How Putin divides the European right

This transcription was generated automatically by Artificial Intelligence and may contain errors or inaccuracies. This is the story of the day from Rádio Observador: how Putin divides the European right. "Ukraine cannot win against Russia. It is impossible." We are hearing Alice Weidel, the leader of the AFD, the German far-right, say without hesitation that one cannot continue to support Ukraine because Ukraine cannot defeat Russia. Weidel does not hide the ties and the desire to strengthen those ties with Moscow. But we hear another woman, leader of another European right, speaking about the agreement that Donald Trump established with Vladimir Putin for the purchase of Russian fuel. "Announced last Friday by the President of the United States, Donald Trump. It is a choice that I consider very risky." Giorgia Meloni, the Prime Minister of Italy, condemns the deal, says it is a very risky choice and goes against the efforts to bring Putin to the negotiation table. Two right wings, two different visions. This is what I will talk about today with the international journalist from the Observer, Madalena Moreira. We will talk about the various sensitivities to Moscow. We will distinguish who is open-handed, who hesitates, and who turns their back on him. And we will understand why, in the face of the threat of war at the gates of Europe, some political leaders no longer have the shame to praise Vladimir Putin. I am Pedro Benevides and this is the story of the day, Tuesday, October 20th. Hello, Madalena. Hello. Today we are going to talk here about a question that I think is interesting, surprising, which is the way Russia exerts a certain fascination on some parties on the right and some of the figures who have had the most prominence at the European level, especially lately. But before we start talking about this, I would like to ask if it is easy to fit these questions in, because when we talk, there is sometimes a certain facilitism in talking about these political movements and these ideologies and where we fit them and put everything in the sack of the far-right, but it is not all like that. No, and as you say, it is a sack and then, perhaps, inside that sack there are smaller sacks and we want to facilitate and classify them as far-right, which would be, as the name indicates, what is further to the right. Looking at the parties we are going to talk about, it would be Germany, the AFD of Germany. But then we also have a radical right, we also have a conservative right and a populist right. What changes? It is the way some of their proposals, yes, but also the way they present themselves, where they put the emphasis of their argument and what they want for the system in which they live. Whether it is the destruction of the system and a totally new system, or if they are adaptations and, therefore, it always becomes difficult, and perhaps we will use throughout this episode, this is the radical right, this is the conservative right, this is the far-right, to compare parties that have some differences that must be considered. And in fact, it begins to be inevitable, considering the strength these parties have had in the last electoral acts here a little across Europe, or what is expected in several elections, namely in the French elections. In fact, we will have to start making a slightly finer distinction here about where each party fits in, which is not always easy to see. But our theme here, the common link, and we will see if it is common, is Vladimir Putin. Is there or is there a certain fascination of the radical right, far-right, populist right, or conservative right with a figure like Vladimir Putin or with Russia? There has always been. We are not talking about a new phenomenon after 2022. On the contrary, it is 2022 that comes here to change things. That is, the invasion of Ukraine, of course. But there is fascination with Vladimir Putin, because some experts say it is his anti-woke views. That is, what is this? It is the preservation of what they call the traditional family, the opposition to immigration. And at a time when Europe had not yet witnessed an explosion of these ideas, Russia of Vladimir Putin already put them into action, a conservative right. And therefore, there has always been this fascination with Russia being in counter-cycle with Europe. The problem is that Russia is in counter-cycle in several aspects, including democracy. Obviously, there is this fascination here that has never been declared or in the parties where it was declared, there have never been mainstream parties. And here is the big difference, and we can already start with one of the examples, which is: when a party enters the mainstream, it seeks to remove this attraction to Russia from its history. That is, when it begins to gain enough electoral power, when it begins, if we want, to smell of power, it begins to slightly change the discourse, is that it? Yes, and no other party was as clear as in the National Union, in France, when it passed to Marine Le Pen in 2011, to her father Marine Le Pen. There is here a strategy that she calls de-demonization, which is: there are some mistakes from the past that we have to correct. And these past mistakes are related to other topics, but also with Russia. They never make a declared anti-Russia statement, and we will go there, but let it not be declared pro-Russia or so declaredly close to Vladimir Putin. She could not say anti-Russia, since Marine Le Pen was financed by Russian banks and, therefore, it has always been a winding path. Curiously, she has not declared this support to Russia in the last few days, but she has already shown to be against the sanctions of the European Union against Russia and has said very serious things such as: if she wins the presidency, France will support Ukraine for six more months and then the tap will close. How can one go from a discourse in which we had the generality of the European countries, including France, alongside Ukraine, to having a candidate with great possibilities of being elected president of France, to openly say that it is six more months and that's it. What changes in public opinion, what makes it politically acceptable? That is why I said earlier that we need to look at the pre-2022 and the post-2022. There is a phenomenon that the experts call war fatigue, which is the fatigue of war. And it is not the fatigue of a soldier fighting in the war. It is the fatigue of people hearing about the war. That is, it seems