How has the "strategic relationship" that Venezuela and Cuba have maintained for years deteriorated after Maduro's capture?

How has the "strategic relationship" maintained between Venezuela and Cuba degraded over the years since Maduro's capture - Author, Ángel Bermúdez - Author Title, BBC News Mundo - Publication Date - Reading Time: 10 min Delcy Rodríguez's recent speech to the UN was the first in 20 years when the Venezuelan representative at the General Assembly debate did not mention Cuba even once. This is not a minor detail if one considers that Hugo Chávez once said that both countries were "one same nation" and had "one same government". In 2009, at that same forum, Chávez made 11 references to Cuba, while his successor, Nicolás Maduro, made 13 in his 2015 speech. The omission by the interim president of Venezuela is a sign of the complex state in which relations with Havana remain since the military incursion of January 3rd, when the United States detained Maduro. Less than two weeks later, Rodríguez claimed his country's right to maintain autonomous diplomatic relations. "We have the right to have diplomatic relations with China, with Russia, with Iran, with Cuba, with all the peoples of the world. Also with the United States. We are a sovereign nation," he said in a speech before the National Assembly. Nine months later, however, the bond between Caracas and Havana shows signs of weakening. "[Venezuela] is a friend country. Ally is a very strong word," said Cuba's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlos Fernández de Cossío, when asked about the relationship with Caracas in a recent interview with Bloomberg. This is the first official admission that the "strategic relationship" initially forged by Chávez and Fidel Castro has degraded. Doctors but also agents Since taking power in 1999, Chávez promoted a rapprochement with Cuba that evolved to a point where he described it as a "strategic alliance," a "brotherhood," and a "historical unity". This bond began to be forged with an agreement to sell Venezuelan oil to the island on preferential terms in exchange for the sending of Cuban personnel to cooperate in areas such as health, education, culture, and sports, among others. Cuban presence in Venezuela was especially visible in the health sector, with the incorporation of thousands of doctors to the Barrio Adentro mission, a social program that sought to bring primary care to the most needy communities. Although the doctors were the most evident symbol of Cuban cooperation, experts consider that the true differential factor of the relationship was the linkage of Cuban agents with Venezuela's security forces. "I would say that the most important element, the most important presence that Cuba had in Venezuela and no longer has is in the area of counterintelligence," he tells BBC Mundo's Frank Mora, a professor of international relations at the International University of Florida (FIU). He points out that after April 2002, Fidel Castro would have begun sending agents from the island to try to protect Chávez and prevent conspiracies within the Armed Forces. "There was a quite deep penetration within the armed forces and the state security of Venezuela by Cuba, to the point that Venezuela incorporated into itself the Cuban military doctrine of 'the war of the entire people'. This cooperation deepened in an extraordinary way, to the point that some people talked about the 'Cubanization' of the Bolivarian Armed Forces of Venezuela," adds Mora, who was also an ambassador and Pentagon official. The expert explains that the Cuban agents not only trained the Venezuelan counterintelligence forces but also had a presence and influence in everything related to counterintelligence and repression. Venezuelan security officials, as well as people who have been imprisoned in that country for political reasons, have testified to the presence and participation of Cuban agents in intelligence and repression work, especially through the General Directorate of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM). For years, Havana denied having security agents in Venezuela, something that was disproven during Maduro's capture, when at least 32 Cubans died, some of whom were members of both the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and the Ministry of Interior (MININT). Among the deceased Cubans were two colonels, a lieutenant colonel, four majors, and three captains, which would suggest they did not perform low-level security duties. In the press conference offered after that US operation, the US Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, said that Cuba "basically tried to colonize Venezuela from the point of view of security". Almost three weeks later, on January 22nd, the President of Cuba, Miguel Díaz-Canel, informed in an X message that he had had a phone conversation with Delcy Rodríguez, during which he expressed his support and solidarity, "as well as the decision to continue strengthening the historic relations of brotherhood and cooperation". Nine months later, what is the state of relations between Havana and Caracas? "Almost everything has changed" "Everything or almost everything has changed," Frank Mora replies to BBC Mundo. After January 3rd, while Delcy Rodríguez was in charge, Washington assumed control over the sale of Venezuelan oil and kept the tap closed for Cuba, a country that had not received Venezuelan crude since the end of 2025 due to the maritime blockade imposed by the US on the coasts of Venezuela. Regarding the presence of Cuban security agents in Venezuela, there has been no official information from any of the governments involved. In mid-January, the Cuban website 14ymedio reported at least six trips made between Caracas and Havana by Cubana de Aviación's Ilyushin IL-96-300 aircraft, the aircraft that had been used to transport the island to the wounded military personnel during the US operation. According to this Cuban media outlet, this four-engine plane has a capacity for about 300 passengers expandable to 400, so they estimated that about 2,500 Cubans could have been repatriated from Venezuela. One month later, the Reuters agency published a report based on the testimony of 11 different sources with