The Management of Business Risk Management

Table of ContentsToggleSpring 2026 started off slowly for seeding. Between last minute changes to crop plans and inconsistent weather conditions, nothing about 2026 is shaping up to be familiar. The primary concern with delayed seeding is thedirect yield impact: less time in soil means less growth.Geopolitical conflictscan impact management decisions needed to coddle that seed, too, forcing farmers to rank risks to production based on its overall impact. Increasingly, this moves farmers towards businessriskmanagement programs to maintain their operation.Immediate vs. UnnecessaryWhich options are undertaken to respond to a given farm risk partially depends on the farmer’s attitude or opinion regarding the risk. Although in general practice it is assumed that risks are considered holistically with the entirety of the supply chain in mind, the reality is that some threats to production elicit irrational, reactionary responses. As a result, risk response can be split into three main behaviours:There is no single correct way to respond to production risks as, beyond perception of the impacts, response can be governed by what the farm can feasibly do to lessen the impacts. Unpredictable weather and the events caused as a result such as wildfires,drought, and winter loss are frequently behind extraordinary loss, making them the basis for immediate government assistance, behind 16 out of 19 AgriRecovery triggers since 2021.AgriRecoveryis not the only business risk management program (BRM), nor are BRMs the onlyfunding available for farmersto recoup financial losses however, which programs are applicable to the situation, the limitations of participation or gaps in coverage, and how likely the farmer is to enter the same program the following year can impact agricultural resiliency.PurposeApplication TimingCompensationCost-sharedAgriInsurancestabilization against severe, natural production lossesPre-losspayment triggered (based on premium paid) when experience production lossFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriInvestsavings account; protection from small income declinesPre-lossgovernment matches 1% of allowable net sales depositedFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriRecoveryrecover from extraordinary (abnormal) natural disaster lossPost-lossgovernment pays applicants based on collective costs and management capacityFederal + ProvincialAgriStabilityprotection from large income declinesPost-loss80% of loss repaid for every dollar of production margin 30% below historical marginFederal + ProvincialCatch-22 of Short Term ReliefBRMs were designed to fit with other management options like best practices. The decision to usebest practices is, in itself, proactive management, as the preparedness for loss and opportunity for cushioning are indirectly considered. Opting into BRMs are considered reactionary because the farmer isfocused on recoveryfrom a loss that has already happened. When farmers are focused on recovery, understandably, very little mental, financial, or physical effort can be given to safeguarding the fields from future risks.For example, droughts have become an increasingly noticeable issue for Canadian production as climate change worsens and, in some regions, farmers have consistently seendrought-related lossesfor over a decade. However, BRMs are not designed to trigger annually and by doing so, it has created a system thatdisincentivizes on-farm improvement. In truth, management behaviours do not change unless farmers areforced to respond, and the farm does not have to meaningfully respond to compensation payments. It can similarly bedifficult to preparefor disaster when the most effective options are BRMs.Input costs are some of the most volatile and highest costs facing Canadian farmers in 2026,weakening the marginsproducers can expect. In theory, such shouldencourage research and development investmentinto realistic farm solutions but the increase in federal-provincial payouts over the last few years signals the opposite. Byasking for BRM improvementfeedback for the 2028-2032 federal funding cycle and simultaneouslyremoving federal agricultural researchprograms, true resiliency does not seem to be viable.Concluding RemarksIn the first half of 2026, governments have turned their focus to macro, conflict-driven supply chain disruptions, forgetting that Canadian farmers are struggling to adapt to new production realities in their own fields. When the risk management structure is cyclical the way it is, it makes it very difficult for farmers to break BRM reliance and protect themselves from extraordinary loss. Unfortunately, by creating an environment of compensation dependency, governments cannot be surprised when the costs of these programs balloon and productivity falls. Table of ContentsToggleSpring 2026 started off slowly for seeding. Between last minute changes to crop plans and inconsistent weather conditions, nothing about 2026 is shaping up to be familiar. The primary concern with delayed seeding is thedirect yield impact: less time in soil means less growth.Geopolitical conflictscan impact management decisions needed to coddle that seed, too, forcing farmers to rank risks to production based on its overall impact. Increasingly, this moves farmers towards businessriskmanagement programs to maintain their operation.Immediate vs. UnnecessaryWhich options are undertaken to respond to a given farm risk partially depends on the farmer’s attitude or opinion regarding the risk. Although in general practice it is assumed that risks are considered holistically with the