a little unempathetic when there is a country actively suffering from it, but it is a phenomenon that occurs in the European population in surveys that European citizens increasingly want to know less if Ukraine wins the war by conquering all the claims it has made in the negotiations. More and more people say: if it is necessary to end the war through a negotiation process in which Russia gains in some areas, we are willing to do that, as long as it does not come out of our taxes as European citizens, support for the missiles to Ukraine, for the Patriots, for the defense systems. Besides everything they have to pay more fuel, and I don't know what. But here in these direct supports, there is this argument: ok, we have already looked at Ukraine for almost five years, the argument used, in this case, by Marine Le Pen, but by other right-wing parties, we have already looked at Ukraine for almost five years, that is enough, we now have to start looking at ourselves, we cannot continue to finance a war that is not ours. And there is a reformulation to stop being pro-Russia, to just be anti-support for Ukraine, because we need to look at other things. That is, the angle changes completely on how we are going to transmit this idea to the population that if we have to buy Russian fuel because it is cheaper for us, then that is what we have to do, regardless of whether we support the Russian war effort or not, because the priority here must be the people, in this case, the French people, we are talking about. I imagine that Vladimir Putin must be pleased with this position, for him it is the same. Now, is this position the general position, is the position of the right in Europe, or this relationship with Putin has several different tones depending on the parties, depending on the countries, depending on the leaders? There are many tones indeed. We have already talked about Alice Weidel, we have already talked about the Marine Le Pen case. Since in Germany it is a discourse- Declaredly pro-Russia, that is, we will stop all support for Ukraine, we will do business with Russia because we need to, while Marine Le Pen does not say that we need to do business with Russia, if it is necessary, we will not close doors. And then, still in the right, and someone who pre-2022 even had a neutral discourse regarding Russia and that we will keep doors open, we will make negotiations, we have Giorgia Meloni, who even before becoming prime minister, turns completely against Russia and becomes pro-Ukraine and defends that it is necessary to support Ukraine to defend Europe. That is, we see, is the discourse that the European Union and the European Commission have had over the last five years. What there is here is an exchange for Meloni's part, which is: if the price to sit at the table of the elders in the European Union is if I support Ukraine, then let's do it, let's support Ukraine and in return, and it is seen by the number of times here in the Story of the Day that Giorgia Meloni is mentioned, that she gained this preeminence within the European space in exchange for opposing Russia in some situations. Against Russia and against even, because that is also a curious fact, against one of its former allies, Donald Trump. She still now, when this deal announced by Trump with Russia happened, she was one of the critical voices. Yes, she declared that it was a risky decision, that it was legitimizing Moscow. And here we return to the question of public opinion, because if there is one thing that is universal in all these parties, they are divided in many things, but in these right-wing parties, even if Donald Trump is still interested in them, they are increasingly less interested in him, because Donald Trump is not a popular politician in Europe, this is basically universal. And therefore, even if some are neutral, Giorgia Meloni realized, no, he is not popular, so in the same way that support for Ukraine will be our line, if we have to criticize Donald Trump to maintain this uniform position within the European Union, then let's do it. Curiously also, in the case of Meloni, because there are also interesting things to look at. It is that she does not lead the Italian government alone, she has several parties, a coalition where many things fall to and many right-wing parties also in Meloni's government. In some cases, some parties that literally wear Putin's shirt. That is exactly it. We are here dividing parties and the place where it is clearest is in the European Parliament, where we have the left, the greens, the center-left, the center-right and then on the right that includes all these right wings that we were saying, we have three different parties. If these three different parties were to unite, they would have a majority in the European Parliament, they would be the largest party in the European Parliament, but they are divided into three. Giorgia Meloni remains in the center, which is of the conservatives and reformers, while the League, which is the party you were talking about, which supports her. Within the Italian government. Within the Italian government, that is, they in Italy are a coalition. In the European Parliament, they sit in different European families, European families that have different views on Russia. And the most extreme League, from that point of view. Exactly. That is, she sits with the rightmost patriots. And then we still have the party where the AFD is, which we were talking about, which is even further to the right and even more extreme. It is an interesting case this of the various sensitivities of the European right regarding Putin. Some hold hands, others remain more or less neutral, and others simply turn their backs on him. That is it, in fact, the title you have in your Observer article. Madalena, thank you. Thank you. I spoke today with Madalena Moreira, the international journalist from the Observer, about the divisions that Russia causes in the right of Europe. Coincidentally we talked about three women who lead parties that govern or are close to governing, and a man who complicates any attempt at a familiar portrait. Putin does not really come out defeated from this divergence of points of view. He does not really need Europe to become pro-Russian; it is enough for it to stop being united, it is enough to start eroding the consensus and that is a gain from there. This was the story of the day. The sound design is by Tomás Ferreira, the music of the generic is by João Ribeiro. I am Pedro Benevides. Until tomorrow.