Berlin 1939/Berlin 2026

How can we simultaneously protect the sovereignty of smaller states, such as Ukraine, and the security interests of great powers, such as Russia? asks Uros Lipuscek. Europe’s Ghosts, Fear of New War By Uroš Lipušcek Special to Consortium News The ghost of Berlin 1939 is haunting Europe. The present and the past cannot simply be the same, yet the politics and the psychology bear remarkable similarities. We are entering a new and dangerous era: military logic is increasingly dominant; freedom of thought and media are restricted; public discourse about an inevitability of conflict intensifies, and diplomacy is pushed to the background. This is the atmosphere today not only in Berlin, but in several European capitals. When a society, or its political elites, begin to think and speak about war, war gradually changes from something unimaginable to what is expected, even necessary. Talk of war with Russia while the anti-war movement remains weak is nullifying efforts to preserve peace. Today we are witnessing a fundamental psychological shift: European states no longer talk merely about defending Ukraine, but about long-term preparations for major conflict with Russia. The European Council this year called for European defence readiness to be “strongly” increased by 2030; E.U. defence expenditure is expected to reach approximately €454 billion this year. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that European military expenditure increased by as much as 14 percent in 2025; its growth in Central and Western Europe was the fastest since the end of the Cold War. The official doctrine is more weapons means more peace. History suggests more weapons usually means more war. Germany at a Crossroads Germany will once again be crucial in determining Europe’s direction. Europe’s economically strongest country is facing accelerating deindustrialisation. Germany’s industrial difficulties are the result of more expensive imported energy, the partial loss of the Chinese market, the slow transformation of the automotive industry, excessive regulation, sluggish productivity growth, demographic decline and other factors. Germany’s economic problems are also a consequence of the war in Ukraine and the destruction of the Nord Stream pipeline, through which Germany had received relatively cheap Russian gas. Volkswagen factories have therefore begun producing armoured vehicles and tanks instead of passenger cars. Despite mounting economic difficulties, Chancellor Friedrich Merz does not support restarting the Nord Stream pipeline. Moreover, the German government has accepted the fact that, under the new E.U. sanctions, all transactions connected with the pipeline are prohibited. Its closure, according to the official explanation, must remain a key part of the pressure on Russia to end the war in Ukraine, even though this appears to harm Germany more than Russia. Berlin and Brussels have nevertheless rejected Russia’s offer to resume gas deliveries through the undamaged pipeline. In this way, Germany could import approximately 28 billion cubic metres of gas annually, covering roughly a quarter of its needs. At the end of August, Germany’s gas storage facilities were only about 51 percent full. Germany’s previous economic model is therefore increasingly being called into question, particularly because the European Commission, with the support of German politicians, has decided that the EU will completely end imports of cheaper Russian energy by the end of next year. Leading German politicians increasingly appear to be acting contrary to Germany’s national interests. The strongest opposition comes from the AfD, which is on the far right of the political spectrum and calls for the restoration of energy relations with Russia. Chancellor Merz, in contrast, has linked his government’s policy towards Russia to its security strategy and to the war in Ukraine. Opinion polls indicate that support for Chancellor Merz is increasingly declining, while the right-wing anti-E.U. and anti-NATO AfD party won the state elections in Saxony-Anhalt on Sunday. The chancellor has announced that the CDU will do everything possible to ensure that the state does not “fall into the hands of radicals”. Despite, or perhaps precisely because of its economic difficulties, Germany is becoming an increasingly militant state, one that is expected within a few years to possess the strongest armed forces in Europe once again. Given Germany’s historical experience and the worsening geopolitical situation, plans by some extremist politicians for Germany to possess nuclear weapons are also a cause for concern. As Merz loses legitimacy – opinion polls reportedly show that only 13 percent of voters still support him – the question arises of how long his government can remain in power. A change in the leading political elites of the three major European states – Germany, France and the United Kingdom – is probably a prerequisite for the E.U. to successfully overcome its present crisis. In May next year, the presidential term of the current French president, Emmanuel Macron, will come to an end, while in Britain everything remains much the same. Labour Prime Minister Keir Starmer has been replaced by Andy Burnham, who is even more Russophobic. Although Britain is no longer an E.U. member, it increasingly behaves as though it were an integral part of the Union. Moreover, its Russophobic policy seriously complicates the war in Ukraine. That the Ukrainian military, with active U.S. support, is using primarily British Storm Shadow missiles to attack targets deep inside Russia could, in an extreme scenario, provide a pretext for Russian missile attacks against the British factories where these weapons are produced. NATO personnel, according to claims by some analysts, are involved in missile attacks on Russia. This raises the question of whether the line between indirect support for Ukraine and NATO’s direct participation in the war is becoming dangerously blurred. Here is the evidence: - Former German Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke of British and French “target control” for British Storm Shadow missiles. - German officers discussed British and French practice with SCALP/Storm Shadow, including people on the ground in Ukraine. - The U.K. acknowledged personnel in Ukraine in support roles. - British and French personnel have helped with data transfer and mission loading inside Ukraine. - New York Times reporting that Western planning and intelligence are part of