entirety of the supply chain in mind, the reality is that some threats to production elicit irrational, reactionary responses. As a result, risk response can be split into three main behaviours:There is no single correct way to respond to production risks as, beyond perception of the impacts, response can be governed by what the farm can feasibly do to lessen the impacts. Unpredictable weather and the events caused as a result such as wildfires,drought, and winter loss are frequently behind extraordinary loss, making them the basis for immediate government assistance, behind 16 out of 19 AgriRecovery triggers since 2021.AgriRecoveryis not the only business risk management program (BRM), nor are BRMs the onlyfunding available for farmersto recoup financial losses however, which programs are applicable to the situation, the limitations of participation or gaps in coverage, and how likely the farmer is to enter the same program the following year can impact agricultural resiliency.PurposeApplication TimingCompensationCost-sharedAgriInsurancestabilization against severe, natural production lossesPre-losspayment triggered (based on premium paid) when experience production lossFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriInvestsavings account; protection from small income declinesPre-lossgovernment matches 1% of allowable net sales depositedFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriRecoveryrecover from extraordinary (abnormal) natural disaster lossPost-lossgovernment pays applicants based on collective costs and management capacityFederal + ProvincialAgriStabilityprotection from large income declinesPost-loss80% of loss repaid for every dollar of production margin 30% below historical marginFederal + ProvincialCatch-22 of Short Term ReliefBRMs were designed to fit with other management options like best practices. The decision to usebest practices is, in itself, proactive management, as the preparedness for loss and opportunity for cushioning are indirectly considered. Opting into BRMs are considered reactionary because the farmer isfocused on recoveryfrom a loss that has already happened. When farmers are focused on recovery, understandably, very little mental, financial, or physical effort can be given to safeguarding the fields from future risks.For example, droughts have become an increasingly noticeable issue for Canadian production as climate change worsens and, in some regions, farmers have consistently seendrought-related lossesfor over a decade. However, BRMs are not designed to trigger annually and by doing so, it has created a system thatdisincentivizes on-farm improvement. In truth, management behaviours do not change unless farmers areforced to respond, and the farm does not have to meaningfully respond to compensation payments. It can similarly bedifficult to preparefor disaster when the most effective options are BRMs.Input costs are some of the most volatile and highest costs facing Canadian farmers in 2026,weakening the marginsproducers can expect. In theory, such shouldencourage research and development investmentinto realistic farm solutions but the increase in federal-provincial payouts over the last few years signals the opposite. Byasking for BRM improvementfeedback for the 2028-2032 federal funding cycle and simultaneouslyremoving federal agricultural researchprograms, true resiliency does not seem to be viable.Concluding RemarksIn the first half of 2026, governments have turned their focus to macro, conflict-driven supply chain disruptions, forgetting that Canadian farmers are struggling to adapt to new production realities in their own fields. When the risk management structure is cyclical the way it is, it makes it very difficult for farmers to break BRM reliance and protect themselves from extraordinary loss. Unfortunately, by creating an environment of compensation dependency, governments cannot be surprised when the costs of these programs balloon and productivity falls. Table of ContentsToggle Table of ContentsToggle Spring 2026 started off slowly for seeding. Between last minute changes to crop plans and inconsistent weather conditions, nothing about 2026 is shaping up to be familiar. The primary concern with delayed seeding is thedirect yield impact: less time in soil means less growth.Geopolitical conflictscan impact management decisions needed to coddle that seed, too, forcing farmers to rank risks to production based on its overall impact. Increasingly, this moves farmers towards businessriskmanagement programs to maintain their operation.Immediate vs. UnnecessaryWhich options are undertaken to respond to a given farm risk partially depends on the farmer’s attitude or opinion regarding the risk. Although in general practice it is assumed that risks are considered holistically with the entirety of the supply chain in mind, the reality is that some threats to production elicit irrational, reactionary responses. As a result, risk response can be split into three main behaviours:There is no single correct way to respond to production risks as, beyond perception of the impacts, response can be governed by what the farm can feasibly do to lessen the impacts. Unpredictable weather and the events caused as a result such as wildfires,drought, and winter loss are frequently behind extraordinary loss, making them the basis for immediate government assistance, behind 16 out of 19 AgriRecovery triggers since 2021.AgriRecoveryis not the only business risk management program (BRM), nor are BRMs the onlyfunding available for farmersto recoup financial losses however, which programs are applicable to the situation, the