Opinion: Huawei trial opens in Brooklyn as DOJ drops some charges

- Huawei’s historic RICO trial starts Tuesday in Brooklyn - DOJ has dropped two IEEPA counts and a trade-secret predicate at the last minute - A conviction could hurt Huawei — but the developing world may pay a higher price China’s telecom and technology megacompany Huawei Technologies goes on trial in Brooklyn Tuesday. But the case the Department of Justice will put before the jury is already smaller than it was last week. In a September 4 filing obtained by FNTV, prosecutors told U.S. District Judge Ann Donnelly they will not proceed at trial on Counts Eleven and Twelve of the April 2026 Fourth Superseding Indictment. DOJ has also dropped, for this trial, a trade-secret episode involving an anonymous “Company 2” as a racketeering predicate. That leaves 12 of the 14 counts listed in the April indictment still on the docket. This doesn’t mean the prosecution is collapsing. It means the government has simplified a sprawling case built from events spread across decades and countries. The bigger issue is what happens if Washington wins. A conviction would not automatically put Huawei on the Treasury Department’s naughty list — AKA the Specially Designated Nationals list — or cut it off from global banking. But it would give Washington a stronger platform for punitive action against a company that countries around the globe — including much of the developing world — rely on to keep critical communications infrastructure running. Hello Moto, goodbye Moto The identity of anonymous “Company 2” is almost certainly Motorola. Huawei and Motorola settled their civil dispute in 2011; the remaining Motorola/Lemko litigation was resolved in 2012. Taking it out undeniably weakens a prominent leg of the government’s attempt to portray Huawei as an enterprise engaged in a long-running pattern of criminal conduct. And the DOJ has already failed to deliver another much-anticipated charge. Washington has spent years portraying Huawei as a national-security threat. Yet when it finally brought its criminal case, a standalone espionage charge was nowhere on the docket. That creates an awkward logic bomb at the heart of the prosecution. Carriers around the world have been pressured to rip out Huawei equipment on the grounds that the company poses a Chinese state-security risk. Governments have spent or committed billions of dollars replacing perfectly functioning infrastructure on that premise. Those same operators are now entitled to ask the obvious question: if Huawei is dangerous enough to justify ripping it out of national networks at enormous cost, why isn’t espionage actually one of the crimes DOJ is prosecuting here in Brooklyn? Why RICO matters No spy charges, then. Instead, Huawei is charged with RICO conspiracy. Prosecutors favor RICO because they think it makes them sound tough -- and because it provides a broad framework for presenting an alleged pattern of coordinated conduct. Of course, the government still has to prove the conspiracy. But RICO lets prosecutors wrap up bank fraud, trade-secret allegations and sanctions conduct all in one legal binder. A conviction would not automatically trigger secondary sanctions. But it could strengthen Washington’s hand if it later chose to implement wider restrictions on Huawei’s access to the dollar-based global financial system. And that is where the courtroom collides with the world’s networks. Huawei says its technology serves more than 7,100 financial institutions in more than 80 countries and regions, including 54 of the world’s top 100 banks. Suppose Washington wins and later imposes restrictions broad enough to interfere with Huawei maintenance, support or software payments. A router in a Lagos bank branch does not vanish because a jury in Brooklyn says “guilty.” A financial network does not conveniently replace itself. Ipso facto, as the dozens of lawyers now camped out at the Brooklyn Marriott might say, financial institutions around the world could find themselves in the ironic position of being legally barred from handling money for the company that supplies their own essential infrastructure. America quit the field America spent years telling countries why they should not buy Chinese technology. China spent those same years doubling down on helping them build networks — and making itself a well-regarded strategic ally at the same time. Huawei made products other countries – especially those in the Global South – could afford. Chinese financing helped operators buy them. Infrastructure got deployed. A lot of infrastructure. Today Huawei operates in more than 170 countries and regions, and Chinese-built communications infrastructure has become the de facto choice across large parts of the developing world, including much of sub-Saharan Africa. (I can testify to Huawei’s presence first-hand. Everywhere I go — from Marrakesh to Mumbai, from the Congo to Cairo — Huawei equipment is ubiquitous). If America wants countries to replace Huawei, somebody will need to provide, finance and install the equipment. Does America want to? It has shown precious little appetite for that kind of responsibility. The retreat from the large-scale generosity that had been an important part of postwar American foreign policy accelerated after Carter, and into the Reagan era, as power, markets and military muscle took an increasingly prominent role. Today, that instinct has curdled into something much darker. America’s most visible overseas export often appears to be war. Not bits and bytes, but bullets and bombs. The people most exposed to the second-order effects of a possible USG win will not be sitting in Brooklyn. They are the professionals within banks, mobile networks, hospitals, schools, utilities, and businesses in countries where Chinese equipment helped make connectivity affordable. And beyond those workers, the hundreds of millions of consumers for whom Huawei is not primarily a totem for U.S.-China friction; it is part of the digital superhighway leading to a more robust economy and a better quality of life. If later American sanctions make those networks more expensive to maintain or harder to upgrade, Huawei will not be the only organization paying the price. Developing economies will be punished, too. So the real question is not whether Huawei scores a Brooklyn victory (how sweet it is!) or loses (fuggedaboutit!), it is whether Washington understands the consequences of its actions if it wins. The U.S. has recently demonstrated a spectacular inability to prioritize long-term thinking over knee-jerk reaction — see Pete Hegseth, the Strait of Vermouth, and America’s Three-Stooges-inspired Iran War. A RICO conviction would plainly be very bad for Huawei. Follow it with poorly designed financial restrictions and the damage could spread much further — slowing developing economies, alienating governments America wants as partners in the new digital and AI economy, and accelerating the already widening gulf (not of Hormuz; that one stays closed) between America and the rest of the world. Winning the case is one thing. Having a cogent plan that doesn’t backfire massively on the U.S. in a year or so’s time is quite another. Catch up on my previous coverage of the communications industry’s trial of the century - Opinion: Watch out, Ray. It's the Feds! - Opinion: The gaping hole in America's case against Huawei - Opinion: Let's get ready to RICO! - Opinion: Huawei: They may rip out our networks, but they'll never take our patents! - Inside Huawei's Evolving Innovation Strategy Stephen M. Saunders MBE is a communications analyst and USPTO-registered inventor examining how digital infrastructure — 5G, cloud and AI — is reshaping industry, power and society, as well as underpinning the emerging, ubiquitous global digital economy. As anchor of FNTV and a longtime industry insider, he focuses less on growth narratives and more on execution, risk and how hyperscale technology is distorting markets, governance and society at scale. Opinion pieces from industry experts, analysts or our editorial staff do not represent the opinions of Fierce Network.