5 inventories. Storage brokers have already reported the other side of that tightness. Diesel storage capacity available for lease in North America and the Caribbean has climbed even as inventories have fallen, which is what a market looks like when participants expect the shortage to last and do not want to pay to hold empty steel. Finite tankage is not a metaphor. Once working capacity fills, the only remaining valves are lower runs, lower prices at the dock, or both. Utilization, Joint Products, and Why Run Cuts Are Not Optional For the week ending 11 September, U.S. refineries processed 17.3 million barrels per day, down 256,000 barrels per day from the prior week, at 96.8 percent of operable capacity. The four-week utilization average was 97.5 percent. Distillate production that week was 5.2 million barrels per day. Gasoline output averaged 9.6 million barrels per day. Those are not slack numbers. Several Gulf plants have been reported running above nameplate when seasonal maintenance was deferred to capture distillate cracks that printed above $100 a barrel earlier in the summer. Diesel, gasoline, and jet are joint products of the same crude barrel. A typical U.S. barrel still yields on the order of 19 to 20 gallons of gasoline and 11 to 13 gallons of distillate, with the balance in jet, residual, liquefied gases, and loss. Hydrocrackers and cokers can lean the cut toward distillate. They cannot turn the entire barrel into diesel. When the export valve closes and Gulf tanks fill, the diesel crack compresses first. No refiner sells the incremental barrel at a cash loss for long. Kenneth Medlock of Rice University’s Baker Institute put the mechanism in one sentence for Reuters: no market participant in any market sells product at a loss, so an export ban that cuts the accessible physical market drives refiners to cut runs. The short-term price dip is not long-lived. Run cuts are not a diesel-only event. Every barrel of crude that does not enter the atmospheric column is a barrel that does not produce gasoline and kerosene-type jet fuel either. Plants already running at 97 to 98 percent utilization have almost no spare capacity with which to “make more diesel for America.” The only available move, once tanks are full and the export dock is closed, is to process less crude. That is why President Trump’s own aside, that a diesel embargo “could have a little bit of an effect on regular automobile gasoline,” is the technically correct part of the political conversation. The effect is not little if the run cut is several hundred thousand barrels a day. It is a simultaneous tightening of three product markets. The Atlantic Council’s 22 September assessment added a timing wrinkle. Even a ban that lasts only a few weeks could pull forward long-deferred maintenance that refiners postponed because distillate cracks were too profitable to shut units. A ban expected to last months would shift crude slates and reduce throughput. A ban expected to last longer would weaken domestic crude demand and the incentive to drill marginal wells. The first-round inventory bulge and the later run cut are the same policy at two different dates. Why the World Price Still Sets the U.S. Floor U.S. wholesale diesel still clears against a tight world middle-distillate market. Hormuz disruption removed or rerouted a large share of Middle Eastern product and crude. Ukrainian strikes cut Russian refining runs and forced Moscow toward its own diesel export limits. Chinese product exports have been restrained. EIA’s September Short-Term Energy Outlook assumes that global distillate production remains below last year’s levels in the coming months and that U.S. net distillate exports stay elevated because the world bid is still there. That world bid is the floor under U.S. rack prices through arbitrage. As long as a Gulf Coast barrel can leave, the domestic price cannot fall far below the netback from Europe or Latin America. If the barrel cannot leave, two things happen at once. Foreign buyers who replaced lost Russian and Middle Eastern barrels with U.S. ultra-low-sulfur diesel bid harder for remaining cargoes from India, the Middle East residual stream, and any European plant still running. The world price rises. Energy economist Philip Verleger told Reuters a U.S. ban could raise world diesel prices by as much as 100 percent given the fuel’s low short-run price elasticity. That higher world price then leaks back into U.S. markets wherever product can still move, through remaining legal channels, through heating-oil and jet substitution, and through the simple fact that U.S. retailers and marketers price off a complex that is not sealed. Allies are not a footnote. France, the United Kingdom, Morocco, and Latin American importers have been using U.S. ULSD as replacement supply. An embargo that strands those buyers does not create a closed American market. It creates a diplomatic and commercial retaliation surface. Foreign buyers divert. Some governments consider reciprocal product measures. California and other PADD 5 markets that already import after local refinery closures are exposed if partners answer a U.S. diesel lock with their own restrictions. Energy Secretary Doug Burgum made that point before the White House tone shifted: an export ban can invite export bans. Export earnings that currently support high utilization would disappear. High