Train sped up after automatic warning system before fatal Bedford crash, Raib report reveals

A passenger train involved in a fatal crash near Bedford sped up after its automatic warning system (AWS) gave a red light, a Rail Accident Investigations Branch (Raib) interim report has revealed. It involved a four-car Class 360 electric multiple unit and a five-car Class 810 bi-mode multiple unit. The driver of train 1H46, 60-year-old Shaun Burton, died as a result of the accident. A total of 162 people were injured, 102 of whom required hospital treatment. Train 1H46, the 4.40pm East Midlands Railway service from Corby to London St Pancras, passed a red signal before colliding with train 1B67, the 3.50pm East Midlands Railway service from Nottingham to London St Pancras. Raib’s interim report has now revealed that train 1H46 sped up after passing the red signal. After the train left Bedford and crossed from the Up Slow to the Up Fast line at Bedford South Junction, it approached signal WH154 where Barton received and acknowledged an AWS warning associated with that signal, which was displaying red, Raib’s report detailed. Despite the acknowledgement, Raib’s downloaded data shows 1H46 continued to accelerate, reaching about 122 km/h before its driver first applied full‑service braking roughly 10 seconds before impact. Emergency braking followed about two seconds later with the on‑train recorder indicating the train was travelling around 80 km/h at the moment of collision. Train 1B67 had come to an unexpected stop beneath a signal gantry after an automatic emergency brake application. Data recovered from on‑train recorders and forward‑facing CCTV show that 1B67 came to a stand after its automatic warning system (AWS) generated a warning while the associated signal (WH154) was displaying green. The driver of 1B67 did not acknowledge that warning within the required 2.7 seconds and the train’s systems automatically applied the emergency brake. Raib detailed how the driver then contacted the signaller to report an AWS fault. On impact, both trains derailed, the leading cab of 1H46 and the rear cab of 1B67 became embedded together and the combined trainset shortened by between nine and 10m. Raib reported that signal WH154 is an automatic four‑aspect signal controlled from West Hampstead. It was not fitted with Train Protection and Warning System (TPWS) train‑stop loops. Under existing regulations and risk assessments, plain line automatic signals in this location were not required to have TPWS fitted. Network Rail’s most recent risk assessment placed WH154 in a low signal‑passed‑at‑danger (SPAD) risk category and it had not been recorded as showing red to any train earlier in 2026. The AWS system fitted to both trains should give a clear indication when a signal shows green and a warning indication when it shows any aspect other than green but Raib found that 1B67’s onboard equipment recorded an AWS warning while WH154 displayed green. TPWS was introduced in the late 1990s as an interim measure against SPADs and is not fitted in all locations or intended to be fail‑safe across the full range of speeds. AWS is a much older warning system that depends on correct track equipment positioning and consistent human response. Subsequent testing after a separate, similar event on 9 July found the AWS electromagnet at WH154 was positioned 16mm below railhead level, which is outside the specified tolerance and lower than the associated permanent magnet. Raib concluded there was no evidence the electromagnet was not energised. It further stated work is continuing to understand how the track equipment interacted with the train’s AWS. Raib also noted differences between the TPWS/TPWS‑panel arrangements on the two train types. The Class 810 unit involved had an “enhanced” TPWS control panel whose layout and alarm behaviour differ from more familiar standard panels. It was further noted witness evidence indicated the audible AWS/TPWS alarm in the 1B67 cab was not recognised by the driver or instructor and the AWS acknowledgement was not pressed before the automatic brake application. Raib emphasised this is an interim report and its investigation remains ongoing where it is continuing to examine why 1H46 passed signal WH154 at danger. It will also continue to investigate the performance and status of braking and safety systems on both trains, the precise behaviour of the AWS equipment at WH154, the reason 1B67 stopped and the crashworthiness of both units. Raib also intends to review the emergency response and the processes used by Network Rail to assess SPAD risk at the location. Have your say or a new account to join the discussion.