Can Andy Burnham deliver a new chapter in UK

Andy Burnham’s arrival in Downing Street promises a new approach to UK-EU relations. Vera Spyrakou writes that rather than reopening the debate over Brexit, the focus must now be on what Britain and the EU can do together to build shared European capacity. The decade since the Brexit referendum has already demonstrated that institutional separation did not remove the reality of British-European interdependence. The arrival of a new government in the UK now shifts the question from whether that interdependence exists to how it should be governed. The arrival of Andy Burnham in Downing Street invites the familiar language of another reset in EU-UK relations. Yet the vocabulary of reset has reached its limits. A reset can repair the political mood; it cannot by itself create a durable relationship. Britain and the EU must now move from diplomatic repair to political construction. Burnham and the EU Burnham inherits a relationship that is warmer than at any point since Brexit, but also one in which ambition has repeatedly exceeded delivery. The first EU-UK summit in May 2025 established a new strategic partnership and opened negotiations on food and veterinary standards, energy, carbon markets and youth mobility. Yet the second summit was postponed following Keir Starmer’s resignation, negotiations over youth mobility remain difficult and British participation in the EU’s SAFE defence fund failed to materialise. This is the political paradox facing the new government. Burnham is personally and politically more comfortable with Europe than many of his recent predecessors, but he is unlikely to reopen the question of membership. His government has instead promised a deeper relationship while retaining Labour’s red lines on the single market, the customs union and freedom of movement. The next chapter should not be organised around how much of Brexit can be reversed, but around what Britain and the EU can do together. The test is whether cooperation can become visible enough to win public confidence, structured enough to endure political change and ambitious enough to strengthen Europe’s capacity to act. What is emerging might be described as a politics of European participation: neither an immediate route back to membership nor a minimalist relationship between distant neighbours, but sustained British involvement in Europe’s capacity to act. It respects the institutional consequences of Brexit while recognising that Britain cannot remain strategically detached from the continent’s security, prosperity and democratic future. From reset to delivery The reset was necessary because Brexit had left behind not only institutional separation but also a politics of mistrust. Re-establishing dialogue and recognising shared interests were important achievements. Nevertheless, goodwill is a political resource, not a policy outcome. The next phase must be judged by delivery. Hamish Falconer, the new minister responsible for the negotiations, has proposed applying Burnham’s “Makerfield test”: agreements should produce tangible change for ordinary people. A sanitary and phytosanitary agreement could reduce barriers affecting food and agricultural trade. Cooperation on carbon pricing and electricity could protect businesses and strengthen energy security. Mutual recognition of professional qualifications and carefully designed mobility arrangements could create opportunities for workers, students, apprentices and researchers. These measures may appear technical, but their political significance is considerable. Brexit became tangible through queues, forms, costs and lost opportunities. A new relationship must likewise become tangible through easier movement, lower friction and renewed possibilities. European cooperation will acquire democratic legitimacy only when citizens can identify what it enables them to do. Youth mobility is therefore more than a negotiating detail. It is an early test of whether both sides can move beyond the defensive assumptions of the Brexit period. The UK must acknowledge that mobility requires reciprocity, while the EU should recognise the domestic and financial constraints facing British universities. A credible agreement would not restore freedom of movement by another name. It would demonstrate that controlled mobility and political openness need not be opposites. Building shared European capacity Yet a relationship built solely around sectoral bargains would remain too narrow for the geopolitical moment. Europe’s security can no longer be separated neatly into EU and non-EU spheres. Russia’s war against Ukraine, uncertainty surrounding the transatlantic alliance, technological competition, energy vulnerability and the accelerating climate crisis all expose the limits of fragmented national action. The European Movement has argued that Europe must think and act as a stronger political whole, including by keeping open the possibility of welcoming back former members such as the UK. Whatever one thinks about the timing of rejoining, the underlying diagnosis is difficult to contest: division reduces Europe’s capacity to protect its sovereignty and democratic order. For Britain, this means treating cooperation with the EU not as a concession made necessary by Brexit, but as an investment in shared European capacity. Security and defence cooperation should include regular strategic dialogue, joint procurement where possible, coordination on Ukraine, cyber threats and critical infrastructure. Climate and energy cooperation should connect carbon markets, electricity systems and resilience planning. Research and technology partnerships should support European capabilities in areas where neither Britain nor individual member states can compete effectively alone. This would not amount to integration by stealth. The UK would remain outside the EU’s institutions and decision-making structures. But sovereignty should not be confused with strategic solitude. The ability to influence events increasingly depends upon the capacity to act with others. A relationship built to last The final test is durability. Post-Brexit relations have depended too heavily on the political temperament of successive governments. A genuinely new chapter requires regular summits, structured ministerial dialogue and stronger parliamentary, regional and civic links. Cooperation should become a normal feature of European governance rather than an exceptional negotiation reopened whenever a crisis occurs. This also requires more honest political language. The British government should explain that closer cooperation involves reciprocity, compromise and sometimes alignment. The EU, for its part, should defend the integrity of membership without treating every British proposal as an attempt to secure benefits without obligations. Friendship does not remove negotiation, but it should change its purpose: from managing separation to producing common capacity. The possibility that Britain may one day return to the EU should remain open. But rejoining cannot substitute for the political work required now. Nor should it become the only measure of whether the relationship is moving forward. Britain will not rediscover its European role through a single declaration or institutional leap. It will do so by rebuilding trust, creating shared interests and demonstrating that cooperation delivers. Britain’s European future therefore begins before rejoining. It begins through participation before membership: when mobility reconnects younger generations, regulatory cooperation produces material benefits, security becomes a common European responsibility and political dialogue grows resilient enough to survive changes of leadership. If Burnham and the EU can establish those foundations, the new chapter will be more than another reset. It will begin to change what Britain and Europe believe is politically possible. Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of LSE European Politics or the London School of Economics. Image credit: Alexandros Michailidis provided by Shutterstock.