Draft Law Would Exploit Tech for National Mobilization

Draft Law Would Exploit Tech for National Mobilization Draft Law Would Exploit Tech for National Mobilization Executive Summary: - Draft revisions to the National Defense Mobilization Law seek to ensure that civilian enterprises and capabilities, such as artificial intelligence developers and cybersecurity firms, efficiently support national mobilization. They also call for the development of more advanced data services. - The revisions are intended to make the system stronger and more operationally coherent, in part by taking advantage of technological developments from the past 15 years since the law’s passage - The proposed update would also reinforce the Party’s ability to manage supply chains and ensure that the needs of the mobilization system are met. This would occur through mandating supply chain security assessments, as well as through the standardization of data collection, processing, and exchange across civilian and military systems so that civilian technological capacity can be rapidly converted into military capability. Technology firm Moonshot unveiled its latest model, Kimi K3, in mid-July with claims that it rivals the best U.S. competitors (Kimi, July 16). State media coverage linked its success with the government policies that have “promoted an overall and systematic leap in the comprehensive strength of artificial intelligence” (推动人工智能综合实力整体性、系统性跃升) (Xinhua, July 17). Days after the model’s release, however, a White House advisor accused the company of stealing capabilities from U.S. firm Anthropic, and the U.S. Treasury Secretary threatened sanctions (Fox News, July 21; X/mkratsios47, July 22). More troubling than these allegations, though, are the ramifications of these advances means in within the Chinese system. Artificial intelligence (AI) companies within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) operate within a system that is both designed to and is making strides in efforts to convert civilian high-tech capabilities, including AI, to military use as a present requirement. In April, the National People’s Congress (NPC) proposed draft revisions to its National Defense Mobilization Law for the first time since its promulgation in 2010 (NPC Observer, April 27). The draft revisions codify deepened Party authority and institutional accountability, making the mobilization system stronger and more operationally coherent (China Brief, June 12). The revisions, which were drafted more than 15 years after the law’s original passage, have been made in part to adapt to changes in technological circumstances, with implications for mobilization planning. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) fuses national development interests with national defense interests as part of a single overarching agenda through the Integrated National Strategic System and Capabilities (INSSC). Technology is the area where that fusion is most apparent, because the capabilities driving economic development are increasingly directly tied to mobilization dependencies. Controlling And Exploiting Technology for Mobilization Since the National Defense Mobilization Law’s initial adoption in 2010, technology’s evolution has dramatically expanded what mobilization can achieve while simultaneously deepening the entanglement between civilian and military capability. The law’s technology provisions focus on creating the conditions through which civilian technological infrastructure can be relied on as a foundational layer of capabilities that support military operations. As a March 2026 PLA Daily analysis described, the technologies, resources, infrastructure, and social mobilization capabilities of the civilian system can be directly integrated into the combat system (PLA Daily, March 26). [1] The draft law contains substantial new technology-related content. These provisions reflect capabilities, infrastructure, and vulnerabilities that either did not exist or were in a far more nascent state when the 2010 law was adopted. The content included in the law covers three distinct areas: infrastructure supporting the mobilization system itself, including its digital and intelligent capabilities; data that will support real-time awareness of resource availability and supply chain chokepoints; and obligations placed on technology assets in wartime. Infrastructure that can support a dynamic and adaptive mobilization system is central to this effort. Article 4 of the draft law explicitly calls for “raising national defense mobilization’s informatization and intelligentization level” (提升国防动员信息化智能化水平) to strengthen mobilization (NPC Observer, April 27). Part of that process is focused on creating efficiency. The vision is for intelligent technologies like large models to enable the automatic conversion of national defense mobilization potential into actual capabilities, with digital resources improving the movement of materials “from factories directly to battlefields” (工厂直达战场) (PLA Daily, March 21, 2025). Article 7 then calls for the development of a “national defense mobilization data services and support system” (国防动员数据服务保障制度). These mandates are reliant on the integration into the mobilization system of research institutes and companies that build and operate the underlying infrastructure. This ensures reliability and that the system works. The draft law’s reinforcement of existing legal obligations on enterprises and institutions responsible for participating in mobilization work support this effort. Supply chain security is critical for mobilization readiness and the state’s sustained operations in a protracted conflict. Article 44 of the draft law introduces supply chain security assessments, an addition to the 2010 law. The article imposes on mobilization agencies the obligation to assess and actively manage the security and resilience of military equipment supply chains (NPC Observer, April 27). It remains to be seen, however, whether the state can ensure the “continuous mobilization of human, material, financial, and scientific and technological resources” (能否确保持续动员人力、物力、财力、科技等资源) in high-intensity, high-technology mechanized, informationized, and intelligentized warfare, while also ensuring that systemic “economic and social risks are not triggered in the process” (不引发经济社会系统性风险) (Soul of China, March 18). The draft law also addresses what happens to technology assets once mobilization is declared. Articles 45 and 47 extend existing stockpiling and priority supply obligations to data and software, alongside other strategic assets like physical equipment, materials, and energy. Among the provisions of article 46 is a call for “promoting civil–military common technical standards” (推广军民通用的技术标准) (NPC Observer, April 27). The standardization of data collection, processing, and exchange across civilian and military systems is a precondition for the rapid conversion of civilian technological capacity into military capability. [2] Once mobilization is declared, the draft law introduces two new provisions directly related to the information environment. Article 70 requires authorities to release authoritative information, manage all communications platforms, and standardize information dissemination order. Article 71 adds wireless communications to the list of sectors subject to wartime state control, which in practice could include everything from the requisition of civilian satellite communications systems to reprioritizing critical communications networks for military use. Conclusion The draft law’s technology provisions largely reflect changes already underway in the PRC’s mobilization system, but their codification is significant. Companies ranging from AI developers to cybersecurity firms to infrastructure operators are directly accountable to the PRC’s wartime mobilization planning and future conversion requirements. As a result, models like Kimi K3, whatever their origins, exist within a legal architecture that treats it as a mobilizable asset. Moreover, because the law makes clear that integration into the mobilization system is a continuous requirement, the condition that critical and emerging technology must be dual-use should therefore be understood as a permanent one. Notes [1] The relevant passage from the article reads: “Following the basic regulations of complex system coupling, resource allocation across all domains, and capability transformation between peacetime and wartime, the technologies, resources, infrastructure, and social mobilization capabilities carried by the civilian system can be directly integrated into the combat system through structural embedding, functional transformation, and systematic collaboration, providing strong support for the generation, expansion, and upgrading of military capabilities” (遵循复杂系统耦合、资源全域配置与能力平战转化基本规律，民用体系所承载的技术、资源、基础设施与社会动员能力，通过结构性嵌入、功能性转化与体系化协同，可直接融入作战体系，为军事能力生成、拓展与升级提供有力支撑). [2] For example, see: Standards Administration of China, May 21, 2019; National Development and Reform Commission, January 2019; Dongfanghong Think Tank, January 2026.