distillate cracks have been the reason plants deferred turnarounds and ran above nameplate. Remove the export netback and the crack that justified those runs collapses at the Gulf dock even if the world crack explodes. That is the paradox that the barrel count conceals. The same policy that is supposed to flood America with cheap diesel is the policy that removes the margin that was paying American plants to make record volumes of diesel. Tankage, the Jones Act, and the Myth of Instant Redistribution The popular version of the embargo assumes that a barrel not loaded in Houston appears, at the same price, in Des Moines, Newark, or Los Angeles. The logistics system does not work that way. Colonial Pipeline and other refined-product lines have finite capacity and already move a slate that includes gasoline and jet. They cannot absorb 1.6 million barrels a day of incremental diesel. Rail and truck can move product, at a cost that shows up in the retail price the policy is trying to cut. Water is the efficient long-haul mode, and water between U.S. ports is still governed by the Jones Act except where the 2026 emergency waiver applies. That waiver, issued in March after Hormuz closed and later extended, has moved tens of millions of barrels on foreign-flag ships and has revealed how thin the compliant tanker fleet is. Cato’s tracker and subsequent voyage work show the Jones Act tanker book fully employed and waiver cargoes supplementing, not displacing, that fleet. Even with the waiver, coastwise capacity is scarce. PADD 5 receipts of Gulf product rose because the waiver created a lane that barely existed in commercial service. An embargo that floods PADD 3 tanks does not automatically fill PADD 1 or PADD 5 racks. Regional mismatches persist because Gulf barrels cannot cheaply reach the coasts that are short. Renewable diesel cannot close the gap on the relevant time scale. EIA expects renewable diesel blended into the distillate pool to rise from about 190,000 barrels per day in 2025 to about 237,000 barrels per day in 2026. That increment is real. It is not a substitute for several hundred thousand barrels per day of lost petroleum distillate if Gulf plants cut runs. Pretending that biofuel units can replace a sudden loss of petroleum output is a category error. Those units are already running against feedstock, credit, and construction constraints. The 1973 Analogy Cuts the Other Way Senator Grassley’s historical reference is the Nixon-era agricultural embargoes, particularly the June 1973 controls on soybeans and cottonseed. That episode is worth taking seriously because it is the precedent being offered as proof that export locks lower domestic prices. The 1973 soybean embargo was short. Controls were imposed in late June and contracts were effectively restored by 1 October once the crop proved larger than feared. Domestic feed prices were the stated target. The lasting effects were abroad. Japan, which took about 90 percent of its soybeans from the United States and imported 97 percent of its needs, treated the episode as a reliability shock. Tokyo built a food-security doctrine and, through JICA, financed large-scale soybean development in Brazil’s Cerrado. The European Community subsidized oilseed production. The United States taught its best customers that an American surplus is a political instrument. Those customers spent the next decade building alternative supply. A diesel embargo in 2026 would teach the same lesson to a different set of customers, at a moment when those customers are already shopping for non-Russian, non-Hormuz barrels. Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Morocco, France, and the United Kingdom would not applaud a U.S. lock as farm relief. They would mark the United States as a swing supplier that closes the dock when domestic politics require it. The 1973 embargo did not produce a durable U.S. price advantage in protein. It produced Brazilian soybeans. A 2026 diesel embargo would not produce a durable U.S. price advantage in middle distillate. It would produce a hunt for Indian, Middle Eastern residual, and European barrels, and a long memory in allied capitals. The 1970s also contained a second lesson that farm-state sponsors of a diesel ban should not ignore. Export controls on commodities the United States was good at producing did not protect farm income for long. They damaged the reputation of U.S. supply and invited competitors. Diesel is the refined-product analogue. The plants that make it are American. The customers that pay the netback that keeps those plants at 97 percent utilization are not. Second-Order Effects: Crude, Gasoline, Jet, CPI, and Refiner Behavior Once the first-round Gulf glut is stated, the later consequences run the other way from the intended price cut. Freight, agriculture, and heating demand are inelastic in the short run. Farmers do not stop harvesting because diesel is expensive. Truckers do not park the fleet. New England does not skip winter. Any subsequent tightening of total distillate supply, after tanks fill and runs fall, reappears in pump prices and in transportation CPI. The EIA weekly on-highway diesel average for the week of 21 September 2026 was $6.529 a gallon, up 24.4 cents from the prior week and $2.780 from a year earlier. AAA’s daily national diesel print on 22 September was $6.5276, a series high. Those are the