limitations of participation or gaps in coverage, and how likely the farmer is to enter the same program the following year can impact agricultural resiliency.PurposeApplication TimingCompensationCost-sharedAgriInsurancestabilization against severe, natural production lossesPre-losspayment triggered (based on premium paid) when experience production lossFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriInvestsavings account; protection from small income declinesPre-lossgovernment matches 1% of allowable net sales depositedFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriRecoveryrecover from extraordinary (abnormal) natural disaster lossPost-lossgovernment pays applicants based on collective costs and management capacityFederal + ProvincialAgriStabilityprotection from large income declinesPost-loss80% of loss repaid for every dollar of production margin 30% below historical marginFederal + ProvincialCatch-22 of Short Term ReliefBRMs were designed to fit with other management options like best practices. The decision to usebest practices is, in itself, proactive management, as the preparedness for loss and opportunity for cushioning are indirectly considered. Opting into BRMs are considered reactionary because the farmer isfocused on recoveryfrom a loss that has already happened. When farmers are focused on recovery, understandably, very little mental, financial, or physical effort can be given to safeguarding the fields from future risks.For example, droughts have become an increasingly noticeable issue for Canadian production as climate change worsens and, in some regions, farmers have consistently seendrought-related lossesfor over a decade. However, BRMs are not designed to trigger annually and by doing so, it has created a system thatdisincentivizes on-farm improvement. In truth, management behaviours do not change unless farmers areforced to respond, and the farm does not have to meaningfully respond to compensation payments. It can similarly bedifficult to preparefor disaster when the most effective options are BRMs.Input costs are some of the most volatile and highest costs facing Canadian farmers in 2026,weakening the marginsproducers can expect. In theory, such shouldencourage research and development investmentinto realistic farm solutions but the increase in federal-provincial payouts over the last few years signals the opposite. Byasking for BRM improvementfeedback for the 2028-2032 federal funding cycle and simultaneouslyremoving federal agricultural researchprograms, true resiliency does not seem to be viable.Concluding RemarksIn the first half of 2026, governments have turned their focus to macro, conflict-driven supply chain disruptions, forgetting that Canadian farmers are struggling to adapt to new production realities in their own fields. When the risk management structure is cyclical the way it is, it makes it very difficult for farmers to break BRM reliance and protect themselves from extraordinary loss. Unfortunately, by creating an environment of compensation dependency, governments cannot be surprised when the costs of these programs balloon and productivity falls. Spring 2026 started off slowly for seeding. Between last minute changes to crop plans and inconsistent weather conditions, nothing about 2026 is shaping up to be familiar. The primary concern with delayed seeding is thedirect yield impact: less time in soil means less growth.Geopolitical conflictscan impact management decisions needed to coddle that seed, too, forcing farmers to rank risks to production based on its overall impact. Increasingly, this moves farmers towards businessriskmanagement programs to maintain their operation. Spring 2026 started off slowly for seeding. Between last minute changes to crop plans and inconsistent weather conditions, nothing about 2026 is shaping up to be familiar. The primary concern with delayed seeding is thedirect yield impact: less time in soil means less growth.Geopolitical conflictscan impact management decisions needed to coddle that seed, too, forcing farmers to rank risks to production based on its overall impact. Increasingly, this moves farmers towards businessriskmanagement programs to maintain their operation. Spring 2026 started off slowly for seeding. Between last minute changes to crop plans and inconsistent weather conditions, nothing about 2026 is shaping up to be familiar. The primary concern with delayed seeding is thedirect yield impact: less time in soil means less growth.Geopolitical conflictscan impact management decisions needed to coddle that seed, too, forcing farmers to rank risks to production based on its overall impact. Increasingly, this moves farmers towards businessriskmanagement programs to maintain their operation. Spring 2026 started off slowly for seeding. Between last minute changes to crop plans and inconsistent weather conditions, nothing about 2026 is shaping up to be familiar. The primary concern with delayed seeding is thedirect yield impact: less time in soil means less growth.Geopolitical conflictscan impact management decisions needed to coddle that seed, too, forcing farmers to rank risks to production based on its overall impact. Increasingly, this moves farmers towards businessriskmanagement programs to maintain their operation. Spring 2026 started off slowly for seeding. Between last minute changes to crop plans and inconsistent weather conditions, nothing about 2026 is shaping up to be familiar. The primary concern with delayed seeding is thedirect yield impact: less time in soil means less growth.Geopolitical conflictscan impact management decisions needed to coddle