America’s “direct return” doctrine

America’s “direct return” doctrine—and what it means for the world In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United States is focused on doing business, at the expense of peace. There are ways for Europeans to acquire a veto over these destabilising activities; but the Trump administration may yet replicate this approach across the globe Last month the US announced a new policy for the Western Balkans: henceforth its decisions are to be guided by the need to pursue “direct return” for American companies. This replaces the goal of “open-ended institution building”, which had been the essence of international policy since 1995’s Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).[1] But this announcement merely reflected what is already happening in the region under the second Trump administration. Politically connected Americans seek to earn money by weakening Dayton’s international institutions. They request the support of the US government, which it gladly provides. Each act of chipping away at those institutions creates yet more commercial opportunities. This behaviour undermines the peace that has held for 30 years. For Europeans, the need is thus simple: recognise that America is treating the Western Balkans as a playground of business opportunities that runs counter to European interests. Europeans must answer in kind by securing the power to veto US commercial deals to protect their interests. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Pipeline of deals The Trump administration’s policy of “direct return for US companies” is more a statement of existing practice. To illustrate: last year, the US lifted sanctions on a long-time Bosnian politician who had styled himself as pro-MAGA. This was not because he (it’s always a guy) had ceased his sanctionable activity, which includes lobbying campaigns that featured a single contract of $4m aiming at securing “the independence of Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina.”[2] Soon after, the brother of a lobbyist who worked to lift those sanctions founded an American company which was promptly announced as owner of rights to build a new gas pipeline, the “Southern Interconnection”. The announcement followed intense lobbying of the administration, the company was the only bidder, and it has no experience in building or operating a pipeline. [3] Besides the probable enabling of corrupt practices in BiH represented by this case, the chipping away at the Dayton institutions soon ensued: the US demanded the resignation of the high representative, which duly happened. The high representative is the senior international official in BiH and, crucially, has authority to resolve a property dispute critical to the pipeline. The incumbent did not, however, favour a resolution sympathetic to the pipeline owners. The US had not prepared its partners for this demand, yet it still insists that a replacement be appointed quickly, ahead of Bosnian and US elections later this year. It has threatened to reassess its commitment to the Dayton framework if it does not get its way. Action, demand for speedy decision and threat, all acted out like Godfather cosplay by middle-aged men—this cycle is likely to recur. As well as benefiting US companies, such deals further enrich elites and cement them in power. These same elites have been impediments to the implementation of the Dayton agreement and especially of BiH’s integration into European structures. A new, presumably more amenable, high representative could thus enable not only the pipeline deal but transactions on more than 1,000 disputed properties, a cornucopia in Bosnian terms, including properties that Bosnian politicians have long sought to control. The high representative had just made a proposal to resolve those disputes without benefit going to politicians who had been undermining the peace deal. For weeks before and after his resignation, MAGA-affiliated Americans have been visiting Bosnian politicians, including one whose sanctions had been removed, for discussions of commercial deals. The administration suggests that US ownership of assets could provide long-term stability. But here is a further twist: rumours in BiH suggest the US company with the gas pipeline concession is likely to sell its interest quickly.[4] This would be money for virtually nothing, and thus a decent deal for US firms involved. Businesses chosen for support by the Trump administration will also have an eye on the Democrats’ likely control of a chamber of Congress in 2027, which would allow them to probe how those companies were selected. This swapping of ownership could create further problems for Europe. If the US company sells, local elites opposed to the pipeline may well acquire the rights. Russian entities may also put in an offer. Either way, just last month the administration said that both corruption and dependence on Russian energy interests have been a “strategic vulnerability” in the region, one the pipeline aims to address. [5] The same administration’s pursuit of “direct return for American companies” may thus steer the region deeper into that vulnerability. Serbia: Signal for the future BiH may be just a warm-up. In Serbia, the Nis oil refinery—the most lucrative company in Serbia, and which is owned by Russian entities—has been under American sanctions since October 2024, when I served in the US government. At the time I left office in January 2025, the refinery’s trajectory seemed clear: the US would relax sanctions but only to facilitate a sale to acceptable, non-Russian owners. The Russians would be paid for their shares. In the meantime, the refinery, which is crucial to oil supplies across the region, would be allowed to operate. As God is my witness, I thought that Republicans would know how to