Strengthening state presence in Colombia’s conflict

Strengthening state presence in Colombia’s conflict-affected territories Bottom lines up front - President Abelardo de la Espriella has prioritized restoring state authority in conflict-affected regions, where long-standing gaps in state presence have enabled armed groups to expand. - A security-first strategy can be paired with territorial development policies that strengthen state presence, expand legal economic opportunities, and address the conditions that enable armed groups to maintain control. - US-Colombia cooperation under the proposed $1 billion US assistance package should focus on civilian protection, rural investment, counternarcotics efforts, and preventing armed groups from recruiting children. Colombia’s security landscape has become increasingly fragmented, with multiple armed groups competing for territory, strategic corridors, and revenues from both legal and illicit economies. In many of the areas where these groups operate, communities also face persistent gaps in security, justice, connectivity, government services, and access to formal economic opportunities. President Abelardo de la Espriella has made restoring state authority and territorial control a central priority of his administration, recognizing the importance of extending the state’s reach into rural areas and fostering economic development. Following the August 10 earthquake, the government started to implement this focus into reconstruction efforts in Chocó, where the earthquake had its epicenter and compounded long-standing gaps in state presence. De la Espriella announced that the department would be the first area prioritized for the distribution of repair materials, an initial three-month rental subsidy for affected families, and the reconstruction of uninhabitable houses. These actions follow his inauguration address where he pledged to provide rural communities with “credit, technical assistance, roads, connectivity, security, effective state presence, and fair commercialization,” all key to making security gains more durable in historically underserved areas. The United States has already signaled its willingness to support the new administration’s efforts, announcing its intention to work with Congress on releasing a $1 billion assistance security package for Colombia. The announcement came on August 7, the day of de la Espriella’s inauguration. With one of its pillars focused on reclaiming, holding, and building state presence, this renewed partnership provides an opportunity to pair security efforts with stronger civilian institutions, basic services, infrastructure, and opportunities for alternative livelihoods. Over the past decade, successive Colombian governments have also pursued different approaches to security, rural development, and peacebuilding with similar goals in mind. Their experiences offer lessons that the new administration can use to develop efforts where gaps remain. The fifth session of the US-Colombia Strategic Alignment Coalition this year explored priorities for strengthening state presence and security in conflict-affected territories, as well as lessons from recent frameworks, including gaps in the implementation of the 2016 Peace Agreement and the missteps of the Gustavo Petro administration’s Total Peace (Paz Total) strategy. Coalition members and additional experts emphasized the importance of advancing strategies that confront armed groups and enable state institutions to reach communities where their presence has historically limited stability and living conditions. This session was held prior to the August 10 earthquake. The coalition is committed to deploying the various tools at its disposal to assist with focusing international attention on the response and recovery needs. The persistent gap in state presence From the mid-1960s, when the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army emerged, the limited reach of state institutions across much of rural Colombia gave these armed groups room to expand their territorial presence. Drug trafficking and illegal mining later increased the value of controlling those territories. To this day, many rural regions still lack the security-force presence needed to protect communities, and residents continue to face gaps in public services and access to the formal economy. This has diminished the credibility of the state in some of these areas, enabling these armed groups to act as de facto state institutions and weakening the rule of law. Armed groups use these vacuums to control communities, land and natural resources, and strategic routes to move drugs and other illicit goods. Successive governments have tried to weaken these groups through military operations, negotiations, or combinations of the two. However, efforts to weaken or demobilize specific organizations have not always been successful. A recent Atlantic Council issue brief examined how the criminal landscape in Colombia fragmented after the 2016 Peace Agreement, the challenges that have marked its implementation, and the shortcomings of the Petro administration’s Total Peace strategy. The Comprehensive Rural Reform of the agreement sought to address the historical gap in state presence and rural opportunity. Through the Development Programs with a Territorial Focus (Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial, or PDETs), it aimed to impact 170 municipalities across sixteen subregions affected by conflict, poverty, illicit economies, and institutional weakness. Communities, social organizations, and territorial authorities identified 33,007 initiatives, which were incorporated into sixteen Action Plans for Regional Transformation (Planes de Acción para la Transformación Regional, or PATR). Implementation, however, remains incomplete. As of March 2025, only 18,501 initiatives (56 percent of the total) had an active implementation pathway. These gaps in state presence and institutional capacity have been compounded by changing patterns of violence. Rather than a conflict dominated by one large insurgent organization, armed groups now split, reconfigure, form new alliances, and compete for territory and revenues from both legal and illicit economies. A recent study by Fundación Ideas para la Paz found that the combined ranks of Colombia’s main armed groups grew from 15,120 in late 2022 to 28,802 in July 2026. This increase occurred during the period in which the Petro administration pursued Total Peace, whose negotiations and ceasefires did not prevent armed groups from expanding. Over a similar period, the number of areas where armed groups were fighting for control doubled from seven to fourteen. In many of the territories where they operate, armed groups exercise authority over communities’ daily lives and economic activities. Through extortion and coercion, they control land, mining sites, and transportation routes. This gives them