that seed, too, forcing farmers to rank risks to production based on its overall impact. Increasingly, this moves farmers towards businessriskmanagement programs to maintain their operation. Immediate vs. UnnecessaryWhich options are undertaken to respond to a given farm risk partially depends on the farmer’s attitude or opinion regarding the risk. Although in general practice it is assumed that risks are considered holistically with the entirety of the supply chain in mind, the reality is that some threats to production elicit irrational, reactionary responses. As a result, risk response can be split into three main behaviours: Immediate vs. UnnecessaryWhich options are undertaken to respond to a given farm risk partially depends on the farmer’s attitude or opinion regarding the risk. Although in general practice it is assumed that risks are considered holistically with the entirety of the supply chain in mind, the reality is that some threats to production elicit irrational, reactionary responses. As a result, risk response can be split into three main behaviours: Immediate vs. UnnecessaryWhich options are undertaken to respond to a given farm risk partially depends on the farmer’s attitude or opinion regarding the risk. Although in general practice it is assumed that risks are considered holistically with the entirety of the supply chain in mind, the reality is that some threats to production elicit irrational, reactionary responses. As a result, risk response can be split into three main behaviours: Immediate vs. Unnecessary Which options are undertaken to respond to a given farm risk partially depends on the farmer’s attitude or opinion regarding the risk. Although in general practice it is assumed that risks are considered holistically with the entirety of the supply chain in mind, the reality is that some threats to production elicit irrational, reactionary responses. As a result, risk response can be split into three main behaviours: Which options are undertaken to respond to a given farm risk partially depends on the farmer’s attitude or opinion regarding the risk. Although in general practice it is assumed that risks are considered holistically with the entirety of the supply chain in mind, the reality is that some threats to production elicit irrational, reactionary responses. As a result, risk response can be split into three main behaviours: There is no single correct way to respond to production risks as, beyond perception of the impacts, response can be governed by what the farm can feasibly do to lessen the impacts. Unpredictable weather and the events caused as a result such as wildfires,drought, and winter loss are frequently behind extraordinary loss, making them the basis for immediate government assistance, behind 16 out of 19 AgriRecovery triggers since 2021.AgriRecoveryis not the only business risk management program (BRM), nor are BRMs the onlyfunding available for farmersto recoup financial losses however, which programs are applicable to the situation, the limitations of participation or gaps in coverage, and how likely the farmer is to enter the same program the following year can impact agricultural resiliency.PurposeApplication TimingCompensationCost-sharedAgriInsurancestabilization against severe, natural production lossesPre-losspayment triggered (based on premium paid) when experience production lossFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriInvestsavings account; protection from small income declinesPre-lossgovernment matches 1% of allowable net sales depositedFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriRecoveryrecover from extraordinary (abnormal) natural disaster lossPost-lossgovernment pays applicants based on collective costs and management capacityFederal + ProvincialAgriStabilityprotection from large income declinesPost-loss80% of loss repaid for every dollar of production margin 30% below historical marginFederal + Provincial There is no single correct way to respond to production risks as, beyond perception of the impacts, response can be governed by what the farm can feasibly do to lessen the impacts. Unpredictable weather and the events caused as a result such as wildfires,drought, and winter loss are frequently behind extraordinary loss, making them the basis for immediate government assistance, behind 16 out of 19 AgriRecovery triggers since 2021.AgriRecoveryis not the only business risk management program (BRM), nor are BRMs the onlyfunding available for farmersto recoup financial losses however, which programs are applicable to the situation, the limitations of participation or gaps in coverage, and how likely the farmer is to enter the same program the following year can impact agricultural resiliency.PurposeApplication TimingCompensationCost-sharedAgriInsurancestabilization against severe, natural production lossesPre-losspayment triggered (based on premium paid) when experience production lossFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriInvestsavings account; protection from small income declinesPre-lossgovernment matches 1% of allowable net sales depositedFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriRecoveryrecover from extraordinary (abnormal) natural disaster lossPost-lossgovernment pays applicants based on collective costs and management capacityFederal + ProvincialAgriStabilityprotection from large income declinesPost-loss80% of loss repaid for every dollar of production margin 30% below historical marginFederal + Provincial There is no single correct way to respond to production risks as, beyond perception of the impacts, response can be governed by what