Is Quiboloy extraditable immediately?

Is Quiboloy extraditable immediately? The request of the United States for the extradition of pastor Apollo Quiboloy to face criminal charges in California reminds me of the first extradition decision of the Supreme Court 24 years ago involving the late Manila Rep. Mark Jimenez. “USA v. RTC Judge Purganan” (Sept. 24, 2002, en banc, that I had the honor of writing) was passed by a divided Court, 8-3-3, because of the due process question raised in the dissent of my bosom friend, Justice Jose C. Vitug. TO BEGIN WITH, EXTRADITION IS NO LONGER LIMITED TO POLITICAL OFFENSES. Neither is it a facility for asylum. Nor is it to be confused with deportation of undesirable aliens, which is a unilateral prerogative of states. It has become an indispensable tool to suppress crimes, including ordinary crimes. To curb interminable proceedings and establish clearer standards, the Court commendably codified and streamlined our extradition framework through the “Rules on Extradition Proceedings” (“Extradition Rules” or simply, “Rules”) on April 8, 2025. Let us examine the salient procedural changes. First, the new Rules expressly provide for an ex parte process for the issuance of an arrest warrant. In the case I decided, Judge Purganan set for hearing the application for a warrant of arrest of Jimenez. The Court ruled that the judge was wrong because a notice or hearing prior to the issuance of the arrest warrant “would give [Jimenez] ample opportunity to escape and, thus, to frustrate and defeat the very purpose of extradition.” Thus, upon receipt of the petition, the trial court—also referred to as the extradition court— shall conduct an ex parte review of the petition— that is, without any hearing and without the participation of the extraditee—and determine (1) the petition’s sufficiency in form and substance, (2) compliance with the law and the extradition treaty, and (3) the existence of probable cause. If satisfied, the court may issue an arrest warrant enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. Second, the Extradition Rules formalized the conditions for bail and affirmed my decision that “bail is a matter of discretion” and not a matter of right. Extraditions are not criminal proceedings where the presumption of innocence applies. Hence, bail may be granted only when the extraditees prove by clear and convincing evidence that they are not flight risks and would abide by the trial court’s orders. Third, appeals under the Extradition Rules now terminate at the Court of Appeals (CA). In contrast, Jimenez’s extradition case reached the highest tribunal precisely because extradition was then fraught with complexities and its procedural contours had not been clearly defined. Today, an appeal to the CA suspends the execution of the lower court’s judgment of extradition. But the CA must decide with finality within 90 calendar days, and its decision is immediately executory. The extraditee may then be surrendered to the requesting state. No appeal to the Supreme Court is allowed, although a separate petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion may still be entertained. The Extradition Rules accomplished what the Court earlier sought to achieve through jurisprudence. They clarified procedures, shortened timelines, and limited the avenues for delay. OBVIOUSLY, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH IS GRANTED DISCRETION to resolve Quiboloy’s predicament vis-à-vis his pending domestic charges. Under Article 11 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Philippine government may either (1) postpone extradition until local cases are concluded or (2) temporarily surrender the accused to the US to face the charges there. Obviously also, under the treaty, our laws, and the Rules, Quiboloy may be extradited. But not immediately because he is currently detained via an order of the Pasig Regional Trial Court (RTC) in connection with a non-bailable qualified human trafficking case. Importantly, the Pasig RTC ordered his arrest and detention in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, not in its extradition powers. The Department of Justice (DOJ) may, if it wants to, hasten Quiboloy’s prosecution to its conclusion. If convicted, Quiboloy may appeal in the ordinary manner. If acquitted, the DOJ may still proceed with immediate extradition. Given the snail pace of prosecutions, the faster way is for the DOJ to pray for the case’s archiving (so it will not be counted in the trial court’s docket) or for indefinite postponement. AS EMPHASIZED IN MY EARLIER DECISION, the judiciary—the bulwark of human rights—should nonetheless guard against legal contortions and “overdue process,” lest our country become a dubious haven where fugitives can delay, frustrate, and defeat the pursuit of justice. Ultimately, the executive branch—as the chief architect of foreign policy—is called upon to enforce this process with firmness, fairness, and fidelity to the rule of law. Whether it chooses to hasten Quiboloy’s extradition by expediting his local trial or by temporarily surrendering him to US custody, the sound exercise of its discretion will be the true measure of how far our extradition framework has followed the first extradition decision promulgated over two decades ago. —————- Comments to chiefjusticepanganiban@hotmail.com