To Secure the Natuna Sea, Indonesia Needs More Than New Ships

Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is one of Southeast Asia’s most persistent maritime security challenges. Indonesia, the owner of the region’s largest maritime area, has expanded patrols in its most contested waters, added community surveillance, and expanded international partnerships to address the threat. As the world’s largest archipelagic country, maritime security is one of Indonesia’s most demanding defense domains. And at its current stage, Indonesia needs significant help. The North Natuna Sea, which lies along the southern portion of the South China Sea, is a hotspot for commercial fishing. Home to over 750,000 tons of fish stock, is among the areas where China’s sweeping South China Sea claims overlap Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Yet despite stepped up maritime law enforcement by Indonesia’s Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), illegal activities – including, but not limited to, IUU fishing – continue. Indonesia is not starting from zero. Since the 2019-2020 confrontations near the Natuna Islands, the government has expanded the Indonesian Navy and Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla) patrol programs, incorporated fishermen and community surveillance into maritime surveillance through the Kelompok Masyarakat Pengawas (POKMASWAS) program, and distributed communications equipment to selected fishermen communities. Yet these initiatives remain unevenly distributed and insufficiently connected to the agencies responsible for verification and enforcement. Indonesia still faces substantial capacity limitations. In 2025, only three of the seven KKP patrol vessels assigned to the broader WPPNRI 711 area could reach the North Natuna Sea. Even when the KKP is able to catch IUU fishing boats in the act, there aren’t enough dock space or facilities to store impounded vessels and accommodate the crew. Jakarta began addressing those shortages this July by announcing ten new Class I surveillance vessels and an expansion of the PSDKP pier in Batam, which will become the principal base for operations in WPPNRI 711. Indonesia’s partners have likewise invested in its maritime capacity. Japan, for example, through a 9.053 billion yen grant (USD $56.57 million) is funding an offshore patrol vessel for Bakamla, scheduled for delivery in 2028. Other Japanese programs have trained Bakamla personnel in boat operations, maritime law enforcement, criminal investigations, and instructor development. Australia’s current strategic partnership plan with Indonesia provides for fisheries surveillance cooperation, maritime domain awareness information sharing, technical training, coordinated patrols, and desktop exercises. In early August, at the Southeast Asia Cooperation and Training exercise in Singapore, Indonesian personnel joined representatives from 15 other Indo-Pacific countries in practicing the real-time transfer of sensor data and vessel-contact information among operational centers, patrol aircraft, and ships. Days later, Bakamla hosted Malaysian and Singaporean coast guard personnel for a trilateral exercise in the Riau Islands covering cooperation in the Natuna Sea. Bakamla Chief Vice Admiral Irvansyah subsequently proposed expanding that model to other ASEAN countries. However, a shared regional maritime security architecture is only reliable as the national systems that feed information into it. Exchanging satellite tracks, radar data, or participating in joint exercises are meaningless if fishermen’s observations are unable to reach Indonesia’s national surveillance and enforcement system in time. In June, local Indonesian fishermen spotted foreign vessels conducting IUU fishing in the North Natuna Sea within Indonesia’s EEZ. The fishermen reported the sighting to patrol officers, and Indonesia’s Navy deployed the KRI John Lie-358 warship on extended patrol the following day. By the time the warship searched the area the following morning, however, the vessels had disappeared. Government Regulation No. 13 of 2022 already provides for an integrated national maritime security and safety information system, alongside joint and coordinated patrols. Bakamla Regulation No. 2 of 2024 goes further, directing the system to improve connectivity among maritime information sources, accelerate the transmission of information about security incidents, and support more effective patrols. The legal foundation exists, but Indonesia still needs to develop a standardized operational procedure to ensure that reports reach the appropriate enforcement asset without losing critical hours along the way. Bakamla’s command-and-control center should maintain a joint reporting and coordination process with designated liaison officers from KKP, the Indonesian Navy, the Water Police, and relevant local authorities. This center would be responsible for interagency communication and assignment, acting as a dedicated maritime desk manned through a single radio frequency and hotline for fishermen to report to. Jakarta should also create a Natuna-wide inventory to accurately identify key needs and distribution gaps and ensure that resources are given to those who need it most, both from a domestic perspective and as a reference point for allies when investing in resources. Capitalizing on the Prabowo administration’s recent investments in the Natuna Red and White Fishing Villages, these new hubs could act disbursement centers for communication materials while conducting training for basic vessel identification guidance and report standardization. Indonesia’s partners should organize their assistance around this chain. Japanese-organized training could help develop watch officers and instructors capable of processing contact reports and integrating the new Bakamla vessel into joint operations. Australian information sharing and desktop exercises could test the full sequence from a fisherman’s initial report to verification and deployment. Future exercises should measure reporting, verification, and response times – not simply whether participating agencies can exchange data. Once the system functions domestically, Indonesia can make it the foundation for regional cooperation. The next exercise with Malaysia and Singapore should begin with a simulated report from a fishing vessel, require Indonesian agencies to verify and task a response, and then test the transfer of the contact if the suspected vessel crosses into another country’s jurisdiction. Indonesia could subsequently use its position as secretariat of the 11-country Regional Plan of Action to Combat IUU Fishing to promote a common contact-report format and standardize procedures for transferring verified vessel information across borders. More patrol vessels will give Indonesia greater reach. They will not matter, however, if those vessels continue arriving after the target has disappeared. The measure of progress would be straightforward: how much time passes between a fisherman spotting an intrusion and an Indonesian agency directing an asset toward it? The Prabowo administration should make the North Natuna Sea the pilot for answering that question, directing its current maritime defense agencies into a single reporting chain with a common response protocol and measurable targets. Japan and Australia should focus their assistance on the communications equipment and personnel training that chain requires, while regional exercises test whether it works under operational conditions. Regional maritime domain awareness will remain incomplete until information from the first observer can reliably trigger action by the final responder.