Ukraine Ramps Up Drone Strikes in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea

Ukraine Ramps Up Drone Strikes in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea Ukraine Ramps Up Drone Strikes in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea Executive Summary: - Ukraine has expanded its medium and long-range drone strike campaign from isolating Crimea to targeting Russian maritime logistics in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea, increasing pressure on Moscow’s military supply routes, naval posture, and control over occupied territories. - Russia is continuing to concentrate offensive operations in Donetsk oblast, particularly around Kostyantynivka, where Moscow appears willing to absorb significant casualties for limited territorial gains. - Ukraine’s drone strikes on Russian maritime traffic in the Sea of Azov and Black Sea have lowered the value of annexed Crimea, eroded Russia’s status as a naval power, and weakened Russia’s position on the world energy market. Since early July, Ukraine has expanded its middle- and long-range aerial and naval drone strikes from isolating the Crimean Peninsula to also disrupting Russia’s maritime traffic in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea (Re: Russia, July 17). This Ukrainian strategy has undermined three key ambitions of Russia’s war against Ukraine by lowering the value of annexed Crimea, eroding Russia’s status as a naval power, and weakening Russia’s position on the world energy market. While the Kremlin struggles to respond to Ukrainian strikes, Russian attacks are concentrated in Ukraine’s Donetsk oblast. Russia seems to regard control of Kostyantynivka— a city that forms the southern anchor of Ukraine’s “fortress belt”—as a decisive factor in capturing the rest of Donetsk oblast. Russia has accepted exceptionally high casualties to secure incremental territorial gains around Kostyantynivka despite evidence that the city’s capture would leave Ukraine’s broader defensive network in the Donbas intact (Meduza, July 8; Lenta.ru, July 15). Russia’s capture of Crimea in 2014 granted Russian President Vladimir Putin a strong surge in popularity. Presently, however, his approval ratings are sliding every week even in semi-official estimates (Radio Svoboda, July 17). In late spring, Ukraine launched a campaign to systematically wipe out Russian air defenses in “Fortress Crimea.” In the last few weeks, Ukrainian drones have been able to target military facilities and energy infrastructure there with little resistance (Krym Realii, July 16). Fuel shortages in Crimea have escalated to a full-blown energy crisis in recent weeks, to the point that Putin acknowledged the problem and ordered the establishment of a fully protected system of energy supply for Crimea (RBC, July 13; Meduza, July 16). Government ministers also reported to Putin that tourist activity in Crimea has decreased, and the government subsequently allocated 3.7 billion rubles ($47 million) for one-time payments to Crimean tourism industry employees on July 10 (Fontanka.ru, June 23; Forbes.ru, July 11). Even if Ukraine is careful to avoid hits on resorts or the long lines of cars at gas stations, a humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Crimea (Novaya Gazeta Europe, July 17). This prized possession has become a strategic liability, and one-time payments are unlikely to calm down shocked vacationers and desperate locals (NV.UA, July 14). Ukraine has unleashed a massive aerial strike campaign on medium and small vessels in the Sea of Azov since early July, with more than a hundred hits (TopWar.ru, July 14; Agentstvo, July 16). Russia could have delivered supplies to Crimea after multiple drone hits on bridges made those routes less viable via cabotage shipping—the transportation of goods between two locations within one country by a transport operator registered in a different country—across the Sea of Azov. Ukrainian drones, however, have also rendered this route impractical. After clearing the Sea of Azov of shipping, Ukrainian drones shifted their hunt to the north-eastern part of the Black Sea, including the main naval and oil port of Russia’s Novorossiysk, where they sank the Izumrud patrol ship (The Moscow Times, July 14; Nastoyashee Vremya, July 17). Moscow decried the effective blockade of the Sea of Azov as “terrorism” and tried to retaliate by increasing the number of missile attacks on Odesa, but cannot find a way to protect its maritime traffic (Izvestiya, July 14; TopWar.ru, July 15). About a month ago, Nikolai Patrushev, current chairman of Russia’s Maritime Collegium and former secretary of the Security Council of Russia (2008–2024) and former director of the Federal Security Service (FSB) (1999–2008), claimed that Russia’s global status is underpinned by its naval might and ability to protect its sea commerce (Rossiiskaya Gazeta, June 15). Patrushev’s ideas about Russia’s confrontation with what he views as an inherently hostile West are so rigid that even some mainstream Russian pundits dared to criticize his warmongering (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 28). Russia’s claim that it is a great naval power is typically undisputed, but Ukraine has exposed its hollowness through its blockade of the Sea of Azov and attacks on Russian ships in the Black Sea. Some journalists have compared Ukraine’s July 11–12 drone strikes on 10 Russian fuel tankers and four ferries in the Sea of Azov, part of a campaign targeting Russia’s “shadow fleet” and maritime fuel supply routes supporting occupied Crimea, to the annihilation of the Russian fleet in the battle of Tsushima in the Russo–Japanese War of 1905 (Dialog.ua, July 7). New blows to Russian energy flows cut deeper than the usual drone hits on oil terminals in places such as Novorossiysk and Tuapse (Neftegas.ru, June 8; Fontanka.ru, July 17). Spectacular explosions at many refineries, from Omsk in Western Siberia to Salavat in Bashkortostan, are making it necessary for Russia to increase exports of crude oil and to begin the import of gasoline and diesel (KP.ru, July 9; RBC, July 14). Functioning maritime trade routes are crucial for both, but the deliveries from the hastily negotiated deal on importing oil products from India are now at high risk because of the Ukrainian attacks in the Black Sea (Forbes.ru, July 1). Russia’s relations with Türkiye, another traditional energy partner, have also deteriorated. After Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Kyiv, where he suggested security guarantees for Ukraine in the Black Sea, Moscow announced restrictions on the import of peaches and apricots from Türkiye (Kommersant, July 17). Such attempts to punish neighbors for perceived misbehavior are typical for Russia’s foreign policy, but appear unwise considering its severe and still deepening fuel crisis (The Moscow Times, July 16). The energy sector is the backbone of Russia’s economy, and its crisis is impacting Moscow’s ability to sustain its war effort. Shrinking energy export revenues are aggravating the budget deficit, and the shortage of diesel is squeezing transport and agriculture (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 16; The Insider, July 17). At the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow expected to assert its dominance over the Black Sea region and to exploit this position of power to project influence further south into the Mediterranean. Instead, its war against Ukraine has severely curtailed Russia’s energy flows, degraded its naval power, and challenged its control over Crimea through Ukraine’s air and sea blockade (Radio Svoboda, July 18). These newly exposed weaknesses put Russia at a disadvantage in any future peace process, as it would have to plead to secure its vulnerabilities rather than demand concessions from an exhausted adversary. Russia historically fought many military campaigns in the Black Sea theater, with mixed outcomes and several total losses of its fleet. The unfolding strategic debacle is by no means unprecedented, but Russia’s capacity to overcome it is fast diminishing as its industrial base decays, its energy complex is degraded and overtaxed, and the Kremlin’s social capital is damaged and corrupted.