Moscow Exploits Poland

Moscow Exploits Poland–Ukraine Dispute Over OUN and UPA Legacy Moscow Exploits Poland–Ukraine Dispute Over OUN and UPA Legacy Executive Summary: - Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy shifted away from his cautious approach to sensitive historical narratives about 20th-century Ukrainian nationalists in recent months, honoring an Organization for Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) faction leader and renaming a special operations unit the “Heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).” - Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, many Ukrainians have increasingly emphasized the UPA’s armed struggle against Moscow, while Poland condemns its role in the 1943–1945 Volhynia and Eastern Galicia ethnic cleansing, in which Ukrainian nationalist forces killed tens of thousands of Polish civilians. - Polish President Karol Nawrocki withdrew Zelenskyy’s Order of the White Eagle award in June and warned that unresolved historical issues could affect Ukraine’s EU accession. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk urged both sides to avoid escalating tensions. - Russia exploited Ukrainian–Polish tensions in July through information operations, including possible provocations by Russian intelligence and the Federal Security Service’s (FSB’s) release of supposed archival documents on UPA crimes, seeking to diminish Polish support for Ukraine. Ukrainian–Polish History Explodes into Political Crisis Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has shifted away from his cautious approach to sensitive historical narratives about 20th-century Ukrainian nationalists over recent months. On May 25, Zelenskyy oversaw the repatriation and reburial of the remains of Andriy Melnyk—the leader of one of the two factions of the Organization for Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN)—with full state honors in Ukraine after his exhumation in Luxembourg. Melnyk, who Zelenskyy described as a “great Ukrainian figure,” led the Melnykite (OUN-M) faction of the OUN from its formation in 1940 and remained its recognized leader until his death in exile in 1964, including during the period when OUN sought collaboration with the Nazis (President of Ukraine, May 25). Two days later, on May 27, Zelenskyy awarded the Separate Special Operations Center “North” the honorary name “Heroes of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA),” the armed force associated with and directed by the OUN-B, the Stepan Bandera-led faction of the OUN. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Kyiv has increasingly remembered the UPA as a movement that fought for Ukraine’s liberation from Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, though its legacy remains deeply controversial because of its role in the mass killing of Polish civilians during the Volhynia massacres (President of Ukraine, May 27). The Melnyk reburial and Zelenskyy’s choice to name a modern military structure after the UPA triggered swift backlash from Israel and Poland (Times of Israel; Onet, May 29). Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, the UPA has increasingly been invoked in Ukraine as a symbol of resistance to foreign domination (Kyiv Independent, May 25). The UPA remains widely condemned in Poland because its members and other affiliated nationalist forces massacred tens of thousands of ethnic Poles between 1943 and 1945 in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, which are a part of modern Ukraine (Kyiv Independent, July 12, 2023; Polskie Radio, June 20). The exact number of people who were killed remains contested, but Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) estimates that Ukrainian nationalists killed about 100,000 Polish people during ethnic cleansing meant to keep the territories out of Warsaw’s control and remove Polish populations from the territory they claimed for a Ukrainian state (Institute of National Remembrance, June 12, 2018). The IPN also estimates that up to 12,000 Ukrainians were killed in Polish attacks in retaliation. In 2016, the Polish parliament officially named the events the “Volyn Genocide” (Rzeczpospolita, July 22, 2016). In response, Ukraine’s Parliament released a statement framing the event as a “tragedy” and calling Poland’s decision to call it a genocide “a manifestation of the politicization of … Ukrainian–Polish history” (Verkhovna Rada, September 8, 2016). The Verkhovna Rada statement highlighted that Poles, including its Home Army, had also killed Ukrainians, both during Poland’s control of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia during the interwar period and in World War II. On June 19, Polish President Karol Nawrocki withdrew the Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state award, from Zelenskyy, which former Polish President Andrzej Duda awarded him in 2023. In Poland, one of the president’s main roles is to represent Poland to the world as its head of state, so Nawrocki, who is backed by the nationalist–conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, shapes much of Poland’s foreign policy (see EDM, July 10, 2025). Nawrocki said Poland may not support Ukraine’s accession to the European Union if the historical dispute was not resolved (Ukrainska Pravda, June 20). This triggered an escalating public diplomacy crisis between Ukraine and Poland, which hosts nearly a million Ukrainian refugees (UNHCR, April 14). Ukraine’s political elite rallied behind Zelenskyy by returning their own Polish honors, including former presidents Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Yushchenko, and Petro Poroshenko, a rival of Zelenskyy, Head of the Office of the President Kyrylo Budanov, Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha, and Ukraine’s Ambassador to Poland Vasyl Bondar (UNN, June 19; Suspilne, June 21). Poland’s government, currently led by the liberal Civic Coalition (KO) party, criticized Nawrocki’s approach. Prime Minister Donald Tusk said that Nawrocki and Ukraine’s leadership must “calm emotions, not … stoke tensions” (X/@donaldtusk, June 19). Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski said that the only winner of the dispute is Moscow, and has previously noted that Russia is “waging a full-scale cognitive war against” Poland (X/@MSZ_RP, June 8; X/@sikorskiradek, June 20). From June 25 to 26, Zelenskyy was absent at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Gdańsk. Poland had reportedly received a diplomatic note on Zelenskyy’s intention to attend (Rzeczpospolita, June 16). Tusk did not invite Nawrocki to this economic and investment forum (Dziennik, June 22; Ukrainska Pravda, June 23). Then, on July 2, Polish Defense Minister Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz said that Kyiv failed to deliver promised drone technology to Poland because, he believes, it is using a “conflict rooted in history … [to build] President Zelenskyy’s image” domestically (Reuters, July 2). This diplomatic crisis is happening alongside broader polarization in Polish attitudes toward Ukraine. In December 2025, 51 percent of Poles believed the current scale of assistance to Ukrainian refugees was too large, and 35 percent displayed a negative attitude toward Ukrainians in Poland (Mieroscewski Centre, January). On March 5, Poland implemented a new law that will roll back social benefits for Ukrainian refugees in phases (European Conservative, March 5). There has also been a spike in hate crimes against Ukrainians in recent months, with 30 percent more crimes reported in the first half of 2026 than the previous year (Rzeczpospolita, July 17). Russia Exploits Poland–Ukraine Dispute Warsaw and Kyiv’s national security teams issued warnings of Russia’s intent to exploit the dispute over historical narratives. On June 25, the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council’s Center for Countering Disinformation announced that Russia’s Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU) “may be preparing provocations using Polish symbols” in Ukraine timed for the Ukraine Recovery Conference to create “a rift between Poland and Ukraine” (X/@CforCD, June 25). On June 29, Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW) detained nine Ukrainians and two Belarusians for involvement in a Russian operation that paid Ukrainian refugees to hold protests in Poland to stoke tensions (Notes from Poland, June 29). In collaboration with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the operation uncovered five fake protests, which allegedly offered $100–$200 for one-time participation (Odessa Journal, July 3). A more ominous warning followed on July 3 when Polish media reported that U.S. intelligence had notified Warsaw of an increased threat of a Russian attack on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) eastern flank. According to sources in Nawrocki’s office, the next month could see a conventional Russian attack on Poland or the Baltic states, a drone strike, a simulated air attack, or a ground incursion under the pretext of a rescue mission or a false flag incident blamed on Ukraine. All threats would be designed to test NATO’s political response and curtail military aid for Ukraine without triggering military intervention (Telegraph; Onet, July 3). The next day, Ukraine’s Center for Countering Disinformation’s head Andriy Kovalenko said that Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) was preparing to publish forged World War II documents to undermine Polish–Ukrainian relations (Telegram/@Kovalenko, July 4). Moscow has amplified the historical dispute since it began, treating it as validation of Russia’s “denazification” narrative used to attempt to justify its war against Ukraine (X/@MedvedevRussiaE, June 19; RT, June 20). Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova described Kyiv’s embrace of the UPA as confirmation that they are “seasoned Nazis” (Izvestiya, June 29). Both OUN factions initially viewed Nazi Germany as a possible strategic partner against Poland and the Soviet Union to achieve Ukrainian statehood. The Nazis, however, quickly made it clear that they did not support Ukrainian independence. After the OUN-B proclaimed Ukrainian independence in Lviv on June 30, 1941, Nazi Germany rejected the declaration and moved to suppress the organization, arresting its leaders and forcing it underground. Bandera was imprisoned in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp from 1942 to 1944, and the Nazis sent Melnyk there in 1944, along with many other members of OUN (Plokhy, The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine, 2015). In early July, the FSB published what it describes as “declassified” archival documents about Dmytro