The Coming Risks to Russian Power

The United States has long viewed Russia as a power in terminal decline. This assessment formed in the 1980s as the Soviet Union began showing clear signs of imperial overstretch, and it congealed after the collapse of first the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union itself. Washington went on to pursue a policy agenda, including NATO enlargement, that treated Russian power and interests as an afterthought, and the long-standing conflict over Ukraine turned dismissiveness into condescension. In March 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama called Russia “a regional power” that was “threatening some of its immediate neighbors, not out of strength but out of weakness.” President Donald Trump shows more fondness for Russian President Vladimir Putin than his predecessors did, but most Russia-watchers in the West still dwell on Russia’s lagging technology; its failure to rescue allies in Syria, Venezuela, and Cuba; and what they see as its reduction to a vassal of mighty China. This picture of Russia as feeble and fading may suit the biases of Putin’s many critics, but it is fundamentally at odds with reality: Moscow consistently punches above its weight in global affairs. Thirty-five years after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia remains a nuclear superpower. As during the Cold War, NATO treats it as the benchmark threat around which the alliance plans its forces. An unprecedented wall of Western sanctions has failed to trigger the economic collapse its architects predicted or to erode political and social stability. The effort to isolate Moscow has faltered as well. The Kremlin has skillfully promoted non-Western bodies such as BRICS, a grouping of major emerging economies, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Eurasian political and security group. In so doing, it has extended its influence over the post-Western order now taking shape. And even though Russia’s economy is far smaller than China’s, the “no limits” partnership between Moscow and Beijing has produced a formidable coalition. This bullish assessment comes with a caveat: it relies on the international conditions that prevail today. Moscow continues to punch above its weight because it is navigating a fragmented, unpredictable world that plays to its strengths. Volatility and instability, active conflicts and arms races across several regions, economic decoupling and the retreat of globalization, the worldwide rise of nationalism and populism, the discounting of soft power and fissures in the Western alliance—all these features of the existing international order work to Moscow’s advantage. The downside risk for Russia is that today’s turmoil and uncertainty may not last. The pendulum is likely to swing back, with global disorder subsiding and the international system consolidating anew. That reversal could come when Trump leaves the White House, especially if his successor restores traditional U.S. support for the transatlantic alliance, multilateralism, and open trade. A planetary shock—accelerating climate change, an out-of-control AI system, or some other surprise—could likewise push states to set aside their current conflicts in favor of closer cooperation. When this change happens—and it will—Russia may find that its time-tested foreign policy and its once-reliable but rigid institutions no longer serve it well. THRIVING IN CHAOS The centrifugal trends pulling the international system apart work to Moscow’s advantage. In a fragmented and dangerous world of strongmen, where raw power decides outcomes, Russia’s military heft remains a durable source of strength and influence. Russia is also the only power that can rival the United States in strategic nuclear weapons. China is modernizing and expanding its arsenal, but Beijing will need a long time to catch up with the two superpowers. Russia’s nuclear status has practical effects: it has deterred NATO members from deploying troops to Ukraine, and it gives Moscow powerful diplomatic leverage on arms control, strategic stability and risk reduction, nonproliferation, and the prevention of nuclear terrorism. As for its conventional capabilities, Russia retains a blue-water navy and long-range strike capabilities; only the United States can project power more widely. To be sure, the initial phase of fighting in Ukraine in February 2022 exposed serious weaknesses in the Russian army. But over the four and a half years since, the armed forces have transformed themselves, sharply improving their efficiency and combat power. Moscow now fields one of the world’s strongest militaries and, beyond that, has unique experience in next-generation ground warfare—an edge over almost any other fighting force, the United States included. Ukraine, too, has adapted its forces and tactics to new battle technologies, but it depends on Western support and may not be able to preserve those capabilities once the fighting stops. The accumulated experience of Russia’s armed forces will keep serving Moscow well in an era of frequent conventional wars. A divided, resource-scarce world also magnifies the leverage that Russia’s vast natural endowments give it. Russia is a supplier of oil, natural gas, coal, wheat, fertilizers, uranium, critical metals, diamonds, and other commodities. It regularly plays the role of dealmaker, especially now that supply, not price, is the priority. Europe, for instance, may be weaning itself off Russian fossil fuels, but China’s reliance on those supplies helps offset the asymmetries in the relationship between Moscow and Beijing. The vulnerability of Middle Eastern supply routes during the Iran war has further strengthened Russia’s hand. Perpetual confrontation with the West does not serve Russia’s long-term development. A fiercely competitive, volatile environment also raises the value of Russia’s centralized economic and political systems. In the West, these are often derided as antiquated, inflexible, and harmful to the country’s development. Yet a strong state has helped Russia maintain social, economic, and political stability despite Western pressure and its losses in Ukraine. In an era of heightened polarization, Russia’s centralized, personalized decision-making carries clear advantages over the liberal alternative. Putin governs with little opposition, few divisions within the establishment, and scant pushback from the media, and he can pursue the kind of long-term strategic planning that unpredictable election cycles in the West rule out. The United States, meanwhile, is a divided political mess, presided over by a mercurial president and a dysfunctional Congress. Trump seems not only to respect Putin but also to envy him and his tight grip on Russia. In Britain