leverage over who can move or sell goods, while protecting and expanding the illicit economies that finance them. Confinement measures are also used by these groups to control communities and prevent access from rivals, the state, and even humanitarian organizations. They rely on curfews, armed strikes, illegal checkpoints, antipersonnel mines, and, in some regions, locally issued identification cards. OCHA, the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, recorded 416 restrictions on humanitarian access across Colombia in 2025, representing a 13 percent increase compared with 2024. The restrictions included attacks on medical missions and the theft of humanitarian vehicles. Armed strikes also force businesses to close and interrupt access to health care, education, and food. According to the International Committee of the Red Cross, over 170,000 people were confined across the country in 2025. Movement restrictions can raise the cost of food and other essential goods, cut residents off from jobs and markets, and delay public works and services that could support local development, especially in PDET municipalities, where multidimensional poverty affected 21.2 percent of the population in 2025. Criminal groups also target leaders who advocate for community needs. INDEPAZ documented the killing of 187 social leaders in 2025. Children face growing threats as well, with UNICEF estimating that armed groups recruit or use, on average, one child every twenty hours for illegal operations. Taken together, these challenges underscore that reducing armed groups’ control will require the state to reach these territories and remain there. De la Espriella framed this priority in his inauguration speech, saying that his government would be “of the regions and for the regions,” with the intention of “defeating narco-terrorism without respite.” Security operations can help open access to contested territories, but it will also be important to strengthen efforts aimed at working with local communities, supporting territorial development, and expanding legal economic opportunities. A June 2026 publication informed by the US-Colombia Strategic Alignment Coalition recommended a regionally differentiated security strategy and targeted investments to rebuild security-force readiness, including territorial brigades, air mobility, communications, and intelligence. Building on those priorities, the recommendations below identify initiatives that Colombia and the United States could advance under the state-presence pillar of the renewed bilateral agenda, with a focus on protecting communities, extending civilian institutions and basic services, and expanding opportunities in rural areas. Recommendations 1. Strengthen civilian-protection capabilities in disputed territories As the coalition recommended in a previous issue brief, civilian protection should be central to a territorially differentiated security strategy, especially in areas where illegal armed groups are actively competing for control. The fourteen contested areas account for nearly 80 percent of Colombia’s humanitarian impacts, including displacement, confinement, and restrictions on mobility and humanitarian access. US support could help modernize and expand the tools Colombia’s armed forces already have to respond to threats in contested territories. Priorities could include the following: 1) improving secure communications and information-sharing systems that turn the Ombudsman’s Office’s early warnings of armed group activity and attacks against communities into faster protection responses; 2) expanding air and river mobility to reach isolated communities when armed strikes, illegal checkpoints, clashes, or other coercive measures restrict access; and 3) enhancing equipment and training to detect and neutralize mines and other explosives that impede civilian movement and access to basic services. This last area could be part of humanitarian demining efforts identified as a priority for US assistance and can build on previous US State Department support in this area. Colombia could complement these efforts by expanding the presence and capabilities of the National Police’s Carabineros, its specialized rural police force, which patrols rural and agricultural areas. Strengthening the Carabineros could include increasing personnel in areas where the state establishes control from illegal actors and improving coordination with intelligence and judicial units. Together, these efforts could help security forces disrupt the tactics that armed groups use to intimidate communities and exercise local control, while creating the security conditions for public services to operate and remain in these territories. 2. Draw on existing community-identified territorial development initiatives and mobilize private-sector funding to advance regional priorities The de la Espriella administration has emphasized the importance of fostering rural development through expanded rural housing and access to land, infrastructure, and markets. The Miracle Countryside (Campo Milagro) strategy, in particular, seeks to increase agricultural productivity by expanding farmers’ access to land and pairing it with credits, technical assistance, irrigation, and stronger links to markets. The administration has also highlighted connectivity and training as important to expanding opportunities in rural communities. To help advance these priorities, the government could draw on the PATR as an existing pipeline of community-identified priorities in territories facing development and security challenges, prioritizing those that align with its rural agenda. By the end of 2025, the Territorial Renewal Agency (Agencia de Renovación de Territorio, ART) identified 3,436 structured projects without a financing source. The ART and the National Planning Department could work with departmental and municipal authorities to prioritize projects that could support the regional growth agenda, including those focused on rural roads, bridges, and river transport infrastructure; irrigation and drainage; and water, health, and education services. The Presidency’s Regions Office (Gerencia de Regiones) could help coordinate responsibilities, financing sources, and timelines with public and private institutions. Some could be considered for US assistance given their potential alignment with the US goal of supporting economic investments in high-threat regions as part of broader efforts to reclaim, hold, and build state presence. Works for Taxes (Obras por Impuestos) could be another tool to move more of these projects forward. The mechanism allows companies to direct resources associated with part of their income-tax obligations toward approved public investment projects in areas designated among those most affected by the armed conflict, including transportation, water and sanitation, energy, and other public infrastructure that supports local productive capacity. Vice President José Manuel Restrepo has proposed increasing by as much as fivefold the annual value of projects that can move forward through the mechanism. If advanced, ART could work with relevant ministries to include more finance-ready PATR initiatives into the Works for Taxes project bank. Because the mechanism can also cover projects in other municipalities affected by violence outside of PDET subregions, it could help mobilize private investment in a broader set of underserved territories. 