Airbus walks line between shareholder returns and clean

Free for nonsubscribers By Howard Hardee July 28, 2026, © Leeham News: Neither half of the global airliner manufacturing duopoly emerged from the Farnborough International Airshow with a totally new trajectory, but Boeing went home with a surprisingly large share of the total aircraft orders secured—reinforcing the perception of growing trust in Boeing during the era of chief executive Kelly Ortberg. However, overall order totals fell well short of lofty forecasts published by some industry analysts prior to the show, which pushed as high as 800 aircraft. Narrowbody and widebody aircraft orders combined for a relatively muted total of 327—173 for Boeing and 154 for Airbus. This is a far cry from the 1,100-plus-aircraft order bonanza of the 2018 Farnborough air show, or even the more modest 500-something order totals from other shows in the 2010s. Perhaps airlines balked at the extremely long backlogs both airframers are working through. At this point, ordering Airbus or Boeing jets amounts to getting in the back of a very long line, with estimated delivery dates stretching into the mid-2030s. If one had to pick a “winner” at Farnborough, it would likely be Boeing because of the changing perception of the company’s commercial business, contrasted with Airbus continuing to tout the advantages of its strong orderbook and dominance in the single-aisle space. In other words, the narrative surrounding Boeing has changed markedly, while Airbus continued projecting confidence in its market position, which is nothing new. But Airbus still took something of a victory lap at Farnborough, taking the opportunity to boost investor expectations through the end of the 2020s. The French airframer announced a €5 billion share buyback plan over the next three years—a sign of significant surplus cash—and a target of €12-€13 billion in adjusted EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) for the full year of 2029. Airbus management expects roughly €10 billion of the 2029 EBIT target to come from the company’s commercial business alone. During a media briefing in London last week, chief executive Guillaume Faury said the buyback plan and the new mid-term guidance reflected strength across Airbus’ portfolio. On the commercial side, he highlighted Airbus’ 9,200-strong aircraft backlog and plans to reach monthly production rates of 75 A320neo-family jets and 12 A350s. “Demand is there. The supply chain is prepared; we have the supply chain in a much better place,” he said. “We’re still having issues here and there, and that will probably continue as we continue to go higher. But it is in a much better place than the years coming out of Covid.” Airbus is still constrained by supply chain tightness, most notably on engine availability. Faury acknowledged that the airframer wants more geared turbofans (GTFs) than Pratt & Whitney is “currently willing to allocate to us”. The engine maker has recently focused on handing engines to airlines struggling with aircraft grounded due to the years-long GTF recall, which has affected A320neo operators most acutely. Faury asserts that engine-related issues will be fully behind Airbus by 2028, as P&W rolls out its GTF Advantage upgrades and the engine maker finally clears its backlog of GTFs that require extensive time off-wing for earlier-than-expected overhauls. Critics of the share buyback plan interpret it as a sign of Airbus placing greater emphasis on shareholder value. Some observers are wary of Airbus embarking on a path similar to the one taken by Boeing starting in the 1990s, which included cost-cutting measures, leaner staffing, and prioritizing profits—with a clear focus on rewarding investors. Aerospace historian and LNA editor-at-large Scott Hamilton has chronicled Boeing’s cultural shift following the merger with McDonnell Douglas in 1997. The transition began under former CEO Phil Condit and accelerated under successor Harry Stonecipher; the latter’s management style was often associated with that of former General Electric CEO Jack Welch. Boeing’s business-first management philosophy was then maintained by James McNerney, Dennis Muilenburg and David Calhoun, all of whom oversaw share buybacks. Critics argue that this line of Boeing leaders often placed profit-seeking above engineering goals, contributing to the quality and safety breakdowns that have defined the company’s recent history. (Muilenburg, who was a career Boeing engineer before becoming CEO in 2015, presents a more nuanced case, though he mostly