numbers the embargo is supposed to break. They are also the numbers that will return if the policy shrinks the total refined-product stack. Lower crude runs reduce offtake of domestic light tight oil and of the heavy sour crude that Gulf coking configurations need. Differentials weaken. Upstream cash flow weakens. The same administration that has treated energy dominance as a strategic asset would be using a product embargo to cut the derived demand for American crude. That is not a side effect. It is the mass-balance consequence of joint-product refining. Refiners will reoptimize toward whatever product remains freely exportable. If diesel is locked and gasoline or jet is not, the cut will lean as far as hardware allows toward the open valve. That shrinks the diesel surplus the ban was meant to trap. If multiple products are later locked to close that loophole, the run cut deepens. There is no version of this policy in which Gulf plants keep running at 98 percent while 1.6 million barrels a day of their highest-margin product lose their market. Foreign retaliation and diversion keep the world price elevated. That world price remains the reference for U.S. wholesale markets through any remaining arbitrage, through import-dependent PADDs, and through the heating-oil and jet complex. The national retail effect of an embargo is therefore smaller and shorter than the barrel count implies, which is the opposite of the political sales pitch. What the Data Allow, and What They Do Not An honest reading has to grant the first-round effect. If exports stopped tomorrow, roughly 1.6 million barrels a day would have nowhere to go except domestic tanks and domestic racks. Gulf Coast wholesale prices would fall. Some Midwest locations served by product pipeline from the Gulf would see relief. Farm-state spot markets nearest to PADD 3 would print the best numbers. That is the part of the proposal that is not fantasy. The data do not support the claim that this relief is national, durable, or free of collateral tightening in gasoline and jet. Stocks are already 12 percent below the five-year norm nationally and far worse on the East Coast. EIA itself forecasts a sub-100-million-barrel national pile into 2027 under current policy. Tankage and coastwise shipping cannot reallocate the Gulf surplus at the speed the politics require. Utilization is already 97 percent. Joint-product yields do not disappear because a senator invoked 1973. The world middle-distillate market is tight for reasons that originated outside Iowa: Hormuz, Russian secondary units, and restrained Chinese product exports. U.S. racks still price off that market. The administration’s own split is the tell. Farm-state pressure and a midterm calendar pull toward a lock. The energy secretary, the refining trade association, and the mass-balance arithmetic pull the other way. Treasury’s question, whether a full or partial ban is feasible given refining capacity, is the right question. Feasibility is not a legal drafting problem. It is a tank, a pipeline, a Jones Act hull, and a crude unit already running at the stop. Conclusion An export embargo would not create more diesel for American buyers. It would park a Gulf Coast surplus for a few weeks, then force refiners running near 97 to 98 percent utilization to cut crude runs, which cuts gasoline and jet as well as diesel. U.S. pump prices would stay tied to a still-tight world middle-distillate market. Inventories would not stay fat once tankage fills. Allies that now depend on U.S. ultra-low-sulfur diesel would bid the residual world barrel higher. Export earnings that support high utilization would vanish. Regional mismatches would persist because a Houston barrel does not become a Newark barrel by statute. Refiners would reoptimize toward whatever product remains exportable, shrinking the diesel surplus the ban was meant to trap. The sequence is a temporary, geographically uneven inventory bulge, followed by lower total refined-product output, weaker crude offtake, and a return of price pressure once the storage buffer is absorbed. The EIA weekly series, the monthly ULSD export table, the PADD stock map, the Jones Act fleet constraint, and the 1973 soybean aftermath all describe the same machine. Locking 1.6 million barrels a day inside the United States does not repeal it. Bottom line: it is a bad idea. If this kind of barrel-level, policy-consequence analysis is what you want before the next headline turns into a bad trade or a bad vote, go to geopoliticsunplugged.com and subscribe to the Daily Rapid Read. Paid subscribers get the full data stack, the second-order effects, and the market map while the window is still open. Free readers get the outline. Paid readers get the decision. Sources American Petroleum Institute. (2026, September 22). A diesel export ban would wreak havoc at home and abroad. Here’s why. https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/news/2026/09/22/a-diesel-export-ban-would-wreak-havoc-at-home-and-abroad-heres-why American Petroleum Institute. (2026, September 22). API statement on potential U.S. diesel export ban. https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/news/2026/09/22/api-statement-on-potential-us-diesel-export-ban Atlantic Council. (2026, September 22). A diesel export ban could disrupt US supply chains. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/a-diesel-export-ban-could-disrupt-us-supply-chains/ Axios. (2026, September 22). Trump backs diesel exports ban, marking a shift for administration. https://www.axios.com/2026/09/22/trump-diesel-exports-ban Bikales, J., & Shin, R. (2026, September 21). Big Ag and Big Oil go head-to-head over diesel export ban. POLITICO. https://www.politico.com/news/2026/09/21/big-ag-big-oil-diesel-export-ban-01086191 Cato Institute. (2026, September 21). The Jones Act waiver has moved more energy than official numbers show. https://www.cato.org/blog/jones-act-waiver-has-moved-more-energy-official-numbers-show CNBCTV18. (2026, September 22). Trump backs diesel export ban; oil industry warns it could cut refinery output and supply. https://www.cnbctv18.com/world/trump-diesel-export-ban-us-oil-industry-refinery-output-fuel-supply-prices-19996236.htm Coppess, J. (2019, May 30). A brief review of the consequential seventies. farmdoc daily. https://farmdocdaily.illinois.edu/2019/05/a-brief-review-of-the-consequential-seventies.html Financial Times. (2026, September 21). ‘Stop the bleeding’: Top Republicans tell Donald Trump to ban US diesel exports ahead of midterms. https://www.ft.com/content/319c7b67-b585-407e-a0da-6e23b1612180 Gizmodo. (2026, September 22). Trump’s proposed diesel export ban could backfire enormously. https://gizmodo.com/trumps-proposed-diesel-export-ban-could-backfire-enormously-2000815624 Grassley, C. (2026, September 22). Grassley continues push to lower consumer costs: Renews calls for permanent E15, temporary diesel export ban [Floor remarks]. U.S. Senate. https://www.grassley.senate.gov/news/remarks/grassley-continues-push-to-lower-consumer-costs-renews-calls-for-permanent-e15-temporary-diesel-export-ban McCormick, M., & Smyth, J. (2026, September 22). Republican lawmakers pressure Donald Trump to ban diesel exports. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/cf151ce7-b284-4f8a-94e9-e27c4228a174 Newsweek. (2026, September 20). Chuck Grassley presses Trump as Iowa diesel prices hit record high. https://www.newsweek.com/chuck-grassley-presses-trump-as-iowa-diesel-prices-hit-record-high-12464839 Newsweek. (2026, September 22). Republican backs diesel export ban in red state that saw $26 gas price. https://www.newsweek.com/republican-backs-diesel-export-ban-in-red-state-that-saw-26-gas-price-12475854 Newsweek. (2026, September 23). Why Donald Trump’s diesel fix needs refining. https://www.newsweek.com/trump-diesel-prices-export-ban-gas-us-12476447 OilPrice.com. (2026, September 22). Trump backs diesel export ban as prices hit record highs. https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Trump-Backs-Diesel-Export-Ban-as-Prices-Hit-Record-Highs.html POLITICO. (2026, September 22). Trump says decision on possible diesel export ban to come ‘fast.’ https://www.politico.com/news/2026/09/22/trump-decision-diesel-export-ban-soon-01087925 Responsible Statecraft. (2026, September 22). Banning diesel exports won’t fix spiking prices due to war. https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ban-diesel-exports/ Reuters. (2026, September 22). Explainer: Ban on US diesel exports would hurt, not help fuel markets, analysts say. https://www.reuters.com/world/us/ban-us-diesel-exports-would-hurt-not-help-fuel-markets-analysts-say-2026-09-22/ The New York Times. (1973, June 28). Soybeans and cottonseed under export embargo. https://www.nytimes.com/1973/06/28/archives/soybeans-and-cottonseed-under-export-embargo-soybeans-and.html The Vault Report. (2026, September). US diesel inventory: 107.9M bbl (September 11, 2026 EIA). https://thevaultreport.com/oil/distillate U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2026, August 31). U.S. exports of distillate fuel oil, 0 to 15 ppm sulfur (thousand barrels per day). https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=M_EPDXL0_EEX_NUS-Z00_MBBLD&f=M U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2026, August 31). U.S. exports of crude oil and petroleum products. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_exp_dc_nus-z00_mbblpd_m.htm U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2026, September 9). Short-Term Energy Outlook. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/ U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2026, September 16). Stocks of distillate fuel oil. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_stoc_wstk_a_epd0_sae_mbbl_w.htm U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2026, September 16). U.S. weekly supply estimates. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_sum_sndw_dcus_nus_w.htm U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2026, September 16). Weekly Petroleum Status Report (data for week ending September 11, 2026). https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/supply/weekly/ U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2026, September 16). Weekly Petroleum Status Report highlights [PDF]. https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/supply/weekly/pdf/highlights.pdf Weekly Diesel. (2026, September 21). DOE diesel price this week: $6.529 (week of September 21, 2026). https://weeklydiesel.com/ Zawya / Reuters. (2026, September 22). Global diesel shortage likely to last into 2027 as storage tanks drain. https://www.zawya.com/en/insights/global-diesel-shortage-likely-to-last-into-2027-as-storage-tanks-drain-1021564