Pontifications: Disturbing Trends at Airbus

Free for nonsubscribers By Scott Hamilton Aug. 31, 2026, © Leeham News and Analysis: Today is my last day as a full-fledged participant in Leeham News and Analysis (LNA). When LNA was sold to AIN Media Group in July 2025, a two-year contract for me was included, with a provision that AIN would strive to find my successor as editor within a year. Howard Hardee assumed the editor’s slot on July 1 this year. I became editor-at-large. I remain under contract until next July, but at a reduced level, which gives me the free time to pursue my bucket list of things to see and places to go. I’ll contribute articles for LNA from time to time and provide advice on business development and related issues. I’ve been closely following Airbus and Boeing since 1992. That’s when Boeing led an industry effort to adopt international standards for the recovery of airliners leased to or purchased by distressed airlines. Under US bankruptcy law, lenders and lessors could repossess the aircraft after a 60-day waiting period following the airline’s bankruptcy filing. No such mechanism existed for non-US carriers. Led by Scott Scherer of what was then Boeing Capital Corp., the Boeing-led effort was successful. By law, distressed or bankrupt carriers in default had to turn over their aircraft after a court filing and approval. In practice, courts often ignored the new international standard, much to the frustration of the lessor or lender. My coverage shifted to Boeing and Airbus as complaints about “illegal” subsidies began to rear their ugly heads. Boeing complained Airbus obtained illegal subsidies that enabled it to undercut Boeing’s pricing. Airbus picked up the refrain and countered with similar complaints. This debate continued in one form or another for the following 30-plus years. Having followed Airbus and Boeing closely since then (and to a lesser extent, Embraer), I’m in a good position to draw conclusions over three decades about these companies. There is no question that Airbus succeeded in overtaking Boeing as the world’s leading airplane manufacturer, beginning in about 2004. There are many reasons for this. To get right to the point today, I’ll say this: there are now trends at Airbus that I find really disturbing. In March 2023, I wrote in Pontifications, “Complacency, arrogance aren’t a Boeing exclusive.” I began that article, “Airbus is resting on its laurels while Boeing struggles to recover from one crisis after another since the March 2019 grounding of the global 737 Max fleet. “Multiple sources tell me that Airbus, aside from the production problems it has in common with Boeing, is enjoying Boeing’s deep freeze by China. The decision by Boeing CEO David Calhoun to delay the ‘introduction’ of a new airplane until the middle of the next decade took the pressure off Airbus to be ready to move sooner rather than later. “While Boeing struggles, Airbus has become conservative, complacent and—gasp—even arrogant, a longtime Boeing trait.” The rest of the article provided some examples of this thesis. Boy, did that cause a stir. I received a call from Airbus communications complaining about the article. A call like this was routine for Boeing, which often whined about things I wrote (my journalistic peers received similar calls) to the point where the phone calls arguably crossed into harassment and intimidation. But Airbus never had done this, at least not with me. Within days, I was on a Zoom with the comms person, the department head, and the CEO of Airbus Commercial. I held my ground, of course. What I’ve seen since that 2023 date hasn’t been a trend in the right direction. Under the administration of Guillaume Faury, the CEO, and Julie Kitcher, the chief sustainability officer and communications at Airbus (the latter being the relevant position for this discussion), Airbus has been slowly shifting its media focus away from veteran aviation reporters in favor of 18-to-35-year-old “influencers,” citing TikTok specifically as an “influencer” outlet. Veteran aviation reporters began falling out of favor. One of the best technical aviation reporters still around was deemed too old. So was I. Bjorn Fehrm, an aerospace engineer by training, also fell off the invite list for a time. I suspected there was a hidden agenda. People like us old-timers and LNA know commercial aviation inside out. “Influencers,” by and large, don’t have a thimble of knowledge that the aviation veterans have. Maybe this is partly the point of favoring them. Who are these influencers there to influence? Certainly not the Tim Clarks, Michael O’Learys and Scott Kirbys of the world. Says an insider: the 18-to-35-year-old influencer strategy is to promote to up-and-comers that Airbus is a cool place to work and build a career. Which is all well and good, but not at the expense of journalists who truly know what they are writing about. Another disturbing trend: Airbus used to be forthright when questions were posed. Today, Airbus is more like Boeing pre-Kelly Ortberg. Answers are often ambiguous rather than informative—though admittedly this is a hit-or-miss complaint. Planned presentations degenerated into advertising vehicles rather than informational content. There was no pre-air show briefing this year, the first time in my memory when there was no briefing. During the era of CEO Tom Enders and his communications head, Rainer Ohler, Airbus executives were commonly available either via headquarters or field