followed business practices established by McNerney.) Boeing’s cautionary tale does not offer a straightforward comparison to present-day Airbus, which is generating a massive flow of free cash and has plenty available for research and development purposes. While there is evidence to suggest that Airbus is becoming increasingly shareholder-friendly, there is less evidence that the airframer’s engineering rigor is eroding. It is also difficult to fault any publicly traded company for pursuing profits; mature industrial firms often invest heavily in developing future products and return excess cash to investors. Precedent suggests it is possible for Faury to please Wall Street analysts and oversee the launch of a successful aircraft program, without sacrificing one for the other. Condit, for example, oversaw the McDonnell Douglas merger and began centering Boeing’s strategies around business performance, but he was also a senior leader during development and launch of the 777 Classic—considered by some to be “legacy” Boeing’s last great program. In fact, the overwhelming industry consensus is that Airbus appears better-positioned to launch a clean-sheet jet, based on Boeing’s shaky-but-improving financial situation and present focus on production stability. Faury is confident that Airbus will be able to launch its next-generation single-aisle program by 2030 because the company has been preparing to do so since 2018. “We started to look at what needed to be done and how to structure the company to be prepared for the next generation of products,” he said. That includes building a “digital backbone” to design and produce the successor to the A320neo family. “We are not there yet,” he said. “We are maturing technologies, but we have a roadmap that leads to being fully prepared for the launch in 2030 and entry into service in the back end of the next decade.” Propulsion remains an area of major uncertainty. Airbus is still unsure if CFM International’s RISE program, which includes a radical open fan engine design, will deliver estimated efficiency gains after accounting for weight added by reinforcing fuselages to protect passengers from blade-out events. Whether that design or a more conventional turbofan will power the airframer’s next jet is one of the most significant questions hanging over the commercial aerospace industry. Meanwhile, the company is advancing its Wing of Tomorrow program, which is examining the potential of higher-span wings produced with composite materials. Airbus is looking at folding wingtips, similar to those featured on the 777-9, to provide lift on its next narrowbody jet. Airbus expects almost all of the efficiency gains over the A320neo family to come from next-generation engines and wing advancements, rather than fuselage design. More immediately, Airbus is reportedly considering stretched variants of the A220 and A350 but did not confirm such plans at the Farnborough air show, rather emphasizing the ramp-up in monthly production rates across its commercial programs. Industry observers will watch closely for signs that Airbus is seeking to stretch the A350 to better compete with Boeing’s still-not-certificated 777-9. Notably, Faury may not helm Airbus fully into its next era. His current term as CEO ends in April 2028, before the company’s stated timeline for launching its next narrowbody program. “I am fully available for the board to do what they think is appropriate for the company,” he said. “I enjoy what I’m doing, but as the same time, 10 years down the road I will most probably no longer be in the company, and I will look backward and want to see a good transition at the right time.” LNA will publish a follow-up story after Airbus reports second-quarter earnings on July 29. This is a US centric view, but I wonder how Europe views it? So why does Airbus then go hat in hand to the Nations for launch money? I hate to see it, Airbus has become successful despite all the odds against it and as I recall the last time, Of Course We Will Seek Launch Money (ahem). The basic concept in theory is to get an industry going, mature and on its own. So Airbus just reinforces the meme, hand out, hat in hand, poor me. Then they want respect. They deserve respect, they do not act like it. The European view is that it is an investment by governments – they get it paid back with interest (assuming the project is successful) – and they get lots of well paid jobs for the countries, more money coming into Europe based on aircraft sales. The US seems to focus more on tax deals, which has