Gaza’s depopulation debate is more than mere election talk

For much of the past year, the idea of removing Palestinians from Gaza appeared to have been pushed back from official possibility to the margins of Israeli politics. It has now returned with something more substantial than a slogan: numbers, a timetable, possible destinations and a proposed government ministry. Israel’s far-right National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir has unveiled a plan called “Disengagement 710.” It envisages 250,000 Palestinians leaving Gaza in its first year, 1.11 million within three years and about 1.86 million within seven. He wants the next Israeli government to establish a ministry dedicated to what he calls “voluntary emigration.” Defense Minister Israel Katz has reinforced the message, arguing that there is “no real solution for Gaza” without such migration and saying Israel is prepared to move Palestinians out by sea or air if suitable countries can be found. The electoral motive is difficult to miss. Israel votes on Oct. 27 and Gaza has become a test of ideological loyalty on the right. Ben-Gvir needs to distinguish himself from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and from other nationalist parties competing for the same voters. The more radical the proposal, the easier it becomes to accuse rivals of weakness. Netanyahu, meanwhile, faces an election with his security credentials still damaged by the Oct. 7, 2023, attacks. He needs far-right voters and possibly Ben-Gvir’s seats to build another coalition. Allowing his allies to revive the idea of removing Gazans helps keep that constituency mobilized without requiring Netanyahu to adopt the entire program formally. That makes the new campaign partly political theater. But it would be dangerous to conclude that it is only theater. The new campaign is partly political theater. But it would be dangerous to conclude that it is only theater Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy Election rhetoric does not emerge in an ideological vacuum. The belief that Israel’s security and demographic problems can be resolved by reducing the Palestinian population has existed for decades on the Israeli far right. What has changed is that ideas once confined to the fringes have entered government language. Katz is not a marginal activist — he is the defense minister and a member of Netanyahu’s Likud party. There is also an administrative foundation. Israel’s Defense Ministry established an office in 2025 to oversee “voluntary emigration” from Gaza. Netanyahu has said he supports allowing Gazans to leave voluntarily, although he has described proposals to rebuild Jewish settlements inside Gaza as unrealistic. The distinction matters but so does the fact that the principle of large-scale departure has already received support at the highest levels of government. The word “voluntary” is doing a great deal of political and legal work. In normal circumstances, people have the right to emigrate. Palestinians should not be imprisoned inside Gaza or denied the freedom to travel. But departure cannot meaningfully be described as voluntary if people are forced to choose between leaving and living indefinitely among ruins, without secure housing, functioning hospitals, adequate food or any credible prospect of reconstruction. The collapse of a war-damaged apartment building in Gaza City last week illustrated that reality. Families were living inside a structure known to be unsafe because they had nowhere else to go. More than 2 million people remain crowded into tents, temporary shelters or damaged buildings, while reconstruction has barely begun. International humanitarian law prohibits the individual or mass forcible transfer of protected civilians from occupied territory. Force does not necessarily mean putting people on buses at gunpoint. A coercive environment can also remove genuine choice. This is why the material conditions inside Gaza cannot be separated from the migration proposals. If reconstruction is obstructed while incentives to leave are offered, “voluntary emigration” risks becoming forced displacement by another name. A territory can be depopulated gradually, through exhaustion and despair, without a single formal deportation order. Yet a mass removal operation is neither imminent nor easy to execute. Three major obstacles remain. The first is the absence of willing destination countries. Egypt rejects any transfer of Gazans into Sinai, viewing it as both a threat to Egyptian national security and an attempt to liquidate the Palestinian cause. Jordan fears that accepting displacement from Gaza would create a precedent for similar pressure on Palestinians in the West Bank. Other states have shown no appetite for absorbing hundreds of thousands of people whose departure might become permanent. The second obstacle is regional resistance. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Qatar, Turkiye, Indonesia and Pakistan have jointly condemned proposals to remove Gaza’s population. They warned that converting such statements into policy would undermine regional stability and contradict President Donald Trump’s own Gaza framework. The third and most important obstacle is Washington. Trump himself gave the displacement idea unprecedented oxygen in February 2025, when he proposed an American takeover of Gaza and the relocation of its inhabitants. He later retreated under Arab and international pressure. His subsequent peace plan said that nobody would be forced to leave, that those choosing to go could return and that Gazans should be encouraged to remain. That creates a real tension between Washington and the Israeli right. Trump is strongly committed to Israel but mass displacement could destroy his regional plan, alienate Arab partners and make any wider diplomatic arrangement impossible. Israeli ministers may hope that the president’s earlier enthusiasm can be revived. For now, however, they do not have the clear American approval required for implementation. The election explains the timing and intensity of the language. It does not explain the ideology behind it Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy Netanyahu’s ambiguity may therefore be deliberate. By neither fully endorsing nor decisively rejecting the proposals, he satisfies several needs at once: he reassures the right, tests Washington’s limits and avoids immediate responsibility for a plan that lacks destinations and international legitimacy. But ambiguity carries its own danger. Repetition normalizes the previously unacceptable. A proposal introduced as an election slogan can become a coalition demand, then a government committee, a budget line and finally an operational policy. Political theater sometimes prepares the audience for what comes next. The critical indicators are therefore not more speeches. They are whether Israel formally establishes and funds an emigration ministry; whether agreements are negotiated with receiving states; whether Palestinians who leave retain an enforceable right to return; whether reconstruction materials enter Gaza at scale; and whether renewed military operations are used to concentrate civilians near exit points. So, is the renewed talk of depopulating Gaza merely election-driven rhetoric or has a genuine crisis returned? The honest answer is both. The election explains the timing and intensity of the language. It does not explain the ideology behind it, the government structures already created or the conditions that could make departure appear to be the only remaining choice. Gaza is not yet facing an executable plan for the immediate removal of its entire population. But it is facing something serious: the gradual conversion of displacement from an extremist fantasy into a policy option discussed by serving ministers. The greatest danger may not be a dramatic expulsion witnessed in a single day. It may be a slower process in which Gaza remains uninhabitable, its people leave one family at a time and the promised right of return quietly disappears. Dr. Abdellatif El-Menawy has covered conflicts worldwide. He is the author of “The Copts: An Investigation into the Rift between Muslims and Copts in Egypt.” X: @ALMenawy