and France, prime ministers come and go, none able to sustain public confidence. The European Union survives for now, but it makes decisions with excruciating slowness and, within its member states, faces surging support for populist parties eager to topple the bureaucrats in Brussels. As long as the international system favors rivalry over cooperation, security over prosperity, regionalization over globalization, and sovereignty over interdependence, Russia will remain in the top tier of global politics. It will even hold comparative advantages over countries with far greater commercial, financial, and technological capacities. Its rivals will be constrained by their own democratic gridlock and restless electorates. Russia cannot beat the West outright, but it can hold its own and play for a draw—until, that is, today’s competitive and fragmented order gives way to compromise, de-escalation, and stability. THE COMING CALM History moves in cycles, and the current configuration of the international system could prove fleeting. Globalization could return in a new form, and instability could give way to a long stretch of stable peace. The seemingly endless fighting in the Middle East could finally stop; Washington and Beijing might reach a sustainable trade and geopolitical compromise; the European Union may overcome its existential crisis; and a new UN secretary-general could succeed in reviving principles of multilateralism in global affairs. The reversal of the pendulum could begin as early as the coming midterm elections in the United States, if they result in a major defeat for Trump’s supporters on Capitol Hill. In such a world, some of the foreign policy assets Russia now prizes most would begin to lose their value. The softer forms of power, which Russia has long underrated, would matter more. Heavy investment in strategic and conventional forces, for instance, gives Moscow geopolitical heft, but it does nothing to help Russia plug into emerging high-value global supply chains. Were its domestic market as vast as China’s or India’s, Russia could insulate itself from the risks associated with globalization’s return. But its long-term demographic decline forecloses that option. Exporting its way out of hardship by selling even more hydrocarbons won’t work either, given the likely fall in demand for fossil fuels. Competing for large-scale foreign direct investment would be harder still. It requires high levels of interstate trust and transparency, as well as a stable and user-friendly legal framework. The country’s geography offers some advantage. With the world’s longest Arctic coastline, Russia can command a large share of the High North’s resource reserves and of the new shipping routes that will open as the climate warms. But to capitalize on its position as a transit corridor between East Asia and Western Europe, Russia would need long-term, stable partnerships with not only China but also the EU. Such relationships are hard to imagine now. Finally, without a strong civilian high-tech ecosystem, Russia could find itself far behind the United States and China in technological prowess. For over two decades, Russia’s leadership has been tightening its grip on the private sector. Its highly centralized decision-making has helped the Kremlin mobilize resources quickly and head off political and social developments that threaten the state, but it has also suffocated the entrepreneurial energy the country needs to regain its technological edge and compete in the marketplace of tomorrow. Russia’s innovation infrastructure remains rooted in the twentieth-century Soviet state-centered model. But today’s technological transformations—AI and robotics, clean energy, quantum computing, gene editing—demand new modes of interaction between states and private businesses, from global platforms down to the garage startups that often lead in key breakthroughs. BEYOND THE FORTRESS How Russia fares over the long run will depend on its ability to hedge against and prepare for another change in the world order. Its current “besieged fortress” model treats the international environment as a challenge rather than an opportunity. It can minimize immediate external risks, but it also keeps Russia from making full use of its geography, resources, and human capital. Perpetual confrontation with the United States and Europe does not serve Russia’s long-term development. The West may keep declining in power, but it will remain indispensable to Russia’s external environment—sometimes a problem for Moscow, sometimes part of the solution. Peaceful coexistence, and even limited cooperation, is the better path. Restoring ties with the EU matters most of all. These days, it is easy to forget that its member states were once Moscow’s main economic partners and its chief source of new technology and modern business practices. Given the dismal state of Russo-European relations, even a partial rapprochement will take considerable time. Once the conflict in Ukraine ends, however, the two sides could begin the slow work of repair. It is also in Russia’s own interest to do its part to uphold international legal norms, especially those coming from the United Nations and other global bodies, even when that means making concessions and giving up potential short-term gains. To be sure, a world governed by “might makes right” offers Moscow real opportunities in the short run. But over the long run, it is a dangerous game. The international balance of power is swiftly shifting, and new actors are rising. A strong international legal system—backed by all major powers, including Russia—may prove one of the few safeguards against revisionist temptations. Russia is, to the dismay of its critics, holding strong and proving itself in the current moment. But to sustain that success, it will have to look beyond short-term gains and narrow self-interest. It must be able to withstand upheaval in the international system and rapid technological change. Russia has the resources and wherewithal to determine its own course, but it is clinging too tightly to its preference for stability over change. This is understandable, given the painful memories of the 1990s, when change came as catastrophe, costing millions of Russians not just their jobs and savings but self-respect, belonging, even a reason to live. But that preference can also harden into a refusal to adapt—a calcification that has pushed great powers to the sidelines before. You are reading a free article Subscribe to Foreign Affairs to get unlimited access. - Paywall-free reading of new articles and over a century of archives - Six issues a year in print and online, plus audio articles - Unlock access to the Foreign Affairs app for reading on the go Already a subscriber? Sign In