similar benefits in terms of jobs creation, but not in terms of return. The successful Airbus projects keep paying % to the governments giving it the loans (I assume A320 family, A330-340 family and soon the A350). The A300-310, A380 were losses, still the netto for the governments I think is a plus besides well paid jobs paying taxes. Just see how much Airbus and CFMI/Safran stand for French export. You have other companies maybe not directly supported making good business as Airbus suppliers like Safran Nacelle, Liebherr, ST Engineering, Michelin, Safran Landing system, Thales besides all US suppliers of some have a EU footprint. “I hate to see it, Airbus has become successful despite all the odds against it” wrong. … because of … Airbus limitations as seen from the US ( hampering all out capitalism and lambasting your workforce ) where the enabler of Airbus success. I think there’s some confusion about the €3 billion loan to Airbus. The loan: – is not provided by the governments of the Countries (France, Germany, Spain, UK) which have funded Airbus’ aircraft development programs in the past; – is not a launch aid for the Next-generation narrowbody aircraft. Instead, the loan: – is provided by the EIB (European Investment Bank) (the EIB’s shareholders are the 27 countries that make up the European Union); – will support Airbus on long-term research and development for commercial aviation, defence and space (The EIB finances projects on the areas of climate, environment, innovation and skills, infrastructure, small and medium-sized enterprises, cohesion and development as well as crises including the COVID-19 pandemic and the 2008 financial crisis); – will have to be repaid by Airbus (the EIB provides long-term loans, typically up to 50% of a project’s overall cost; the EIB is not funded through the budget of the EU; instead, it raises money through the international capital markets by issuing bonds; as the EIB is rated triple-A or equivalent by Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch, it can borrow money at lower rates to then lend it at lower rates). https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2026-228-eib-commits-eur3-billion-to-airbus-to-boost-europe-s-industrial-base-and-technological-edge-in-aerospace-innovation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Investment_Bank Boeing, as is well known, also receives public funding for R&D (for example from NASA) https://www.usaspending.gov/recipient/419ccd27-d6f4-d363-aeaf-b9e2c3ae6f5d-P/2026 Taking things out of ordoer. the US until more recently did not do a fouccers projet as so called researth. The TTWB was such a focus. Boeing was its only target. What I see from a European response is a lot of what we call Bow Rapping a Pressent. Airbus does a project, and Spain, UK, Germany, France hand them billions. Those billions are supposed to be refunded, but they put a twist into it. Only if the project is a success. In legal terms that is so squishy as to get thrown out of court. In the vernacular of FLM, its two things, both hidden from the public. Maffia accounting, cook the books get the experts up from Italy. 1. What actual numbers have to be built to achieve it. Valid reports for the A380 were 750. So, bottom line, once the A320 happened to “succeed” we do not want that happening again. Set a ridiculous high number you never have to meet. Smoke and mirrors 2. How much on each A320 (our only example) do we have to return. Oh, make sure that is cut as well just in case we make a mistake and actually have to pay it. To this day all we have is a claim they are paying it, not at what number it kicked in at. The ooops number. No one will tell us the numbers on the A340, 330, 350 and guesses on the A380. At a guess the A340 was a flop, The A330 should return and the A350 should return, not a peeep. So they are not paying it. Free Lunch Money So, why all the secrecy. So they can hidewhat the reality is and adjust it as needed. Smoke and mirrors. NASA at one time let its research out to the world. RISE is purely free money to CFM Hitching its ride on Safran being EU) . Might GE with 2/3 of the Single Aisle Market cashes in. Boeing gets tax breaks. So does Airbus, not just Alabama, it was traced to individual countries in Europe on on top of the FLA. Airbus can stand alone, they wont and do not want to though they want the respect. That only happens when they go government free. I admire what they have done. They get govt money and do not have to account for it, sweet deal. They have divorced themselves from the messy govt