the farm can feasibly do to lessen the impacts. Unpredictable weather and the events caused as a result such as wildfires,drought, and winter loss are frequently behind extraordinary loss, making them the basis for immediate government assistance, behind 16 out of 19 AgriRecovery triggers since 2021.AgriRecoveryis not the only business risk management program (BRM), nor are BRMs the onlyfunding available for farmersto recoup financial losses however, which programs are applicable to the situation, the limitations of participation or gaps in coverage, and how likely the farmer is to enter the same program the following year can impact agricultural resiliency.PurposeApplication TimingCompensationCost-sharedAgriInsurancestabilization against severe, natural production lossesPre-losspayment triggered (based on premium paid) when experience production lossFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriInvestsavings account; protection from small income declinesPre-lossgovernment matches 1% of allowable net sales depositedFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriRecoveryrecover from extraordinary (abnormal) natural disaster lossPost-lossgovernment pays applicants based on collective costs and management capacityFederal + ProvincialAgriStabilityprotection from large income declinesPost-loss80% of loss repaid for every dollar of production margin 30% below historical marginFederal + Provincial There is no single correct way to respond to production risks as, beyond perception of the impacts, response can be governed by what the farm can feasibly do to lessen the impacts. Unpredictable weather and the events caused as a result such as wildfires,drought, and winter loss are frequently behind extraordinary loss, making them the basis for immediate government assistance, behind 16 out of 19 AgriRecovery triggers since 2021.AgriRecoveryis not the only business risk management program (BRM), nor are BRMs the onlyfunding available for farmersto recoup financial losses however, which programs are applicable to the situation, the limitations of participation or gaps in coverage, and how likely the farmer is to enter the same program the following year can impact agricultural resiliency. There is no single correct way to respond to production risks as, beyond perception of the impacts, response can be governed by what the farm can feasibly do to lessen the impacts. Unpredictable weather and the events caused as a result such as wildfires,drought, and winter loss are frequently behind extraordinary loss, making them the basis for immediate government assistance, behind 16 out of 19 AgriRecovery triggers since 2021.AgriRecoveryis not the only business risk management program (BRM), nor are BRMs the onlyfunding available for farmersto recoup financial losses however, which programs are applicable to the situation, the limitations of participation or gaps in coverage, and how likely the farmer is to enter the same program the following year can impact agricultural resiliency. PurposeApplication TimingCompensationCost-sharedAgriInsurancestabilization against severe, natural production lossesPre-losspayment triggered (based on premium paid) when experience production lossFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriInvestsavings account; protection from small income declinesPre-lossgovernment matches 1% of allowable net sales depositedFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriRecoveryrecover from extraordinary (abnormal) natural disaster lossPost-lossgovernment pays applicants based on collective costs and management capacityFederal + ProvincialAgriStabilityprotection from large income declinesPost-loss80% of loss repaid for every dollar of production margin 30% below historical marginFederal + Provincial PurposeApplication TimingCompensationCost-sharedAgriInsurancestabilization against severe, natural production lossesPre-losspayment triggered (based on premium paid) when experience production lossFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriInvestsavings account; protection from small income declinesPre-lossgovernment matches 1% of allowable net sales depositedFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriRecoveryrecover from extraordinary (abnormal) natural disaster lossPost-lossgovernment pays applicants based on collective costs and management capacityFederal + ProvincialAgriStabilityprotection from large income declinesPost-loss80% of loss repaid for every dollar of production margin 30% below historical marginFederal + Provincial PurposeApplication TimingCompensationCost-sharedAgriInsurancestabilization against severe, natural production lossesPre-losspayment triggered (based on premium paid) when experience production lossFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriInvestsavings account; protection from small income declinesPre-lossgovernment matches 1% of allowable net sales depositedFarmer + Federal + ProvincialAgriRecoveryrecover from extraordinary (abnormal) natural disaster lossPost-lossgovernment pays applicants based on collective costs and management capacityFederal + ProvincialAgriStabilityprotection from large income declinesPost-loss80% of loss repaid for every dollar of production margin 30% below historical marginFederal + Provincial stabilization against severe, natural production losses payment triggered (based on premium paid) when experience production loss Farmer + Federal + Provincial savings account; protection from small income declines government matches 1% of allowable net sales deposited Farmer + Federal + Provincial recover from extraordinary (abnormal) natural