Russia Concerned About Upcoming NPT Review

Russia Concerned About Upcoming NPT Review Russia Concerned About Upcoming NPT Review Executive Summary - Russia is preparing for the 2026 NPT Review Conference by warning against “politicized” agendas that could challenge its nuclear posture and constrain its freedom of action. - The Kremlin is appearing concerned about new cooperation among members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), particularly as France is to boost its nuclear arsenal and extend nuclear deterrence arrangements in Europe. - Russian officials are attempting to shift responsibility for their own nuclear behavior onto Western states while struggling to manage their approach to Iran and escalating nuclear intimidation narratives toward Ukraine and NATO. The Kremlin is due to approach the upcoming Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) with “a significant number of disagreements” with other signatories, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. On March 24, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN Office in Geneva, Gennady Gatilov, expressed visible concern about shifts in the transatlantic nuclear posture ahead of the 2026 NPT Review Conference (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 24). The review, which occurs every five years, will take place April 27–May 22 in New York City (United Nations; IAEA, accessed March 24). The conflict in Iran and France’s updated nuclear posture are central points of tension. Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation, Rosatom, is currently evacuating personnel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant (NPP) in Iran, claiming that the United States and Israel have launched strikes targeting the plant (Sputnik; Interfax, March 25). The Kremlin has struggled to respond to the U.S–Israeli strikes beyond narratives that conflict with its own behavior (see EDM, March 2). Moscow has held double standards over strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities compared to the approach it takes toward Ukraine and its ongoing occupation of the Zaporizhzhia NPP (see EDM, June 27, 2025). Russian officials frequently use fabricated claims to argue that Western states are attempting to reshape the nuclear balance. This allows Moscow to present itself as responding to external pressure rather than initiating escalation. On March 2, French President Emmanuel Macron announced an increase in French warhead numbers and invited European partners to participate in deterrence exercises (President of France, March 2). France and Germany also agreed to set up a “nuclear steering group” to deepen nuclear deterrence cooperation (President of France, March 2). The Kremlin is attempting to depict these moves as destabilizing while ignoring its own escalatory behavior. It frames France’s new direction on nuclear deterrence as part of a broader European movement toward a collective nuclear stance that challenges Russian national security and the NPT’s non-proliferation aims. Gatilov said that France’s intention to increase its nuclear arsenal will “very negatively impact” global disarmament dialogue (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 24). Gatilov also rebuked the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe as among the immediate threats to Russia’s security. In February, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) accused, without evidence, the United Kingdom and France of preparing to secretly transfer a nuclear warhead to Ukraine. The SVR said that it believed the United Kingdom and France could secure more favorable terms for Ukraine in ending the fighting (SVR, February 24). Despite France, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine having rejected the claims, Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, threatened the use of Russian nuclear weapons against Ukraine and supplier countries in a “nuclear conflict” (Telegram/@medvedev_telegram, February 24). A former head of the Soviet nuclear and radiation safety inspectorate said that Russia would launch a preemptive strike against the United Kingdom and France in response to such a move (Gazeta, February 24). The Russian nuclear doctrine considers aggression toward Russia by a non-nuclear weapons state that is supported by a nuclear weapons state to be considered a joint attack, thereby justifying a nuclear response (see EDM, December 18, 2025). North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) frontline states, especially Poland and the Baltic countries, are welcoming nuclear cooperation with France possibility given the threat from Russia, as well as interference by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (see EDM, January 16, 30; Euractiv, March 2; TVP World, March 3; LRT, March 5; The Parliament Magazine, March 12; The Baltic Times, March 16). These countries have been directly threatened by Russia’s stationing of nuclear weapons in Belarus (see EDM, April 17, December 2, 2025). Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk confirmed that his country is talking about joining a broader nuclear deterrence initiative with France (TVP World, March 3; see EDM, March 4). Marko Mihkelson, chairman of the Estonian parliament’s foreign affairs committee, said that using France’s nuclear capability would be the most “logical, fastest, and most cost-effective option” for the foundation of an independent European nuclear deterrent (Politico, February 5). Russia has consistently escalated its nuclear posture from a predominantly defensive deterrence model toward offensive nuclear deterrence and intimidation since its war against Ukraine began in February 2022 (see EDM, December 18, 2025). Putin frequently signals Russia’s commitment to strategic stability without pursuing follow-up actions, such as offering in September 2025 to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) (see EDM, December 18, 2025). The Kremlin later blamed the United States for failing to accept its proposal, since New START expired on February 5 (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 7). Moscow, meanwhile, brings a record of obstruction to nuclear non-proliferation. During the previous NPT Review Conference in August 2022, Russia blocked consensus on any agreed recommendations, preventing states from carrying forward a unified approach to the next cycle (United Nations, August 26, 2022). Russia’s subsequent decision to deploy nuclear weapons to Belarus further undermines its claim that it seeks stability. Russia’s attempts to shape the debate ahead of the 2026 NPT Review Conference reveal a broader pattern in which the Kremlin constructs a narrative that shifts responsibility for its nuclear behavior onto other nuclear-weapon states while it avoids accountability for its own actions. The Kremlin’s intentions surrounding nuclear weapons are malign and dangerous because it is willing to take risks (see EDM, December 18, 2025). The Kremlin’s willingness to manufacture threats and obstruct multilateral processes reflects its discomfort and potential fear of nuclear dynamics that are changing in ways it cannot direct or prevent.