interference despite taking govt money, nice trick. I can not respect them when they rake in billions and do share buy back and loose the money for future so they can go hat in hand for the next project. Nice not to have to pay for your failures. But pointing at NASA, wow. Europe is spending billion in research in aeronautics. Focused on hardware. So for every benefit Boeing gets on taxes, there is a over matching European project to give Airbus billions. And note, the one focus project from NASA is no longer operational. In all the years of Airbus they only did one true innovation, putting FBW on commercial aircraft. Boeing has pushed all the rest. The reason airbus flopped on the A330 Super was they had nothing in the quiver to respond with. Ver 4.0 they finally took what they had and did the A350. Which is impressive, nice success, and it does not pay back either. And we still get the A330NEO. For all its flaws, the 787 bests them all, its got a realistic 3500 sales. Nothing better comes along and a GTF NEO and it would go higher still. Boeing will be looking at that and you got 3 hungry engine mfgs that would love to supply that engine. CA casualty talks about the A320 and A330 being repaid. SHOW ME THE ACCOUNTING. Where are the checks? Its all words and words are no better than the lips that speak them. Wink Wink nod nod. I think the balanced answer about launch aid (sorry, refundable launch finance) is that both Europe and US were subsidising their industries and came to an agreement that US would continue to give tax credits and NASA funded R&D, while Europe could pay for up to a third of development cost, so long as it was repaid at a commercial rate of interest if the programme met certain milestones of deliveries. This worked nicely for a while, until US raised the issue of what constituted a commercial rate of interest. The European perspective was that it should be what the companies paid on their debt, while the US argument was that because it was only repayable if the programme was a success, a commercial lender would charge more for that loan as the risk was higher. Both are valid arguments, although I’d suggest the US perspective is to the letter, while the European perspective is to the spirit. (This was further complicated by accusations from US that the milestones set by Europe were unrealistically high, so the money would never be repaid. I seem to recall that the launch aid on the A320 and A330 were more than repaid, while it was not fully recovered on the A340 and A380 – overall, I believe the European governments have had good investments.) It is true that a commercial lender would demand higher rates for launch aid (a point to US), but if the US perspective were correct, there would be no point in seeking launch aid, all the while the US companies were still getting tax credits and NASA R&D, so effectively the US perspective is “you can’t have your subsidy, but we can still have ours”, which doesn’t seem very equitable. The bottom line is that it would be stupid for European companies not to seek launch aid as it reduces their risk. Charles – very well put but I must mention that the A330 and A340 were parts of the same programme, at least as far as the UK Government saw it when funding it. A year or so ago I did a FOI request to the UK Government asking how much profit we had made from the Airbus investments and how much we still receive in royalties each year. They claimed the figures weren’t available and it would take too long to work them out. I didn’t push it but various MPs over time have mentioned Airbus have paid hundreds of millions (GBP) in royalties from the A320 programme in addition to paying back the inital loan. Having said that – I do feel a €5 billion share buy back isn’t a good look when the company is ‘only’ getting €3 billion from the EIB. I’m sure shareholders disagree! from EIB website… article title EIB commits €3 billion to Airbus to boost Europe’s industrial base and technological edge in aerospace innovation “The financing comes as the first tranche of a €3 billion envelope, the largest corporate loan ever authorised by the EIB.” “For the EIB, the financing falls under the flagship TechEU initiative, which seeks to accelerate investment in critical technologies and strengthen the European Union’s industrial and technological competitiveness” “TechEU The agreement falls under EIB Group’s flagship TechEU programme, the largest ever financing initiative for innovation in Europe. Over the 2025-2027 period, the EIB Group will commit €70 billion to support