The NATO victory plan that overplays a defeat

The NATO victory plan that overcomes a defeat The NATO presented the concept of how it intends to repel a Russian attack at the Security Forum in Warsaw: an operations plan according to the textbook, but without offensive elements for active defense. When a military chief announces his intentions for how he will conduct the fight, he tries to dispel any doubt among his people. This is how it sounded on a battlefield during basic training when General Alexus Grynkewich, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (Saceur), presented NATO's "victory plan" at the Warsaw Security Forum on Tuesday. "Block, blunt, break" is the short form of his fighting idea for the NATO eastern flank. Everyone can remember the three-part harmony; it sounds martial and resolute: the alliance will stop the enemy, wear them down, and crush them if an ally were attacked. If at all. The NATO currently meets Russia with conspicuous intelligence gathering. No armed conflict is imminent, nor is it inevitable, said Grynkewich in Warsaw. While Moscow intensifies its covert attacks on the West almost daily, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte suddenly no longer sees Russia as an "immediate military threat." Theory of the Culmination Point The confusion over which situation is currently valid did not resolve by the end of the Warsaw Security Forum, nor did the tension between the renewed betrayal by American President Donald Trump to Ukraine and the fundamental alliance loyalty of the USA. The empty words from the White House and American realpolitik hardly fit together anymore. Grynkewich is the personification of this strange situation. He is the Saceur that Trump put in place, but he is also an American soldier who wants to prevent Russia from attacking the alliance. In a MAGA-style manner, he speaks of a "victory plan," a "victory plan," but actually only the standard procedure for defending against a comprehensive attack. The textbook for this is—among other things—the "Joint Publication 3.0," along with the US Army's "Field Manual 3.0." The regulation details how ground combat is connected with military effects from the air or cyberspace. The technical term for this is "Multi Domain Operation": the synchronous cooperation of all forces in all spheres of action. For Grynkewich's "victory plan," this means concretely: - Block: Heavy forces on the ground stop a Russian attack immediately at the start of hostilities. The territorial reinforcements that arise along the border with Russia prevent a rapid, area-wide advance. The enemy can hardly move and is crushed by artillery fire. The operational principle is "territorial denial" or in American military jargon, "area denial." Thanks to superior reconnaissance and communication means in space, NATO has the information superiority and knows every movement of Russian troops. - Blunt: In this phase, it is about limiting the opponent's freedom of action on the ground for defense so that they cannot continue the fight. The operational initiative is taken away from the attacker. NATO could block key areas like the Russian exclave Kaliningrad from the air and the sea. Through electronic warfare, jamming satellites, and cyberattacks, communication would also be cut off. Russia would no longer be able to fire long-range weapons against targets in NATO territory. The Kaliningrad option was practiced by NATO in a maneuver in mid-August. - Break: If the enemy does not give up and follow up with reserves, Grynkewich threatens to break the will of the opponent. All effects come into play simultaneously operationally: the long-range fires destroy the Russian deployments, the logistics depots in the depths of the space, and also the air defense means. It is about "disintegrating" and "destroying" the opposing forces, as stated in the "Field Manual 3.0." NATO crushes the military system that the opponent uses for its attack. However, there is an explicit avoidance of a mechanized thrust beyond the direct contact line into Russian territory. Instead of conducting an active defense battle with offensive components, Grynkewich wants to remain strictly on the defensive. His plan is based on the assumption that he can defeat the Russian army at the culmination point of their attack. This approach follows the theory of the Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz, who tried to explain the mechanisms of war in some parts of his work with mathematical metaphors. The USA can only conduct one large war at a time Clausewitz wrote that most attacks only reached a point "where forces are just sufficient to hold the defense and wait for peace." Beyond this point lies the turning point, Clausewitz writes: "The violence of such a counter-blow is usually much greater than the force of the thrust." The American military doctrine is strongly influenced by Clausewitz's thinking. Nevertheless, the operational textbook of the US Army—contrary to Grynkewich's intention—recommends leading the defense offensively: "Defensive operations alone do not usually lead to a decision, unless they are sufficient to achieve the overarching political goal." The military reason for restraint: The USA simply are not able to conduct two large wars simultaneously. Grynkewich himself said in the discussion at the Warsaw Security Forum that the "victory plan" also takes into account that the American forces could be involved in a conflict in the Pacific simultaneously with an escalation in Europe. Therefore, the Saceur on the NATO eastern flank also wants to use a mix of precision weapons and drones. However, it is questionable whether the USA can surpass Russia in the production of cheap systems. But Grynkewich is not concerned with the lessons from the Ukraine war; the Pentagon wants to keep most of the means for the even greater challenge than a Russian attack: the strategic competition with China for the position of the number one world power. The Doctrine of the "High Entry Price" Grynkewich expressed very little in Warsaw: "We had a useful consideration when we also had a conflict in the Middle East at the same time as the conflict in Ukraine, and that gave us some real insights into the burdens our war system would face and how we must adapt this." In other words: the offensive against the regime in Tehran in the first half of this year forces the USA into a defensive posture. In a pure defensive battle, significantly fewer forces are needed than if larger attacks are also foreseen. Therefore, in the event of a Russian attack on a NATO country, only the NATO forces already stationed along the eastern flank are likely to be used—including the German Panzer brigade in Lithuania or the French contingent in Romania. The Saceur's intention is to tie down as many Russian troops as possible but to move as few American units as possible to Europe. Grynkewich wants to increase the "entry price" for Russia with the "victory plan" for an attack—similar to the doctrine of the Swiss Army in the Cold War. Long-range attacks in the gray zone between war and peace Trump's obsession with pleasing Putin therefore has hardly any influence on the Saceur's intention. He tries to show strength without giving the Kremlin an excuse for a conventional war. From this perspective, the NATO's optimistic prognosis that Russia is currently not an immediate threat, and the rather pessimistic assessment of the intelligence services no longer appear categorical. The differences arise from the focus of the individual security forces on different escalation levels: This is how the director of the Czech intelligence service, Michal Koudelka, recently explained to parliament in Prague, that the Russian army in Ukraine is so blocked that the Kremlin must expand the conflict to still win. Koudelka does not mean a mechanized ground offensive but a significant intensification of covert actions, as currently being observed. The Czech intelligence chief warned that an air attack with a ballistic missile or a drone on one of the transit points of military Ukraine aid in NATO territory is also possible. Grynkewich did not speak about such a scenario in Warsaw—perhaps also because it is in a dangerous gray zone. In the escalation dynamics of the 21st century, long-range weapons seem to represent the last millimeter before the war threshold. However, if the NATO constantly raises the conditions for an alliance case, it loses its credibility in the medium term. The alliance may stop Russia in the extreme case, but no longer with that overwhelming superiority as before. The NATO's "victory plan" ultimately serves to overturn Trump's strategic defeat in the Middle East. But the USA still retain an active role in the defense of Europe—at least for now. Caroline Jemima Adler