Moscow Aims to Treat Critical Minerals as Diplomatic Instruments

Moscow Aims to Treat Critical Minerals as Diplomatic Instruments Moscow Aims to Treat Critical Minerals as Diplomatic Instruments Executive Summary: - Russia is increasingly treating critical minerals as instruments of foreign policy, using state-backed resource projects tos deepen long-term strategic partnerships across BRICS countries and the broader Global South rather than simply expanding commodity exports. - Moscow’s approach combines upstream resource access with processing, technology cooperation, and existing nuclear-sector relationships. Sanctions, infrastructure constraints, and strong international competition, however, limit its ability to translate geological potential into industrial influence. - Cooperation with India, Brazil, and Bolivia demonstrates that Russia’s critical-minerals diplomacy is tailored to local political and economic conditions but consistently seeks to embed resource cooperation within broader state-to-state strategic relationships. On June 16, reports emerged that Moscow offered India access to the Tomtor rare-earth deposit in Yakutia. This deposit is one of the world’s largest undeveloped rare earth element sites, with forecast resources of 154 million tons of ore and audited initial resources of 13.2 million tons of high-grade ore. India’s state-owned IREL is reportedly discussing the delivery of samples, with preliminary processing expected in Russia before the material is sent to India for analysis (The Moscow Times, June 16). Earlier reporting indicated that Russia and India were discussing broader cooperation in rare earth and lithium exploration and processing, while India was simultaneously working with Argentina, Australia, Japan, Peru, and Chile (Kommersant, May 12). This creates room for Moscow, but not as a monopoly power since India’s strategy is diversification, not dependence. Even without becoming India’s principal supplier, Russia can still gain political influence, industrial cooperation, and commercial openings through India’s diversification strategy. These moves fit a broader Russian effort to use critical minerals to diversify away from hydrocarbons and to build state-backed industrial partnerships across the BRICS and the wider Global South (see EDM, April 27, 2023, February 13, April 24). [1] In that model, upstream resource access is linked to processing, technology cooperation, and existing ties in the nuclear sector. Moscow is not trying to replace the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—the world’s largest producer of critical metals—but to position itself as an additional strategic partner for countries seeking more room to maneuver. Granting India access to Tomtor is the instrument through which Moscow is trying to turn geological potential into industrial leverage (The Moscow Times, June 16). The project, however, is geographically remote, infrastructure-heavy, technically difficult, and tied to sanctioned state-controlled actors. India may be able to analyze samples, but whether it has the technology, logistics, and risk appetite to process Siberian rare earths at industrial scale is uncertain. In the near term, Tomtor is less likely to deliver a supply breakthrough than to signal that Russia can bundle upstream access, state backing, and prospective processing cooperation into a longer-term political offer. If Tomtor shows the upstream logic of Russia’s strategy, Brazil shows how Moscow tries to scale that model through Rosatom’s pre-existing institutional footprint in a core BRICS state. In March, Rosatom’s Uranium One Group and Núcleo Brasil Energia Participações signed an agreement to create Nadina Minerals, a joint venture for critical mineral exploration and extraction in Brazil (World Nuclear News, March 26). Rosatom framed the project as covering permits, geological exploration, extraction, and processing facilities for metals critical to high-tech industries. Russian industry media also stressed Brazil’s large reserves and Rosatom’s existing medical-isotope business with Brazilian customers (Strana Rosatom, April 6). In this configuration, Brazil is especially attractive because Rosatom already has a nuclear foothold there, including uranium supply for Angra and a 2025 enrichment-services contract (Strana Rosatom, February 27). More broadly, Rosatom uses existing nuclear relationships to enter adjacent strategic sectors (see EDM, March 11). In Brazil, rare earths look less like a standalone business line than an extension of Russia’s state-led engagement model. Despite a promising future, Brazil also reveals the limits of Russian ambition. Moscow is entering a crowded field in which the European Union, the United States, India, and Japan all seek access to Brazilian critical minerals (Indian Embassy in Brazil, July 8, 2025; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2, 2024; U.S. Embassy in Brazil, March 