high-risk projects and innovative companies throughout their investment journey, from idea to IPO, mobilising €250 billion together with financing partners in investment for disruptive technologies and enabling infrastructure.” https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2026-228-eib-commits-eur3-billion-to-airbus-to-boost-europe-s-industrial-base-and-technological-edge-in-aerospace-innovation so what is the US counter to “TechEU programme, the largest ever financing initiative for innovation in Europe” The comparison to Boeing’s under-investment period is not entirely fair. Airbus is aiming to return 60% of FCF (which is already after investment in e.g. new FALs etc) to shareholders. At the height of Boeing’s policy of maximal shareholder returns, Boeing was aiming for 100% of FCF. So, knock it down to 40% and put the rest into your next project! Do not get me wrong, Boeing was trying to liquidate the company while each news set of mgt had enough left to bail out with millions. That is a sad part of US Corps, they can and do that. Airbus tries and the founding countries would come down like a ton of bricks and rightly nationalize what they own anyway. Pretending you need a hand out removes respect. in view of the character and behaviour of the current POTUS: Are Boeing sales to be seen as political. protective acts? fully or partially ? I think government support for aerospace since the most recent presidency, is unprecedented. In the sence that the head of state pressures other national airlines to buy (~1000) Boeing aircraft in return for lowering (deemed illegal) tarriffs, celebrates it, celebrating it on the white house website and he gets the Boeing salesperson of the year award. https://www.ainvest.com/news/boeing-gave-trump-salesman-year-award-month-bessent-2511/ And then people pointing out unfair government involvement at Airbus. Simply Amazing how things work these days. To be clear. That sort of garbage should not occurr. Its based on a single indivual who will be gone (how many BAD PMs has the UK had in the last 6 years?) None AS BAD as Trump, EU has Orban (had) and its own issues it tolerates and structures for. Macron goes abroad and sells Airbus, why can not a normal US president do the same? Airbus is up in China and I never saw a notion BEFORE RE trump that its an issue with a Dictator using his buying power to split an alliance? Trump aside, we stand as a group or we fall as a group. Some slight corrections needed here – the UK in recent times has had Boris Johnson and, notably, Liz Truss as appallingly bad PMs – Truss in particular! – and we may yet have Nigel Farage (though hopefully not). And to be clear, Boeing had no business putting it all into share buy back nor paying its execs in stock. It sunk Boeing. Airbus does not need hand outs nor does Boeing. It won’t stop Alabama or Charleston garbage, I want it stopped for everyone. China can stew in its risk adverse juices, that is what you get with total government control bun by Bureaucrats. A slow moving Dinosaur. Russia will fail on the MC-21, its a governemtn program for Russia and series production? Right. Airbus is pushing Rolls-Royce to develop a successor to the XWB-97, but how exactly can RR do that? Obviously, Rolls-Royce is still struggling to improve the durability of the XWB-97. They keep promising a major breakthrough, but Emirates doesn’t seem convinced. This is not entirely accurate. What has been reported is that an A350 stretch would require a new engine if it wanted to retain the performance of the base A350-1000. If Airbus are happy to trade-off range etc that would be different. On the engine upgrade path, RR are not “struggling”. The XWB 97 has already been through two Upgrades which have increase time on wing by about 40%. Phase 3, which will double time on wing, is currently undergoing bench testing and is specifically aimed at hot and dusty environments. It is due to be in service beginning 2028 on new engines and retrofitted to the existing fleet. Emirates’ positions are rhetorical and commercial, not technical. Ethiad and Qatar both operate A350-1000 fleets in the same environment. A pure stretch of the 350 with minimal improvement to the airframe and engines would at least need 7500nm in my view to stay attractive. Similar to the 787-10 Some more weight removals, drag reductions to the frame plus ultrafan inspirations to the XWB97 are for usre possible. Emirates is already in bed with the 777x, no need to chase them, but for sure DL, BA, LH, SG etc. could use a stretched 350k on quite