What Iran’s resilience tells China, Russia about US power

When the US-Israeli war against Iran began, few in Beijing or Moscow likely expected Tehran to withstand military pressure from two of the world’s most capable powers. In the early days, US and Israeli air, intelligence and technological superiority were striking, and Iran suffered heavy blows. But what could have been a short campaign to disable Iran’s military capabilities has turned into a longer, costlier war. Despite severe losses, Iran has preserved its political structure and much of its military response capability — proof that inflicting extensive damage and forcing surrender are two very different things. This resilience is more than a battlefield development. For China and Russia, the war has become a real test of the limits of American power. The two countries have different stakes in the conflict, but neither can treat a decisive Iranian defeat as a purely Middle Eastern matter. Both appear to understand that if the United States can use military superiority to strategically weaken one of West Asia’s most important independent powers, the region’s balance of power will shift, with consequences reaching into the broader geopolitical and geoeconomic contest among Washington, Beijing and Moscow. China’s dilemma China may have more economic reason than any other major power to want the war to end. Disruptions to energy flows and insecurity in the Strait of Hormuz hit the Chinese economy directly, since China has been Iran’s largest oil buyer for years. Reuters reported that China’s seaborne crude imports in August 2026 stood at roughly 7.14 million barrels per day, nearly 40% below the prewar average. The disruption has also cut Chinese refineries off from a key source of crude. But this is where Beijing’s central contradiction begins. The war’s continuation hurts China, yet it cannot easily welcome Iran’s strategic defeat either. Iran is not merely an oil exporter to Beijing; Tehran is part of the network of relationships China has built across West Asia to expand its economic and political influence without the military alliances the US relies on. A severe weakening of Iran would mean more than a shift between Tehran and Washington — it would mean greater US influence in the region and less strategic space for China. China’s conduct bears this out. Its support for Iran has never been confined to political statements during years of maximum US pressure. For one, Beijing has remained a major buyer of Iranian oil, and independent Chinese refineries have remained among the most important markets for that oil even under threat of secondary US sanctions, which is why Washington has made Chinese purchases a centerpiece of its economic pressure campaign. That relationship has only grown more consequential during the war. As Washington works to cut off Iran’s oil exports and related financial channels, China remains one of the few major economies able to absorb part of the pressure on Tehran. For Beijing, buying Iranian oil is not simply a commercial transaction — it’s part of a larger contest over how far US sanctions can dictate the behavior of major economies outside Washington’s orbit. That is also why US pressure on Chinese buyers has become a persistent point of friction between the two powers. China’s support isn’t limited to economics, either. US reports in recent years have pointed to Iranian access to certain dual-use technologies, including some used in its drone and missile programs, through companies and commercial networks linked to China. A distinction should be drawn between official Chinese government policy and the activities of China-based commercial networks. Still, those networks illustrate how the economic relationship helps preserve part of Iran’s technological and industrial base under sanctions. Diplomatically, Beijing has likewise declined to support Iran’s complete isolation. China, alongside Russia, has repeatedly called for a political resolution and opposed international measures it considers unilateral pressure on Iran. That doesn’t mean Beijing is committed to defending Iran militarily — it continues to seek an end to the war and stability along energy routes. But there’s a meaningful difference between ending the war and ending it with Iran severely weakened and the regional balance tilted toward Washington. This is where Iran’s resilience matters most for China. The more Tehran shows it can maintain its response capability after heavy attacks, the more complicated Beijing’s calculus becomes about the consequences of a decisive Iranian defeat. China doesn’t need to enter the war to support Iran. Its economic, commercial, technological and diplomatic tools let it resist Tehran’s total isolation without becoming a direct party to the conflict. Perhaps the most valuable thing China is gaining from this war, though, is neither oil nor its relationship with Tehran, but a strategic lesson about the United States itself. The conflict has let Beijing observe US forces’ actual performance in a high-intensity war, including with regard to long-range strikes, air operations, ammunition consumption, logistics, missile defense and more. For a country whose future competition with Washington centers heavily on Taiwan, that experience is far from trivial. Russia’s stake is different Russia’s calculation diverges from China’s. Moscow doesn’t share Beijing’s dependence on Middle Eastern energy, and higher energy prices can even create short-term advantages for the Russian economy. For the Kremlin, the Iran question is bound up instead with Russia’s position in Eurasia and the prospects for a multipolar order. Iran is not just a regional partner for Moscow — it’s one of the few powers simultaneously locked in conflict with the US and Israel, capable of pulling some geopolitical pressure on Russia away from Europe and Ukraine and toward the Middle East. A recent analysis in Middle East Policy argues the war has created short-term strategic advantages for Russia while raising Iran’s importance to both Russia’s regional standing and its relationship with China. Evidence of Russia-Iran military cooperation extends well beyond politics. Financial Times reporting indicates that Russian experts have worked with Iran since 2023, under a secret program, to develop propulsion technology for hypersonic cruise missiles — cooperation that continued into 2026. Other reports point to satellite cooperation and transfers of military equipment between the two countries. None of this amounts to a formal military alliance. Neither China nor Russia has extended Iran a security guarantee comparable to the mutual commitments of a formal defense pact. But that informal cooperation may be the most important feature of these relationships today: both powers can use economic, technological and diplomatic tools to strengthen Iran’s capabilities and constrain US pressure without committing to a direct war with Washington. Emerging new global order Ultimately, the significance of the US-Israeli war against Iran doesn’t hinge only on who gains the upper hand on the battlefield. The larger question is whether the United States can still use its military and economic superiority to impose its preferred political outcome on a regional power. For China and Russia, the answer matters in more ways than one. If Iran can keep resisting despite military pressure and economic sanctions, the war will show that America’s ability to inflict damage is not the same as its ability to impose a political order — a lesson especially relevant to China as it prepares for long-term competition with Washington. At the same time, China and Russia’s conduct shows that challenging US hegemony doesn’t require a formal anti-American alliance. Buying Iranian oil, sustaining trade, transferring technology, cooperating militarily and wielding UN Security Council vetos are all part of a broader toolkit that raises the cost of unilateral US power. On April 7, China and Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution on the Strait of Hormuz, with Beijing explicitly arguing the council shouldn’t legitimize unauthorized military operations. None of this suggests a cohesive China-Russia-Iran axis is emerging. Their interests diverge in many respects, and none is willing to bear unlimited costs on another’s behalf. But the war in Iran could accelerate a broader shift from an order in which the United States sets the rules and outcomes of international crises toward one in which rival powers can raise the price of that exercise of power. The war has made the contours of this emerging order clearer. For Beijing and Moscow, Iran’s fate is not simply the fate of a regional partner. It is a test of whether the United States can still determine a war’s outcome on its own or whether other powers, through resistance, partnerships and counterpressure, can raise the costs of US hegemony high enough to push the international order inexorably toward multipolarity. Seyed Reza Hashemi Jebeli is a PhD candidate in international relations at Imam Sadiq University in Tehran, specializing in Iranian foreign policy, China-Iran relations, China–Middle East affairs and the emerging global order. Shock & Awe lacks teeth without boots on the ground.