the kill chain, much of it from outside Ukraine. In the event of a Russian attack on British missile factories, the British government would almost certainly demand activation of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty concerning collective defence, which could lead to an open confrontation between NATO and Russia. Article 5, however, does not apply automatically, leaving room for de-escalation of a potential conflict. Amid reports that Russian President Vladimir Putin is under increasing pressure to order such attacks, C.I.A. Director John Ratcliffe secretly visited Moscow last month. U.S. President Donald Trump is reportedly trying to end the war in Ukraine and sent his envoys to Moscow over the weekend in a failed bid to do so. Trump needs some sort of diplomatic victory to overshadow the debacle with Iran. Ukraine: A War Without a Diplomatic Exit There are thus few indications the war over restructuring European spheres of influence, will end soon. Russia’s condition in 1990 for German reunification was that NATO would not expand eastward, including into the territory of the former German Democratic Republic. Then U.S. Secretary of State James Baker promised Russia NATO would not move “one inch” to the east. The flagrant violation of the human rights of the Russian minority, particularly restrictions on the use of Russian in schools and institutions, together with violence by extremist nationalist forces, were, alongside NATO expansion, among the main causes of Russia’s military intervention in 2022 into the Ukrainian civil war that began in 2014. The Russian army is slowly gaining ground, while the Ukrainian military is attempting to halt the Russian advance through missile counterattacks against targets inside Russia. The Ukrainian economy is on the verge of collapse, while the coming winter will probably be the most difficult test yet. It is argued in NATO capitals that if Russia is not stopped in Ukraine, it will attack NATO states. Moscow categorically denies such intentions. These predictions have no realistic foundation. Peace will be extremely difficult to achieve. From Russia’s perspective, the war in Ukraine is an existential issue; from Ukraine’s perspective, it is a determined effort to escape Russia’s sphere of influence. The Idea of Security Zones A compromise could possibly be achieved on the basis of a proposal by economist Jeffrey Sachs, who has advanced the idea of so-called security zones. [See: Jeffrey Sachs: Negotiating Lasting Peace in Ukraine] Spheres of influence are a reality that cannot simply be denied, even though they conflict with one of the fundamental principles of international law: the sovereignty of states. Great powers attempt to exercise influence over smaller states. The best-known theorist of the realist school in the United States, John Mearsheimer, argues in this context that great powers cannot allow other great powers to approach their strategic borders. Russia saw Ukraine as a potential Western military platform for an attack on Russia. From the Russian perspective, the strategic situation after 1991 became fundamentally different. Ukraine was the last major geopolitical state between Russia and NATO. Moscow’s position was essentially this: “We cannot accept the military infrastructure of our main geopolitical rival approaching our key strategic areas.” Sachs has made an important conceptual shift in the theory of spheres of influence: in his view, great powers have legitimate security interests along their borders, but they have no right to create spheres of influence or determine the domestic policies of smaller neighbouring states. This is the crucial distinction. Its greatest value is that it cuts through the usual propaganda dilemma: “Is Russia or the West to blame?” and replaces it with a much more useful question: “How can we protect the sovereignty of smaller states while at the same time taking into account the security interests of great powers?” Sachs’ theory implies that Ukraine should accept a neutral status, based perhaps on the Austrian, Finnish, Swedish or some kind of hybrid model of neutrality. The war in Ukraine can therefore be understood as a clash between the principle of sovereignty — Ukrainians insisting that they themselves will decide their future and alliances — and the principle of indivisible security — Russia insisting that it cannot allow Ukraine to become a military platform for attacks against Russia. A Possible Compromise If Sachs’ logic were applied, approximately the following compromise might be possible. Ukraine would remain a sovereign state with its own armed forces. It could become a member of the EU, provided that the EU does not transform itself into a military organisation. Ukraine would become a neutral state, outside NATO; it would have no foreign troops or military bases on its territory and would receive appropriate international security guarantees. Russia would recognise Ukrainian sovereignty, withdraw its forces from agreed areas, and refrain from interfering in Ukraine’s internal affairs. In return, it would receive appropriate guarantees from Western states that Ukraine would not become a platform for NATO military systems. Such a settlement would mean that neither side would obtain everything it demands, but neither side would be completely defeated either. For the time being, no compromise has been reached. It would mean NATO giving up its ambition to replace the Russian government and dominant Russia as it did in the 1990s after it essentially claimed victory in the Cold War. From NATO to a European Security System Elements of such an approach can also be found in various peace proposals and negotiations. The formula described above would also require an institutional redefinition of NATO. The NATO Defense College, for example, already identified several years ago the possibility that NATO could, in one possible future scenario, be transformed from a traditional military alliance into “a security organisation.” NATO today is defined primarily by what it says is a threat from Russia. If Russia were to become its partner, the organisation would have to redefine its role in international relations, particularly in Europe. The greatest mistake of today’s European policy is that it understands security primarily as a consequence of military superiority rather than as the consequence of political balance. During the Cold War, the architect of international balance of power, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, advocated such an approach through détente. Russia should, in a renewed security system, be inside the system rather than at its margins. Lessons of the Period Before the Second World War A similar solution concerning Germany was advocated before the Second World War by, among others, French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou. Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, the Soviet Union and France would establish a system of mutual guarantees. If one state attacked another, a system of collective assistance would follow. The purpose was to integrate Germany into the European security system, thereby limiting its potential for aggression. The question was not — and is not today — how to exclude a potentially dangerous great power from the European system, for example through extensive sanctions, but how to integrate it in such a way that its power becomes part of a system of collective security. Barthou also understood that the Soviet Union had to be included in the institutional system of European collective security rather than pushed to the edge. In 1934, he therefore supported the admission of the U.S.S.R. into the League of Nations. Barthou was assassinated in Marseille together with the Yugoslav King Alexander I Karadjordjevic. His successor, Pierre Laval, did not carry his ideas through to completion. American diplomatic documents from 1934 indicate that Barthou and the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov had reached a preliminary agreement on several essential elements of Barthou’s plan, known to historians as Eastern Locarno. Barthou sought to create a European system capable of preventing Hitler’s expansion and perhaps even changing the course of events that led to Munich and later to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and the Second World War. After Barthou’s death, his campaign for collective security against Nazi Germany was continued by Soviet Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov. However, because of the reluctance, hesitation and opposition of Britain, France and Poland, he failed to establish a functioning system of collective security. Europe finds itself in a similar situation today. The OSCE as Skeleton of a New Security System A new security system should be created within the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which has been pushed to the sidelines because Europe’s ruling elites have prioritised continuing the war and weakening Russia. Something similar happened at the beginning of the Second World War. During the negotiations in 1940 concerning the end of the Soviet-Finnish War, Britain and especially France attempted to prevent the signing of a peace agreement. They were preparing to intervene in the war on Finland’s side with tens of thousands of troops. History appears to be repeating itself. The latest pro-Ukrainian Coalition of the Willing, led by France, is preparing the ground for sending its troops to Ukraine after the war. French diplomats attempted in 1940 to prevent the signing of the agreement ending the Soviet-Finnish War. In April 2023, former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, meanwhile, allegedly succeeded in preventing the signing of the Istanbul agreement that could have ended the Ukraine war. In both wars, there was an influential group of Western powers whose strategic interest was that the war against Russia should not end too quickly. This leads to the conclusion that Western powers, at certain crucial moments in the 20th and 21st centuries, have given – or continue to give – priority to strategically weakening Russia. What Will America Do? Europe needs a new European peace project that would transform the NATO military alliance into a pan-European security system. The question is to what extent such a system would be acceptable to the United States, where people are already talking about a so-called NATO 3.0. Under this new strategy, Europe would have to assume responsibility for the costs of its own conventional defence. The Americans will undoubtedly not give up NATO as the main instrument for projecting their power in Europe as part of their global strategy. From this perspective, it is questionable whether Washington would accept a potentially autonomous Europe which, as American power relatively declines, could begin to establish closer relations with Russia and China independently of Washington. That would mean Europe dispensing with current, extreme Russophobia. This may be one of the key geopolitical questions of the coming decade. Not Victory, but Compromise A future European security agreement – if one is reached – must not be a “victory of the West over Russia” nor a “Russian victory over Ukraine.” It must instead be an agreement that allows all major actors to preserve both their dignity and their security. Europe needs a security system based on a balance between the sovereignty of smaller states and the legitimate security interests of great powers. If no compromise is reached, particularly on territorial questions – which at present seems unlikely – Europe faces long-term instability, if not a new war, and the definitive farewell to the status of a great power that Europe enjoyed for almost half a century. And this is precisely why we should ask ourselves whether the greatest danger facing Europe today is really a lack of weapons – or rather a lack of diplomacy. For now, there is no statesman on Europe’s horizon capable of banishing the ghost of Berlin 1939. That is why preparations are under way for a Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation III to be held in 2028 under the auspices of peace movements rather than governments. Its purpose will be to increase pressure on Europe’s political elites to act in the direction of peace rather than war. Uroš Lipušcek Ph.D. is a Slovenian journalist and historian who was the long-time correspondent for RTV Slovenija from the U.N., U.S. and China. He was a candidate for the E.U. parliament in 2024. At present he is a professor at Emuni University (Euro-Mediterranean University) in Piran, Slovenia. He is the author of several books and analyses on history, among them Ave Wilson: USA and the Remaking of Slovenia in Versailles 1919–1920, (2003) and Sacro Egoismo: Slovenians in the Clutches of the Secret London Pact of 1915 (2012). Please Donate to CN’s Summer Fund Drive! Western bankers will have to be reigned in if this security plan is to have a chance of success. 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