some trunk routes. SJ: 40% of bad is still not good. HOw many years to get to normal and then get that all back into your built fleet of engines? PW is working through that issue. RR still has not corrected the Trent 1000 in service and continues to take aircraft out of service to deal with. The TEN has issues they are still working throruhg and now we get the latest greatest 1000 XE that solves it all. All those issues started with the 1000 and impact all the 7000 and XWB. We see hints, no one want to talk about it as they are stuck with it and it was their choice. They will solve it but the backlog in the 1000 alone still impacting tells you volumes that the future is not a bright turn aro9und but a snail like pace of getting to where it should be. @TransWorld You’ve effectively been throwing FUD (Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt) — for whatever reason — against Rolls Royce, at this site, for the last decade. Of course, whatever floats your boat…. Meanwhile: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2026/jul/19/rolls-royce-fixed-engine-problems-support-uk-narrowbody Emirates knows how long the T-XWB-97 stays on wing in the ME and was initially not impressed even though RR handles the engine changes quickly so Qatar don´t suffer and the power by the hour program keeps ticking. So EK might want a backup solution if the heavy 777-9 is not as economical as hoped for and they decide to build an engine heavy maintenance shop for the T-XWB’s they have and are getting. Then a stretched A350-1000 with a bit less range but a tad better than the 777-300ER would fit many 777-300ER operators and could keep the T-XWB-97 engines slightly updated. On the matter of orders at the Farnborough AS, unusually there were quite a lot of frames ordered not long before the show opened, and many of the “orders” placed were well telegraphed in advance, too. I think drawing conclusions from the orders at the show itself, for both OEMs, does not give a necessarily balanced picture. Agreed. Backlog is huge and mostly you can do deal in the margins of where you can get slots from the current. Take your orders when you get them and lock em in and air shows are no longer relevant. I do see the airshows becoming less relevant, at least for civilian aircraft orders. I live near Farnborough. I’ve been aware of the airshow all my life, been there as a spectator when they had decent displays and could even see most of it from various vantage points in the area but most of the displays stopped following the Shoreham airshow crash. Sort of understandable as Farnborough and its environs is a built up area and there were 31 fatalities in one terrible incident back in 1952 but we live in an area that used to be dominated by aviation so it’s in the blood of many locals. This year’s effort was terrible. It’s turning into an arms fair. I don’t know if Scott has commented yet following his visit but various other aviation writers were saying how little was on public display and how much spare time they had whereas, in the past, they’d be running from chalet to chalet for the latest announcement. The only thing that’s still the same is the traffic snarled up for miles around at closing time but then it’s always busy for a few hours around 5pm when the offices close (a few of which used to be aviation related factories). Regarding a stretched variant of the A350-1000; yes, Airbus should IMO stretch the A350-1000 by 7 frames : 4 frames forward of the wing (increasing the total distance between Doors 1 and 2 to 28 fuselage frames, which is equal to 700 inches) and 3 frames aft of the wing (increasing total distance between Doors 3 and 4 also to 28 fuselage frames, or 700 inches). 60 ft or 720 inches is the maximum distance allowed between the doors on a civilian airliner. The length of the stretched A350-1000 would be 78.225 metres (73.78 metres for the A350-1000. Furthermore, the stretched A350-1000 would have the same MTOW (324 metric tonnes) and the same Trent XWB-97 engine as the A350-1000. Phase 3 of the multi-phase enhancement programme for the Trent XWB-97 engine should be completed by 2028 and well before a stretched A350-1000 would enter into service. Hence, a 324 metric tonne MTOW, stretched A350-1000 and powered by two Trent XWB-97 engines should be a relatively cheap undertaking. Now, the best Airbus response in the year 2027 to the 777-9 and a possible 777-10X, is IMO an all new large Airbus twin engine widebody family that would enter into service some 3-4 years after the EIS of the 7-frame stretch of the