On the US

Some readers have asked why I have not commented on Canada and the economic actions that President Donald Trump has taken against it. The reason I haven’t written much is that I have had very little to say about it. I have focused instead on the United States’ general strategy as it tries to reduce its involvement in the Eastern Hemisphere and reshape the geopolitical structure of the Western Hemisphere. Washington has explicitly said it is doing as much, and I predicted years ago that whoever was president would pursue such a strategy. It is in that context that I place the U.S. stance toward Canada. In broad terms, Canada’s relationship with the U.S. has two dimensions: economic and military. The U.S. is attempting to adjust the former but not the latter. The Trump administration is increasing economic pressure on Canada through tariffs, as it has with the rest of the world, which has naturally introduced tension into the relationship. At this point, the tension is reaching a point that it may affect the military dimension as well. During the Cold War, the U.S. greatly valued its military relationship with Canada, based as it was on geography. The confrontation with the Soviet Union had the potential to become a nuclear war. A Russian nuclear attack on the U.S. would likely pass through Canada. The U.S. needed to be able to detect a Soviet nuclear strike with enough time to launch its own nuclear weapons. The U.S. and Canada aligned on this basis and built what was called the Distant Early Warning, or DEW, line of radar installations throughout northern Canada to ensure detection of an attack. It was replaced in the late 1980s by the North Warning System radar array. In addition, NORAD (the North American Aerospace Defense Command) was a joint force, always helmed by an American commander and Canadian deputy commander. In other words, the two countries’ economic relationship was always secondary to their military relationship, and was bearable under any circumstance, bound as it was by history and necessity. With the end of the Cold War, the security dimension of the relationship did not disappear, but its importance was somewhat reduced. At the same time, Russia’s actions in the Ukraine war initially increased to some extent the tension between Russia and the U.S. and thus the importance of the military dimension of U.S.-Canada relations. Canada’s importance in this respect can be seen in the president’s desire to acquire Greenland, partly based on the evolution of warfare and technology and the potential increase of a polar route threat from Russia. Given the evolution of satellite-based detection of military actions, the necessity of the DEW line or the North Warning System declined significantly. But at the same time, satellites were themselves becoming vulnerable, and the technological ability to intercept and destroy missiles, along with other polar-based threats, is becoming more significant, making defense systems on Greenland much more important. But given the evolution of warfare and, in this case, polar warfare, if Greenland is of value, Canada remains extremely important for American security, and American power to defend it is critical for Canada as well. The U.S. needs the strategic depth Canada provides, and Canada needs the defensive technology the U.S. provides to reduce the likelihood of a successful polar enemy action. NORAD remains intact. It would seem that creating an economic crisis, then, would be detrimental to U.S. interests. But it increasingly appears that Washington believes no action it takes can override Canada’s dependence on the United States. At the same time, the question is whether a break in the military relationship would be a critical threat to the United States as well. Greenland is hardly an alternative to a polar defense system, but it is a useful addition. The other observation, of course, is that the president assumes that such an important asset must be under American control, in spite of the U.S.-Denmark alliance through NATO. I must assume that the president is aware not only of the lesser issue of Greenland but also of the fundamental importance of Canada for U.S. security (not to mention Canadian security). The assumption seems to be that Canada has no room to maneuver on the military dimension, and therefore, there is no military risk in redefining economic relations in a way that is more beneficial for the United States. While the Canadian prime minister has at various times spoken of a shift in Canadian relationships with other nations, creating a new geopolitical system of middle-tier countries, that would likely not solve Canada’s security problem. I am not a policymaker but a geopolitical analyst and therefore propose no course of action here. I leave it to policymakers to draw any conclusions on my analysis if they think it valuable. And I will leave it to my readers to consider the possible strategies that follow. Canada does not have many options in dealing with the U.S. economically or militarily. The U.S. also has no options militarily but some economic room, and obviously, it intends to take advantage of that. There is a saying that nations have no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests. Like all sayings, that is clever and has much truth in it, but it assumes that nations can precisely calibrate interests, and that emotions cannot overwhelm strategic calculation. Emotions can do that, albeit with significant risk and cost to the nations. I think that this is the U.S. calculus, or, if not calculus, instinct or opinion. In part, this analysis is why I have not commented on the U.S.-Canada relationship. Geopolitical theory is based on rational actors, and I deeply believe in that principle. At times, the rational becomes so complex and subtle that certainty becomes difficult. Yet having avoided this topic, I am forced to present this now for your consideration. This is the best I can do. But one thing is clear: Both the United States and Canada have options.