18; Folha de S.Paulo, June 16). Because Brasília prizes strategic autonomy, Russia is likely to be one partner among many rather than an indispensable patron. There is no guarantee that an agreement, which at this stage looks more like a declaration of intent than a joint strategic agreement, will lead to substantive cooperation between the two parties. Sanctions also complicate financing, insurance, technology transfer, and access to Western equipment. Brazil may welcome Russian expertise where it is useful and cost-effective, but it is likely to avoid arrangements that jeopardize its broader economic and geopolitical options. Russia’s presence in Bolivia illustrates how Moscow is attempting to apply the same strategic logic to lithium diplomacy beyond rare earths (see EDM, February 23). Although lithium is distinct from rare earth elements, both belong to the broader category of critical minerals that Russia increasingly views as instruments of long-term geopolitical engagement. Early reporting on the Rodrigo Paz administration (in office since 2025) suggests greater continuity than rupture. The Bolivian side is more likely to honor existing lithium agreements while seeking broader regulatory and contractual clarity than to end cooperation with Moscow abruptly (Russia’s Pivot to Asia, January 2). For Russia, Bolivian lithium is not only a technology export opportunity but also a sanctions-era supply-security issue. Russian analysis notes that Argentina and Chile curtailed lithium exports to Russia after 2022, while Russia’s own industrial production remains delayed. Bolivia could become critical for Russian battery projects and so-called “technological sovereignty” (RIAC, May 15). Moscow also benefits politically if it can portray Bolivia as another Global South partner resisting Western dominance. Bolivia also has alternatives. For instance, the PRC is already deeply involved in the country’s resource sector. In contrast, the United States and the European Union have shown growing interest in Bolivian lithium, even if neither has yet matched the scale of Chinese and Russian positioning there. German sources previously emphasized how Russia and the PRC outpaced German firms in Bolivia’s lithium race (DW, December 28, 2023). The current situation, however, creates a more beneficial competitive landscape for Bolivia’s European partners. Bolivia can use this competition to renegotiate terms, demand transparency, and extract better fiscal, environmental, and social concessions. Additionally, local resistance in Potosí, indigenous consultation requirements, and environmental concerns further constrain Russia’s room for maneuver. Russia’s comparative advantage is not supply-chain dominance on the Chinese model. It is state coordination. Rosatom, Rosneft-linked assets, diplomatic backing, and BRICS rhetoric allow Moscow to package minerals as elements of broader strategic partnerships rather than simple commodity sales. That model can appeal to some Global South governments because it offers training, pilot projects, political support, and fewer governance conditions than Western-backed arrangements. This appeals to some Global South governments seeking leverage against the West. That advantage remains narrow. The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) estimates that Russia produced 2,600 metric tons of rare earths in 2025, compared with the PRC’s 270,000 metric tons and a global total of 390,000 metric tons, leaving Russia at well under 1 percent of global mining output (USGS, 2026). Russia still lacks the separation, refining, and magnet ecosystem that gives the PRC system-wide leverage. At the same time, sanctions, capital shortages, and the incomplete implementation of earlier state plans continue to constrain rapid scaling (NedraDV, 2022). The weaknesses are substantial and, realistically speaking, quite challenging to overcome in a short period of time. Additionally, Russia faces sanctions, suffers from capital and technology constraints, and often depends on partners that are themselves diversifying away from overdependence. Earlier government plans in Russia to expand rare earth output were not fully implemented, while the 2026–2030 period is more likely to bring limited industrial growth than rapid scaling (Dprom, January 27; Institute of International Market Research, May 20). Therefore, Russia’s critical-minerals diplomacy could be seen more as a bid to convert geological potential into geopolitical leverage, not as a ready-made alternative to PRC dominance. Its success—which, at the moment, appears vague—will depend on whether Moscow can move beyond upstream extraction and prove useful in processing, financing, and politically durable industrial partnerships. Note: [1] BRICS is a loose political-economic grouping originally comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, the PRC, and South Africa, but now comprising 11 members.