disaster loss government pays applicants based on collective costs and management capacity protection from large income declines 80% of loss repaid for every dollar of production margin 30% below historical margin Catch-22 of Short Term ReliefBRMs were designed to fit with other management options like best practices. The decision to usebest practices is, in itself, proactive management, as the preparedness for loss and opportunity for cushioning are indirectly considered. Opting into BRMs are considered reactionary because the farmer isfocused on recoveryfrom a loss that has already happened. When farmers are focused on recovery, understandably, very little mental, financial, or physical effort can be given to safeguarding the fields from future risks.For example, droughts have become an increasingly noticeable issue for Canadian production as climate change worsens and, in some regions, farmers have consistently seendrought-related lossesfor over a decade. However, BRMs are not designed to trigger annually and by doing so, it has created a system thatdisincentivizes on-farm improvement. In truth, management behaviours do not change unless farmers areforced to respond, and the farm does not have to meaningfully respond to compensation payments. It can similarly bedifficult to preparefor disaster when the most effective options are BRMs.Input costs are some of the most volatile and highest costs facing Canadian farmers in 2026,weakening the marginsproducers can expect. In theory, such shouldencourage research and development investmentinto realistic farm solutions but the increase in federal-provincial payouts over the last few years signals the opposite. Byasking for BRM improvementfeedback for the 2028-2032 federal funding cycle and simultaneouslyremoving federal agricultural researchprograms, true resiliency does not seem to be viable. Catch-22 of Short Term ReliefBRMs were designed to fit with other management options like best practices. The decision to usebest practices is, in itself, proactive management, as the preparedness for loss and opportunity for cushioning are indirectly considered. Opting into BRMs are considered reactionary because the farmer isfocused on recoveryfrom a loss that has already happened. When farmers are focused on recovery, understandably, very little mental, financial, or physical effort can be given to safeguarding the fields from future risks.For example, droughts have become an increasingly noticeable issue for Canadian production as climate change worsens and, in some regions, farmers have consistently seendrought-related lossesfor over a decade. However, BRMs are not designed to trigger annually and by doing so, it has created a system thatdisincentivizes on-farm improvement. In truth, management behaviours do not change unless farmers areforced to respond, and the farm does not have to meaningfully respond to compensation payments. It can similarly bedifficult to preparefor disaster when the most effective options are BRMs.Input costs are some of the most volatile and highest costs facing Canadian farmers in 2026,weakening the marginsproducers can expect. In theory, such shouldencourage research and development investmentinto realistic farm solutions but the increase in federal-provincial payouts over the last few years signals the opposite. Byasking for BRM improvementfeedback for the 2028-2032 federal funding cycle and simultaneouslyremoving federal agricultural researchprograms, true resiliency does not seem to be viable. Catch-22 of Short Term ReliefBRMs were designed to fit with other management options like best practices. The decision to usebest practices is, in itself, proactive management, as the preparedness for loss and opportunity for cushioning are indirectly considered. Opting into BRMs are considered reactionary because the farmer isfocused on recoveryfrom a loss that has already happened. When farmers are focused on recovery, understandably, very little mental, financial, or physical effort can be given to safeguarding the fields from future risks.For example, droughts have become an increasingly noticeable issue for Canadian production as climate change worsens and, in some regions, farmers have consistently seendrought-related lossesfor over a decade. However, BRMs are not designed to trigger annually and by doing so, it has created a system thatdisincentivizes on-farm improvement. In truth, management behaviours do not change unless farmers areforced to respond, and the farm does not have to meaningfully respond to compensation payments. It can similarly bedifficult to preparefor disaster when the most effective options are BRMs.Input costs are some of the most volatile and highest costs facing Canadian farmers in 2026,weakening the marginsproducers can expect. In theory, such shouldencourage research and development investmentinto realistic farm solutions but the increase in federal-provincial payouts over the last few years signals the opposite. Byasking for BRM improvementfeedback for the 2028-2032 federal funding cycle and simultaneouslyremoving federal agricultural researchprograms, true resiliency does not seem to be viable. Catch-22 of Short Term Relief BRMs were designed to fit with other management options like best practices. The decision to usebest practices is, in itself, proactive management, as the preparedness for loss and opportunity for cushioning are indirectly considered. Opting into BRMs are considered reactionary because the farmer isfocused on recoveryfrom a loss that has already happened. When farmers are focused on recovery, understandably, very little mental, financial, or