EU space policy shows the limits of strategic autonomy

The EU has targeted strategic autonomy, but autonomy from whom? Bruno S. Sergi and Dario Pellicanò show that in the case of space policy, the EU’s measures fall short of giving Europe real independence, especially in relation to the United States. In November last year, the United States provided some illuminating feedback to the European Commission on its draft EU Space Act. Washington encouraged the EU to avoid using untrusted suppliers for its space services, specifically mentioning Russian and Chinese companies. Yet at the same time, it opposed digital sovereignty measures that might restrict American companies from entering the European market. These contrasting positions raise a fundamental question: the EU has said it would like to achieve “strategic autonomy”, but autonomy from whom? In the field of aerospace, clarity isn’t achieved through bold statements alone but through a well-structured and secure supply chain. In this area, the EU still needs to develop clear regulatory or industrial solutions. An asymmetric alliance When the EU speaks about securing autonomy from Russia and China, the meaning is plain. But things are left deliberately vague with the United States because dependency on Washington is more complicated. The EU countries and the United States have a friendly network of supply agreements, including the Artemis Accords, along with scientific and industrial collaborations that the EU has willingly embraced and still depends on. This is not a hostile relationship. Rather, the relationship between the EU and the United States is what an asymmetric alliance looks like in practice. For instance, in its comments on the draft EU Space Act, the US urged the EU to prevent disruption to transatlantic supply chains but did not offer – and was never asked to offer – any corresponding relaxation of its own export controls. Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the United States retains the power to decide what the EU may buy, use and re-export. It can do so because it is the stronger partner in the relationship and the EU, as the weaker partner, is obliged to engage with the US on this basis. This is why autonomy in space cannot be discussed without reckoning with an ally rather than a partner. Europe’s reliance on the US Consider a satellite designed, financed and assembled in Europe. If a critical radiation-hardened component falls under US export controls, a licensing decision taken outside Europe may still determine where it can be sold, launched or operated. European institutions have been addressing this for two decades. The European Space Agency launched a European Component Initiative in 2004 to reduce reliance on suppliers subject to export restrictions, targeting pin-compatible European replacements for ITAR-listed devices. The EU’s own case studies show why. For example, the European Space Agency has long depended on a single American manufacturer’s ability to supply radiation-hardened accelerometers, as well as on the US government’s willingness to allow this. The pursuit of alternatives continues today: the Horizon Europe Work Programme 2026-2027 asks applicants to demonstrate that their supply chain and final product are free from export restrictions such as ITAR. A funding instrument that keeps asking this of its own industry is knowingly describing a dependency. And yet, it addresses this dependency with the lever of funding rather than the lever of law. An alternative already exists The EU Space Act asks operators to map their supply chains, inventory non-EU assets, and adopt reduction strategies. But this mainly results in an inventory being produced rather than ensuring compliance. As Eurospace, which represents most European space manufacturing, mentioned to the Commission in November 2025, the Act missed the chance to treat supply chain resilience as a matter of sovereignty rather than just competitiveness. Additionally, it imposes no compliance obligations on suppliers. Yet an alternative already exists. The European Defence Industry Programme, Regulation (EU) 2025/2643, requires that at least 65% of component costs come from the EU or associated countries. It also gives the EU primary design authority. It allows recipients to make product design decisions without interference from non-associated third countries, including the ability to substitute or remove restricted parts. The Cybersecurity Act 2, proposed on 20 January 2026, would also enable the Commission to identify third countries of concern, categorise suppliers as high-risk based on their establishment, ownership and control, and mandate phase-outs applying these rules to satellite networks as well through Article 111. This means Europe can influence funding based on origin, enforce the removal of restricted components and would even be able to exclude certain suppliers altogether. However, these regulatory powers of acceptance or exclusion do not currently extend to the EU Space Act. Is Europe serious about strategic autonomy? Europe has clearly responded to the challenge of reducing dependencies. It has targeted Chinese suppliers and given itself the power to exclude them. It has also taken steps to address dependencies in the space industry, mainly by requiring reporting rather than taking direct action. Yet while these measures provide a detailed list of parts Europe doesn’t fully control, they still fall short of giving Europe real independence, especially in relation to the United States. The real question now is whether Europe is ready to openly acknowledge this dependency and take meaningful steps beyond merely identifying it. Note: This article gives the views of the authors, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics. Image credit: IM_photo provided by Shutterstock.