A350-1000. The 777-9 is 76.7 metres long, while a stretched 777-10 X has a projected length of 268 ft, or 81.69 metres. Interestingly, the length of the unbuilt 747-600X concept was 279 ft, or 85 meters. So, clearly Boeing envisaged in the late 1990s that an 85 metres long civilian aircraft should be able to operate from then existing airports, albeit with possibly a slightly modified infrastructure. If a nearly 82 metres long 777-10X will be able to operate from current airports — exceeding the 80 m x 80 m ICAO Category F box dimensions — then an 85 metres long ,very large twin should IMJ be able to do it as well. So, the all new very large Airbus twin engine aircraft family (i.e A360X) should IMO have: 1) A 10 abreast configuration (18-inch-wide seats, 2-inch-wide armrests and two 19.5-inch-wide aisles = 245 inches). 2) An external fuselage width of 255 inches (i.e. 256 inches for the 747 and 244 inches for the 777). 3) A wing with an area of around 550 m2, a wingspan of 75 metres and two 5.15 metres long folding wingtips. The A360-900X should IMO have the same 85 metres length as that of the unbuilt 747-600X, while the shorter A360-800X should have about the same length as that of the stretched A350-1000 (88 metres). The all new Rolls Royce engine could be based on the RB3025 concept/ Advance3 core (RB3025: RR’s proposal for the 777X), as well as numerous technological advances developed from the Trent XWB programme. It would take 7 years to develop such an engine (according to the CEO of RR). Better than to use it on an aircraft that would be superior to the 777X; capacity-wise as well as performance-wise, instead of using such a new engine on a stretched A350-1000, where a TXWB-97-powered, 7-frame stretched A350-1000 should match the 777-9 in capacity. Finally, the A350-1000 stretch could become the A350-600 (building on the legacy of the A340-600 as the longest member of the family), while an A350-700 and A350-800 could be an 11 frame stretch and 5 frame stretch, respectively, of the A350-900. As a general rule, airlines want the smallest possible aircraft capable of connecting city pairs. Emirates and Qatar are half the 777X backlog. Everyone else is replacing legacy large aircraft with A350 or B787. You want a better idea…try a longer range A330neo. Broadly true for wide bodies (ie trip costs are proportionally more important than seat-mile costs, so there is a trend to smaller planes). However, the reverse is true for narrow bodies, where filling the plane is less of a concern, so seat-mile costs are more important, so you get upgauging Fascinating aircraft. I dont see many customers for it other than ME carriers A 777-10 is going to be as big as it gets and even that is a Niche to Emirates. Not sure I see a A350-2000 as a possible. We saw the limit with 747 let alone A380. TC asside. He will make do with what he can get. Why not a new fully CFRP 80m span wing custom designed for this aircraft with 7400nm range and the latest RR T-XWB97 engines. If the UK does not pay up to make it Dassault with EU money could make the switch. Well relations between Dassault and Airbus could be better than now (after the French wanted a carrier fighter per NAVY spec and Germany wanted a AIR FORCE fighter per its different spec’s.) The only time the US Air Force accepted a Navy spec fighter was for the F-4 Phanton II @ Casey It would appear as if you subscribe to the idea of short-termism and not winning strategies for the long term. An A360X family would EIS in the mid 2030s and would, in all likelihood, be perfectly positioned in the market, a decade hence, as the global air passenger demand is projected to more than double by 2050. – https://www.researchgate.net/publication/356888267_The_role_of_very_large_passenger_aircraft_in_global_air_transport_-_a_review_and_outlook_to_the_year_2050 @OV-099 Airbus tried Very Large aircraft already. It was called the A380. The B747-8 did not fare well either. COVID did not kill that aircraft. It was already functionally dead by the time COVID arrived. Maybe I am missing something, but your correlation of larger aircraft vs time does not prove causality. The beauty of smaller aircraft is you do not have to fill 500+ people on a flight and it sidesteps the most constrained mega airports. Emirates has their strategy and it works for them, but that airline is an abberation. Smaller aircraft are also more marketable, they will appeal to a broader array of airlines than simply national flag carriers. That matters when the preponderance of aircraft are now leased and lessors