Crooks Behind Manchester Airports Group Hack Leaked Data of 8.8 Million People

Manchester Airports Group, which operates Manchester, London Stansted and East Midlands airports, has confirmed a data breach involving customer information held in a third-party database. The company says airport operations, passenger safety and aviation security were not affected, but the incident has exposed data that can make fraud far more convincing. The data related to parking, lounge and Fast Track bookings, as well as airport Wi-Fi sign-ups. MAG said attackers took email addresses, phone numbers, vehicle registration details and postcodes, while payment-card data was not accessed. The group disclosed the incident on 27 August and said it had contained the risk, engaged specialist advisers and notified relevant authorities. The extortion group FulcrumSec claimed responsibility for the intrusion and leaked the data after MAG had refused its ransom demand. “Today we are releasing the Manchester Airports Group dataset: every customer, event, configuration that serves Manchester Airport, London Stansted and East Midlands Airport. Half a terabyte, and every byte of it is pure PII. However, we have decided to withhold the most dangerous part of the breach : the nearly 200,000 passengers whose entire upcoming travel schedules were exposed by MAG’s negligence, which, when linked with their full PII and vehicle information, creates an ideal opportunity for burglars, stalkers, and worse.” FulcrumSec wrote on its data leak site. “Unfortunately for them, MAG made zero effort to protect all their data they’d been collecting. The way we gained access was so simple it is tragi-comical: Iterable admin keys in the frontend JavaScript of each of its three airports’ websites: manchesterairport.co.uk, stanstedairport.com, and eastmidlandsairport.com. Each site had its own key hardcoded into it that provided access to millions of passengers who had passed through that airport. That means for this breach to have occurred at the scale it did, MAG had to make a catastrophic security mistake not once, not twice, but THREE times.” FulcrumSec claims it accessed MAG’s systems using administrator keys exposed in the JavaScript of its three airport websites. MAG hasn’t confirmed this, and SecurityWeek hasn’t independently verified it, so the claim remains unproven. Still, the case highlights a basic security rule: keep secrets off client-side code, rotate them regularly, limit access and scan code, repositories, logs and configurations for accidental exposure. The group then published roughly 550 GB of uncompressed data it says came from the airport operator’s systems. “These exposed keys gave us access to the following: The announcement claims that a leaked MAG database exposes 190,849 future bookings, including 142,755 linked to vehicle registrations, potentially revealing when homes will be empty. It also claims the data includes thousands of government, judicial, military, police, NHS and defence-industry employees, creating significant security risks. The attackers say they removed the most sensitive travel details before publishing, while accusing MAG of downplaying the breach. Databreach notification service Have I Been Pwned processed the available dataset and added the incident to its breach database. The service reports that approximately 8.8 million email addresses and phone numbers were compromised, alongside names, IP addresses, browser user-agent details, geographic information, purchases and vehicle registration plates. That is not just a list of email addresses. It is a working fraud kit: a criminal can link a person to an airport, a booking type, a car, a location and a contact number. They don’t need to guess much after that. What affected people should do Anyone who has used MAG’s parking, lounge, Fast Track or airport Wi-Fi services should assume that phishing attempts may become more tailored. They should be cautious with messages claiming to concern a booking, refund, parking penalty, account problem or payment request. Users should change passwords if they reused one associated with these services elsewhere, especially on email accounts. They should also enable multi-factor authentication, review account-recovery methods and avoid clicking links in unexpected messages. A legitimate organisation will not ask for a password, a banking PIN or a one-time authentication code by email, SMS or phone. If a message refers to a booking, open the relevant airport or provider site manually rather than following the link it contains. The Have I Been Pwned breach entry allows users to check whether their email address appears in the published dataset. Follow me on Twitter: @securityaffairs and Facebook and Mastodon (SecurityAffairs – hacking, Manchester Airports Group)