physical effort can be given to safeguarding the fields from future risks.For example, droughts have become an increasingly noticeable issue for Canadian production as climate change worsens and, in some regions, farmers have consistently seendrought-related lossesfor over a decade. However, BRMs are not designed to trigger annually and by doing so, it has created a system thatdisincentivizes on-farm improvement. In truth, management behaviours do not change unless farmers areforced to respond, and the farm does not have to meaningfully respond to compensation payments. It can similarly bedifficult to preparefor disaster when the most effective options are BRMs.Input costs are some of the most volatile and highest costs facing Canadian farmers in 2026,weakening the marginsproducers can expect. In theory, such shouldencourage research and development investmentinto realistic farm solutions but the increase in federal-provincial payouts over the last few years signals the opposite. Byasking for BRM improvementfeedback for the 2028-2032 federal funding cycle and simultaneouslyremoving federal agricultural researchprograms, true resiliency does not seem to be viable. BRMs were designed to fit with other management options like best practices. The decision to usebest practices is, in itself, proactive management, as the preparedness for loss and opportunity for cushioning are indirectly considered. Opting into BRMs are considered reactionary because the farmer isfocused on recoveryfrom a loss that has already happened. When farmers are focused on recovery, understandably, very little mental, financial, or physical effort can be given to safeguarding the fields from future risks. For example, droughts have become an increasingly noticeable issue for Canadian production as climate change worsens and, in some regions, farmers have consistently seendrought-related lossesfor over a decade. However, BRMs are not designed to trigger annually and by doing so, it has created a system thatdisincentivizes on-farm improvement. In truth, management behaviours do not change unless farmers areforced to respond, and the farm does not have to meaningfully respond to compensation payments. It can similarly bedifficult to preparefor disaster when the most effective options are BRMs. Input costs are some of the most volatile and highest costs facing Canadian farmers in 2026,weakening the marginsproducers can expect. In theory, such shouldencourage research and development investmentinto realistic farm solutions but the increase in federal-provincial payouts over the last few years signals the opposite. Byasking for BRM improvementfeedback for the 2028-2032 federal funding cycle and simultaneouslyremoving federal agricultural researchprograms, true resiliency does not seem to be viable. Concluding RemarksIn the first half of 2026, governments have turned their focus to macro, conflict-driven supply chain disruptions, forgetting that Canadian farmers are struggling to adapt to new production realities in their own fields. When the risk management structure is cyclical the way it is, it makes it very difficult for farmers to break BRM reliance and protect themselves from extraordinary loss. Unfortunately, by creating an environment of compensation dependency, governments cannot be surprised when the costs of these programs balloon and productivity falls. Concluding RemarksIn the first half of 2026, governments have turned their focus to macro, conflict-driven supply chain disruptions, forgetting that Canadian farmers are struggling to adapt to new production realities in their own fields. When the risk management structure is cyclical the way it is, it makes it very difficult for farmers to break BRM reliance and protect themselves from extraordinary loss. Unfortunately, by creating an environment of compensation dependency, governments cannot be surprised when the costs of these programs balloon and productivity falls. Concluding RemarksIn the first half of 2026, governments have turned their focus to macro, conflict-driven supply chain disruptions, forgetting that Canadian farmers are struggling to adapt to new production realities in their own fields. When the risk management structure is cyclical the way it is, it makes it very difficult for farmers to break BRM reliance and protect themselves from extraordinary loss. Unfortunately, by creating an environment of compensation dependency, governments cannot be surprised when the costs of these programs balloon and productivity falls. In the first half of 2026, governments have turned their focus to macro, conflict-driven supply chain disruptions, forgetting that Canadian farmers are struggling to adapt to new production realities in their own fields. When the risk management structure is cyclical the way it is, it makes it very difficult for farmers to break BRM reliance and protect themselves from extraordinary loss. Unfortunately, by creating an environment of compensation dependency, governments cannot be surprised when the costs of these programs balloon and productivity falls. In the first half of 2026, governments have turned their focus to macro, conflict-driven supply chain disruptions, forgetting that Canadian farmers are struggling to adapt to new production realities in their own fields. When the risk management structure is cyclical the way it is, it makes it very difficult for farmers to break BRM reliance and protect themselves from extraordinary loss. Unfortunately, by creating an environment of compensation dependency, governments cannot be surprised when the costs of these programs balloon and productivity falls.