knowledge of the matter, according to which Cuban security and medical agents were being evacuated from Venezuela due to Washington's pressures on Delcy Rodríguez. One of those sources assured that the Cuban officials had been removed from their positions within the DGCIM. Other sources pointed out that it was not clear whether the Cubans were being expelled by Rodríguez's government, if they were being called by Havana, or if they were leaving of their own will. "It is all very opaque. It is interesting that there is not much public information from the US about the changes being made to the security apparatus or the state. Everything is based on carefully orchestrated press releases," says John Polga-Hecimovich, an associate professor of Political Science at the US Naval Academy, who published a research on the relations between Cuba and Venezuela in 2020. The expert highlights that the "de-Cubanization" of Venezuela's state security is a priority for US intelligence and points out that "everything seems to indicate that they have succeeded in that task". Frank Mora, from FIU, told BBC Mundo that members of the Pentagon had told him that indeed the Cuban security agents had left Venezuela. In response to a BBC Mundo inquiry, a spokesperson from the State Department offered no concrete information on this matter but indicated that since January 3rd there has been "a drastic change in relations between the United States and Venezuela". "What was previously a country dominated by socialism, which prioritized bilateral relations with adversaries of the West, is now a nation with democracy on the horizon, as we continue to advance in the three-phase plan, filling Americans and Venezuelans with hope for the prospect of a prosperous region," he added. What does not seem to have changed as much is the presence of Cuban doctors in Venezuela, according to a recent investigation by Archivo Cuba, an NGO dedicated to documenting human rights violations on the island, as well as the international action of the Cuban government in other countries. "We have confirmed that the Cuban medical missions continue to operate in at least 22 states of Venezuela and, according to the Cuban government, after the earthquakes, they were present in the 24 states of Venezuela," says Maria Werlau, executive director of Archivo Cuba, to BBC Mundo. She indicates that the novelty in these months lies in the increase in the number of Cuban doctors who have abandoned this program to "flee to Colombia, Guyana" or to "stay hidden" in Venezuela. Meanwhile, the Cuban embassy in Venezuela remains active although there have been no public records of meetings between the ambassador and any member considered part of the hard core of the government, composed of Delcy Rodríguez, her brother and President of the National Assembly, Jorge Rodríguez, and the Minister of Interior, Diosdado Cabello, whom many Venezuelans refer to as the "triumvirate". A review of the press releases about Venezuela published by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveals meetings between the Cuban ambassador and Venezuelan governors, mayors, deputies, as well as social movements. Regarding the frequent trips that Maduro's cabinet officials used to make to Havana, in the current year, Cuban authorities have only provided information about a visit in April in which the Minister of Communication and Information, Miguel Pérez Pirela, participated. Allies or enemies The alliance between Chávez's Venezuela and Fidel Castro's Cuba was cemented in its "anti-imperialist" ideology and its opposition to capitalism and the US. From that perspective, Delcy Rodríguez's government made a 180-degree turn by aligning with the government of Donald Trump, while simultaneously maintaining the suspension of crude oil shipments to Cuba at a time when Havana desperately needs that fuel. Despite this radical change—which some Cuban activists have called "betrayal" on social media—the Díaz-Canel government has not publicly criticized Delcy Rodríguez. The harshest reaction to date was a Facebook post where the Cuban Minister of Economy and Planning, Joaquín Alonso Vázquez, suggested that Rodríguez had committed "treason". "Treason only has one name: treason," the official wrote as a comment to a post that criticized Rodríguez for not reacting to the UN speech in which Trump called Nicolás Maduro "criminal". This post was subsequently hidden or deleted. But why does the Cuban government, known for its vehement verbal attacks against its political adversaries, not exhibit that tone with Delcy Rodríguez? Javier Corrales, a political science professor at Amherst College in the US, believes that although Cuba misses Venezuelan oil aid, there is no enmity with Caracas. "I do not believe there is a rupture in the sense of animosity necessarily. There must have been a huge initial shock, but I think they believe that despite how bad it could have been, this outcome is not so bad," he tells BBC Mundo. Frank Mora considers that Havana is focused on surviving its own crisis and that, at the same time, it very well understands the pressures Delcy Rodríguez faces from the US. In this context, furthermore, Cuba gains nothing by attacking Venezuela, whose government has ceased to be a forced ally by circumstance. Nícmer Evans, a Venezuelan political scientist and editor of the Punto de Corte platform, highlights that historically Cuba's strategy has been to never detach itself from its current, past, or possible allies. "They will always try to maintain or rescue the relationship. Perhaps they are not reaching the hard core of the triumvirate now because the circumstances do not help, but I do not think they have abandoned their link with sectors of Chavismo," he tells BBC Mundo. That strategy of not burning bridges can be really useful in a context like the current one, where the political change in Venezuela is not guaranteed and where, in fact, the possible transition seems to depend largely on the will of the Trump government to promote it. From that perspective, both Havana and Caracas would be playing to gain time to see if they can last until a change of government in Washington that—without Trump at the helm—would give them the opportunity to reestablish ties.