Klyachkivsky, a senior UPA commander. The FSB claims he is responsible for the Volyn massacre, publishing a Soviet intelligence agent’s “eyewitness” account of the operation (TASS, July 4; Notes from Poland, July 6; FSB, accessed July 22). On the same day, a seemingly coordinated digital vandalism attack took place on Google Maps across Poland (Instagram/@the.warsaw2, July 6; EUalive, July 7). For example, the Museum of the Warsaw Uprising was renamed the “Museum of the Third Reich Uprising,” Stefan Żeromski Park was renamed “Stepan Bandera Park,” and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier was renamed the “Tomb of the Known SS Soldier.” Far-right nationalist groups also held a march in Krakow, with a graphic historical display of the Volyn atrocities (Radio Krakow, July 5). On July 6, Sikorski warned of the threat of a Russian “false flag operation.” He said that U.S. intelligence that indicated that Russia was preparing to create a pretext for invading Ukraine in 2022 stopped Moscow from pressing “the provocation button” (Polskie Radio, July 7). That warning, however, was effective because visible Russian military preparation was available, and because U.S. citizens were given clear instructions to leave Ukraine (Baltic Sentinel, July 5). On July 7, Budanov, the head of Zelenskyy’s office, said that he expected Ukrainian–Polish tensions to peak the following week, when Poland marked the National Day of Remembrance of Victims of the Volyn Tragedy (European Pravda, July 7). Russia’s actions that week were not limited to information warfare. It also compressed its schedule of mass missile attacks on Ukraine, with major strikes on Kyiv on July 1–2, 5–6, and 7 ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara (see EDM, July 6; OHCHR, July 2). Ballistic and surface-to-surface missiles struck Kyiv on July 11 before an air raid warning was issued (Ukrainska Pravda, July 11). Russian military pressure is unlikely to relent soon, as Russia takes advantage of Ukraine’s depleted anti-ballistic missile interceptor stocks and lead time before Patriot interceptors, licensed from the U.S. to Ukraine at the NATO summit on July 7, can be produced (Institute for the Study of War, July 6, 8). Zelenskyy and Nawrocki Begin to Ease Tensions In Warsaw, ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara, Sybiha proposed an anti-crisis strategy for Ukraine and Poland. Suggestions included “initiating consultations between our Ministries of Foreign Affairs, organizing a meeting of World War II expert historians who participated in the Polish–Ukrainian Congress of Historians in May, and reaching out to the religious leaders of both nations to leverage their authority in our bilateral dialogue” (X/@andrii_sybiha, July 4). In 2025, the countries made progress by organizing exhumations in the region (New York Times, September 9, 2025). On the last day of the Ankara summit, Zelenskyy met with Nawrocki. Zelenskyy said that they spoke for over an hour and that “We face one common threat: Russia” (X/@ZelenskyyyUa, July 8). Nawrocki said that though his position on Kyiv’s warming approach toward the UPA and OUN remains unchanged, “this does not preclude our dialogue—that is obvious in the world of diplomacy. We remain in dialogue and feel a common threat from the Russian Federation” (X/@Prezydentpl, July 8). Poland’s Sikorski dug in, thanking both heads of state for “so intensely trying to solve the problem that they themselves created” (X/@sikorskiradek, July 8). He also pushed back on comments made by Budanov, saying he told the Ukrainian foreign minister that “I think it is better to tone down the emotions, because Ukraine needs the West’s support, and Poland has done a lot for it” (Onet, July 8). The European Parliament also passed a resolution, filed by a Polish member of parliament from Tusk and Sikorski’s party, regarding Ukraine’s decision to honor the UPA. The resolution “regrets the recent unnecessary and unprovoked escalation” and expressed disapproval for “the disregard for Polish sensitivities and grief linked to the UPA’s estimated tens of thousands of victims and their families” (Euronews, July 8). On July 11, Nawrocki gave an address on the National Day of Remembrance for the massacre in Radruż, Podkarackie region (President of Poland, July 11). The president, also the former head of Poland’s National Institute of Remembrance, equated the UPA with Nazis and called for a legislative ban, saying that its red and black flag “has no place today, not only in Poland but also in a united Europe.” In an address on the same day, Zelenskyy emphasized Ukraine’s commitment to accelerate exhumations and commemorate the victims (President of Ukraine, July 11). The next day, Zelenskyy listed a range of domestic and foreign policy priorities, including neighbor relations “which require a new foundation, especially Poland and Hungary” (X/@ZelenskyyUa, July 12). Ukraine’s conciliatory posture may have marked the end of diplomatic escalation and Russia’s window for exploitation. Stanford University Professor Emeritus Norman Naimark’s speech on July 1 at the Warsaw East European Conference addressed this topic. He said, “The best way to deal with these matters [such as the killings in Volyn] is to leave them to historians’ commissions rather than hand them to politicians or even diplomats” (University of Warsaw, July 1).