DN Debate. "The Red Sea is so much more than just pirates"

DN Debate. "The Red Sea is much more than just pirates" DN DEBATE. The Red Sea region is one of the most unstable areas in the world, a geopolitical battlefield with conflicts bubbling up in all directions. Last week, Houthi rebels took control of the Bab el-Mandeb strait, a maritime passage of greater significance for Europe than the Persian Gulf. Yet we underestimate the risks, write the African experts Fredrik Meiton and Lisa Boström. This is an opinion piece in Dagens Nyheter. The writer is responsible for the opinions in the article. Get more from DN as a logged-in Do you know you can create a free account on DN? As a logged-in user you can access several smart features. The United Nations Institute for Human Rights (UNHRI) and CMI – Martti Ahtisaari Peace Foundation recently assembled an expert group to discuss the security situation in the Red Sea region. What is the significance of the conflicts for Sweden and the Nordic countries? And what can we do to contribute to stability and peace in the region? The conclusion was clear: Europe – and the Nordics – underestimate what is happening in one of the world's most strategically important maritime areas. Since last week, the Houthi rebels control the strategic strait of Bab el-Mandeb in the southern reaches of the Red Sea. This will affect all of Europe, especially Sweden. Just over a tenth of world trade passes through the sea annually. The largest part, valued as much as Sweden's GDP, consists of goods trade between Europe and Asia. With the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi Arabia has redirected its oil exports so that most of it now flows through the Red Sea, a solution that has now become unsustainable. The result is higher energy prices in an already strained situation with its dwindling reserves of both oil and gas. But even if the Houthi are the most acute threat, the problem is much larger. No single power dominates. Instead, we see a growing number of local conflicts that are increasingly intertwined with each other and with the ambitions of regional and global powers to dominate this strategically important region. The USA, France, Italy, Japan, and China all have military bases in Djibouti, whose coast forms the southern side of the narrow Bab el-Mandeb strait. Turkey's largest foreign military base is located in its neighboring Somalia, Russia seeks a foothold in Port Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates is operating ports in Somaliland and seeks to establish more along the coast. Simplified, the region can be divided into two loose groupings. On one side are the United Arab Emirates, Israel, and Ethiopia, which all pursue an aggressive foreign policy and are often accused of not respecting the sovereignty of other states. In December 2025, Israel recognized Somaliland as an independent state, with the stated aim of securing maritime chokepoints in the Adenvatic and Bab el-Mandeb. The confrontation with Iran in the summer of 2025, and the Houthis' naval blockade of ships heading to Israeli ports, had exposed the vulnerability of the southern sea lanes. Somaliland offered a base within reach for the Houthi goals on the other side of the strait. For the Emirates, the Red Sea region is a crucial battlefield in the rivalry with Saudi Arabia and an important source of gold and other natural resources. Ethiopia, in turn, wants to regain direct access to the sea, which the country lost when Eritrea gained independence 35 years ago. On the other side is a constellation consisting of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey, Qatar, and Somalia, all of whom oppose the recognition of Somaliland and are concerned about the expansion of the Emirates and Israel in the region. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates have supported different sides in the wars in both Yemen and Sudan, and the conflict over Somaliland has deepened the rift between them. Turkey, in turn, has strengthened its military and economic presence along the entire Red Sea corridor, especially in Somalia and Sudan, and is seen by many as a competitor to the Emirates and Israel. In January 2026, Turkey sent fighter jets to Somalia, just days after Israel recognized Somaliland. Egypt, which is already in a deep diplomatic conflict with Ethiopia over the Nile and the Grand Renaissance Dam, has formed a security pact with Eritrea and Somalia as a counterweight to Ethiopia's ambitions. This creates space for warlords and state actors to seize territory through what is called conflict economies – systems where instability itself generates power and income. Behind the geopolitical rivalry lies a deeper problem: state decay. In countries like Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen, the government lacks both capacity and legitimacy. This creates space for warlords and state actors to seize territory through what is called conflict economies – systems where instability itself generates power and income. In parallel, external actors invest in ports, agriculture, and mining in a way that is intimately intertwined with military and political influence. Israel's vision for a network of like-minded states along the maritime routes, the Emirates' growing port empire, and the rivalry with Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia's quest for coastal access, and the desire of all actors to secure their access to the region's natural resources – all this affects the stability of an area to which Europe is deeply dependent. The threat from the Houthis is therefore just a symptom of a deeper problem, namely a regional – and growing – conflict complex. In Europe and Sweden, the Red Sea is regarded as too narrow, as a matter of trade routes and energy supply. European efforts have not sufficiently focused on the political and economic drivers behind the instability. Maritime freedom is crucial, but focusing solely on that is insufficient if the goal is long-term stability. Within the foreign ministries of all of Europe, Africa and the Middle East are still divided into separate entities – leaving common geopolitical areas like the Red Sea without coherent analysis and response. We should think differently here. Our foreign ministries need to coordinate internally and with each other on this issue. Within the foreign ministries of all of Europe, Africa and the Middle East are still divided into separate entities. For the Nordic countries, the need for coordinated action is obvious. We share interests, values, and – above all – security-political vulnerabilities. Information exchange and coordination would enable joint analysis and policy responses and lay the foundation for long-term engagement in the region. We need to invest in deeper geo-economic analysis of the financial flows of conflict economies, and support regional governance structures that enable dialogue between coastal states and other stakeholders. At the same time, there is a growing need for deeper strategic dialogue between the Nordics and the Gulf States. The war in Ukraine and the recent confrontation with Iran have shown that both regions are increasingly facing similar challenges: fragmented political environments, vulnerability regarding energy and shipping flows, and reduced trust in previous security structures and partnerships. This also creates opportunities for mutual exchange and closer cooperation on regional security and resilience. The Red Sea region may be geographically distant, but it is at the very highest degree a present factor for European and Nordic security and for our role as a global peace and security actor.