manage the sale of an oil refinery. Instead, the Trump administration has zigged and zagged. It relaxed and then enforced sanctions on Nis, jeopardising oil supplies throughout the region, and finally in December 2025 agreed to allow the Hungarian state oil company, MOL, to negotiate for the refinery. At the time, this would have allowed the then Kremlin-friendly Hungarian government to buy the asset. This administration renewed its approval by issuing a new licence shortly before the Hungarian election. MOL still intends to operate the refinery itself, but the sale has not been approved by either Russia or the US administration. What the administration does about Nis may tell us something about its remaining two years in power. It could support MOL, now associated with Hungary’s anti-corruption, pro-European government; back a qualified, pro-Western consortium to buy Nis if one is found; or allow Russians to keep the refinery. This last option would suggest the administration continues to believe commercial deals between the US and Russia remain possible (which could be ominous for Ukraine). Or the administration could require a US purchaser. This would be evidence of its new “direct return” policy in action; that is, taking care of the administration’s supporters. Such a choice would portend a raucous, self-dealing period until this term ends in January 2029. If an American buyer of Nis looks to sell quickly, it is highly likely that Russian bidders will seek to enter the mix. Acquiring European vetoes The core challenge for Europe is to get a veto on the commercial deals that motivate US policy. Europeans can then seek a reasonable resolution on BiH’s governance front. In BiH, Europe’s best option is to have an empowered high representative in place with a mandate to avoid corrupt or opaque deals on state property or critical infrastructure like the Southern Interconnection. The issue is less who the high representative is—although a person from a large state or with a political-level background could help—than what the mandate is on property issues. Winning US agreement on an empowered high representative will require a difficult discussion at political levels. This may mean seeing France take the leading role, given President Emmanuel Macron’s personal involvement in the issue. It will likely result in a distasteful deal where the US gets some of what it wants, perhaps including agreements to allow American client actors in BiH to participate in the Bosnian autumn elections as well as clearance for a select number of commercial deals related to state property. Europe would protect the peace agreement and include stipulations that neither European nor Bosnian state entities will pay compensation if the commercial deals fall apart. Europeans can point to the fact that the commercial deals need European markets and perhaps investment. They can also point out the US cannot walk away from peace structures altogether without losing its vote within them. In Serbia, the EU has a simple way forward: use its sanctions authorities to require the transfer of Nis to a buyer it deems acceptable. The EU designated the refinery’s largest shareholder in 2022 but held back from ordering the transfer of ownership. The European Commission could take that step on its own authority now. Whatever its original reasons for inaction, these no longer seem to hold. The failure to use the authority silences Europe on what might be the most important piece of energy infrastructure in the region. The EU could reinforce its offer by supporting a European-led consortium to buy the refinery. It might also incorporate requirements for pro-European ownership of Nis into its various tools for integrating Serbia into the single market and into various European sectoral arrangements on energy and transport. Slight return The logic of the US policy to seek “near-term, measurable” returns to American companies points in one direction—towards a weakening of the international institutions that have delivered peace in BiH for more than 30 years. The money flowing from these deals seems too small to jeopardise peace. But power and money will flow towards people who thrive on the margins of the rule of law. These are the grey areas built by the wars of the 1990s and which—without the Dayton infrastructure and EU interest—are the kind that too often return to conflict. This is how peace will unravel in the age of Trump. Even those who do not follow the Balkans should look carefully at what is happening there. The choices made by the administration in support of money-for-a-few could indicate how it will act over the last years of the Trump administration, in Gaza, Ukraine, Iran, the South Caucasus and around the world. Europeans can change this, and they have options to do so. The author participated in the negotiation and particularly the drafting of the Dayton Peace Agreement, served as US presidential envoy for the region several years after Dayton and was involved in US policy as the secretary of state’s sanctions coordinator and assistant secretary for Europe in the Biden administration. [1] Report to Congress on United States Policy to Promote Regional Stability and Prosperity in the Western Balkans, pursuant to Section 7109e of the National Security, Department of State, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2026 (Div. F, PL 119-75) and the Joint Explanatory Statement (May 2026) (hereinafter “Report”). [2] See disclosure of Dickson Canada at Department of Justice Foreign Agents Registration Act registry, https://www.justice.gov/nsd-fara. Filing received by DoJ on October 3rd 2025 (accessed June 22nd 2026). [3] Author conversations, May 2026. [4] Author conversations, May 2026. [5] Report, supra note 1, at page 4. The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.