3. Work with US counterparts to use fiscal year 2026 assistance to support vulnerable communities, including through post-earthquake reconstruction In February 2026, the US Congress appropriated $15 million under National Security Investment Programs for human rights activities in Colombia and an additional $25 million to support Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities. While the funds have been appropriated, a specific implementation strategy has not yet been announced. The de la Espriella administration could engage the US State Department to identify how these resources could support efforts to build state presence and advance economic opportunities in rural territories. As these funds are programmed, a part of the $25 million could support post-earthquake reconstruction in Colombia’s Pacific region, where many affected communities are Afro-Colombian and Indigenous. Priority investments could include water and sanitation systems for communities that still lack safe drinking water, electricity solutions where reliable grid coverage does not exist, reconstruction and improvement of health and education facilities, and connectivity for remote areas. Funding could also provide grants, equipment, and technical assistance to resume local commerce, tourism, or other community-based economic activities following the earthquake. Investment in river transport, roads, and other transportation infrastructure will also be key to ensuring that reconstruction efforts help address long-standing gaps that have left communities isolated from markets and public services. The human rights funding can be leveraged to support efforts aimed at protecting social and community leaders. This could include helping ethnic authorities and guards document threats, and raise cases with national institutions responsible for protection and prosecution, including the Ministry of Interior’s National Protection Unit and the Attorney General’s Office. The funding could also support initiatives from civil society organizations working in conflict-affected areas where ethnic communities are disproportionately impacted by the presence of armed groups. These efforts could include educational and extracurricular activities for children, legal and psychosocial assistance for community leaders, and systems to identify and track security risks. 4. Deepen child-recruitment prevention in high-risk areas under Law 2590 Weak state presence and limited educational and social opportunities have left children particularly vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups in Colombia’s conflict-affected territories. Children may be recruited through coercion and threats, but also due to economic hardship or separation from parents and caregivers. Armed groups have also increasingly used social media to lure children with false promises of employment and income. In July 2026, Colombia enacted Law 2590, which strengthens the country’s framework to prevent and respond to child recruitment. Among other measures, the law calls for the design of a national prevention plan and an accompanying National Council for Economic and Social Policy document to define its targets, funding, and implementation mechanisms. It also establishes a national observatory to consolidate information on recruitment risks and trends, creates national and local risk-response protocols, and requires prevention programs targeted for territories identified as at risk by the Ombudsman’s Office. As Colombia implements the law, the US State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) could provide technical assistance to institutions contributing to the observatory, particularly the National Police and the Attorney General’s Office, to strengthen recruitment-risk data collection and information-sharing. Building on previous INL efforts to strengthen Colombian law enforcement’s capacity to investigate the criminal exploitation of minors, assistance could place renewed emphasis on understanding and tracking how armed groups use social media platforms to recruit children. In doing so, Colombian authorities could be better equipped to develop prevention and protection strategies tailored to evolving recruitment threats, helping curb tactics armed groups use to expand and consolidate their territorial control. Conclusion Under de la Espriella, Colombia is entering a new phase in its effort to confront rising coca cultivation, expanding illicit economies, and ongoing violence. The challenge is no longer the demobilization of a single insurgent organization, but a fragmented landscape of illegal armed groups that compete for territory, control illicit economies, and exercise authority in areas where state institutions remain weak. This makes sustained state presence as important as debilitating these organizations and recovering territorial control. Military and law enforcement operations can create conditions for the state to reenter contested territories, but stronger public institutions, local governance, infrastructure, land formalization, private investment, and legal economic opportunities are essential to consolidating those gains and preventing criminal organizations from returning. Existing territorial programs and institutions provide Colombia with tools and experience that the new administration can adapt and expand. With renewed US support, Colombia has an opportunity to pursue an integrated territorial strategy that helps turn areas under armed-group influence into territories where the state can govern, legal economies can grow, and communities can build safer livelihoods. About the US-Colombia Strategic Alignment Coalition At a moment of renewed US focus on the Western Hemisphere and Colombia’s ongoing electoral cycle, the Atlantic Council launched the US–Colombia Strategic Alignment Coalition to help update and modernize the bilateral agenda and put forward recommendations for renewed cooperation across security, economic, and governance priorities. This coalition is the successor of the Atlantic Council’s US-Colombia Task Force originally established in 2017 under bipartisan US Senate leadership. Related content Explore the program The Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center broadens understanding of regional transformations and delivers constructive, results-oriented solutions to inform how the public and private sectors can advance hemispheric prosperity.