were burned badly by the A380. I would respect the idea of a larger aircraft more…except that the backlog of the 777X is so heavily weighted on ME carriers. The other orders tend to be older orders from what seems like another era (mid-2010s). The original reason why the B747 sold well was not for capacity as much as range (it was trans Pacific). You can do the same thing with a B777…and now you can do it with a B787. B757 replaced with A321XLR…I can go on. I fully agree with the above. Big Aircraft are NOT flexible. Others rode on the A380 Coat, but it was a Emirates Aircraft. And just about all have dumped it. BA is an outlier (LU?). The 787 Category has room for competition though its mostly indirect. 777X does not. Its a one bird market, otherwise you get an A380/747 and the A380 never did an F. 747-8 is now desirable for off the wall stuff, Looking Glass mission. Go Sierra Nevada, good luck with loosing lots of money. AF-1 never to be repeated. The 767-8F will be missed when they want new lift with a Nose Opening and none to be had. UPS might sell theirs off one day. @Casey Your VLA comparison is fundamentally flawed and your analysis appears to have a heavily US-centric perspective. The A380 and the 747-8I are 4-engine aircraft. The 747-8I has a legacy design from the 1960s and the A380-800 has a very heavy wing (100+ metric tonnes), optimised for a much larger stretch and MTOWs exceeding 600 metric tonnes. BTW, there is no reason why either Airbus or Boeing couldn’t design a VLA twin today using existing technologies. For example, the A330-900 has a MTOW of 251 metric tonnes, a wing area of 375 m2 and a wing span of 64 metres — and, consequently, the A330neo has the highest wing aspect ratio of any widebody aircraft (64 m squared) / 375 m2 = 10.92) — and two Trent 7000 engines with a maximum thrust of 324.0 kN / 72,834 lbf at take-off. Now, let’s scale up these numbers by 100 percent. MTOW of 502 metric tonnes — i.e. in contrast, the A380-800 has a MTOW of 575 metric tonnes and a wing area of 845 m2) — wing area of 750 m2, wing aspect ratio of 10.92, which means that the wing would have a wing span of 90.5 metres (or 79.7 metres wing span when on the ground with the two 5.4 metres folding wing tips folded up). Interestingly, the wing area of the A350-1000 wing is 464 m2 and the estimated wing weight of the aircraft is ~43t. Scaled up to 750 m2, in a first order approximation, the weight would be around 70 metric tonnes, or at least 30 tonnes lighter than the A388 wing. With an all composite fuselage and two single mounted Main Landing Gear (MLG) with eight wheel bogies***, replacing the two wing gear bogies: 4 wheels on each side (8 total wheels) located under the wings, and two body gear trucks (centerline): 6 wheels on each rear fuselage leg (12 total wheels) tucked under the belly to support MTOWs exceeding 600 metric tonnes, in addition to smaller horizontal and vertical tailplanes, the Operating Empty Weight (OEW) of an A390-800X twin engine VLA, that would have the same fuselage size as that of the A380-800, should have a reduction in OEW of more than 50 metric tonnes (i.e from 277 metric tonnes on the A380-800 to less than 230 metric tonnes of the all composite, twin engine A390-800X VLA. A 50 metric tonnes reduction in OEW should lead to, at least a 100 metric tonnes reduction in MTOW. Hence, a stretched, 80m long, 8000 nm capable A390-900X should have a MTOW in the neighbourhood of 500 metric tonnes. Again, scaling up the engine thrust at take-off from the Trent 7000, would mean that a state-of-the-art A380-900X VLA — having the same fuselage architecture as that of the A380, and with the alumnium skin, aluminium stringers and aluminium fuselage frames, replaced by a CFRP skin, CFRP stringers and CFRP fuselage frames — would require engines having a maximum thrust of some 145,000 lbf at take-off. Interestingly, the GE9X has a maximum recorded test thrust of 134,300 lbf, though its normal certified operational maximum takeoff rating is 110,000 lbf. *** https://patents.google.com/patent/EP0865986A2/en Some slight corrections needed here – the UK in recent times has had Boris Johnson and, notably, Liz Truss as appallingly bad PMs – Truss in particular! – and we may yet have Nigel Farage (though hopefully not). Boris was a wacko but he lived inside the constraints as well. Carter was the worse President of recent history till Trump came along. Carter looks like a genius now. Trump is gone, sooner if we are fortunate. He is not going to survive the term, either in a rubber room or drooling.