offices. Today, Airbus is more like Boeing; executives are rarely available for interviews. Today’s Airbus also retaliates against a journalist who wrote something executives disliked by freezing him or her out, just like the “old” Boeing. It’s true that John Leahy, the former COO of Customers, regularly put a reporter on ice, including me (three times), but communications largely continued to cooperate behind the scenes. For years, beginning with CEO Jim McNerney, Boeing beat up suppliers under the program called Partnering for Success. This misleading title was used to squeeze the profit margins of Boeing’s supply partners. Many earned double-digit margins compared with Boeing’s single-digit profits. Boeing demanded price cuts under the threat of being replaced. Suppliers called it Preparing for Sacrifice or Preparing for Poverty. Airbus also had a program to cut costs, but even suppliers—notably those common to both companies—said Airbus’ approach was more collaborative than combative. However, today Boeing is characterized by a series of crises and is humbled, while Airbus has become more arrogant. Boeing is now called transparent, and some suppliers complain that Airbus is no longer, reflecting the “old” Boeing. More concerning than the media policies is the increasing emphasis on shareholder value. For anyone who has followed Boeing since 1997, when its top priorities became shareholder value, shareholder value, shareholder value, and everything else thereafter, this is cause for raised eyebrows. LNA editor Howard Hardee touched on the announcement concurrent with Farnborough International Airshow that more emphasis will be placed on shareholder value. I wrote about this as far back as April 2023. The timing was not coincidental with the come-to-Jesus meeting I had with Airbus over arrogance and complacency. Thomas Topfer, the CFO of Airbus Group, laid out the new emphasis in an investors’ briefing concurrent with Farnborough. “It’s now the right time to accelerate shareholder returns; therefore, we are launching a €5 billion share buyback program to be executed over a three-year time horizon subject…to continued shareholder approval,” Topfer told analysts. “This marks clearly a significant step change over the past four years we returned €7.2 billion to our investors through regular and special dividends. With this new program, we are expanding that commitment. We expect total cash returns over the 2026 to 2029 period to represent around 60% of our accumulated free cash flow generation.” At least Airbus has limited the shareholder returns to 60% of free cash flow. Boeing committed to returning 100% of free cash flow to shareholders, leaving limited room for product development. Boeing suspended dividends and share buybacks following the second 737 Max crash in March 2019. “Importantly, I would like to emphasize, of course, this share buyback is a targeted tactical move based on our current strengths rather than a permanent recurring annual commitment,” Topfer said. He said that this ensures that Airbus will “continuously drive long-term shareholder value while fully preserving our strategic flexibility. These strategic levers mark our transition into a value-driven phase for Airbus, and as we scale past 1,100 deliveries and surpass the triple-digit revenue mark, our success is driven by disciplined execution across commercial aircraft, defense, space, and helicopters alike. “Our structural cash generation enables us to invest in our future while accelerating shareholder returns at the same time. We’re delivering on this through our continued commitment to a progressive dividend policy which will be complemented by the €5 billion share buyback program, and these actions demonstrate our focus on consistent value,” Topfer said. LNA was told long ago that institutional shareholders were pressing Airbus for more value. Although Airbus hasn’t gone to “full Boeing” yet, by dedicating 100% of free cash flow to shareholders, the trend is worrying, nevertheless. I think the comments about returning cash are a little unfair. FCF is after R&D (which is expensed) and capital investment. FCF is literally what’s left. Airbus does not have a high level of debt and has a stable balance sheet. What is it meant to do with the cash? Pile it up? Conduct inefficient investment or research? Returning FCF tells you nothing about whether Airbus is investing enough or researching enough. Boeing’s problem was that it was under investing in engineering and production. Airbus has its tech bricks and capacity ramp investments ongoing. You wouldn’t happen to work in finance at Airbus by any chance? Absolutely (well, being IFRS Airbus may be able to capex R&D items instead of opexing them, but either way FCF remains post R&D). I don’t know what time frame their capex on facilities etc is optimal for but as far as I can see their R&D spend has actually remained very stable for a decade+, which to my mind is good. Another great article Scott. I know many of us with miss your frequent excellent articles. LNA has been a great source of very interesting information over the years, and I will continue to read them. Good luck in working on your bucket list, you have earned it. Enjoy the free time. All the best Leeham. Always appreciated your opinions. Take good care! I wish this website had been available during the middle of my 20 year career in aerospace. It has been a tremendous asset to the industry. Best of luck in the future, Scott. article title Mahindra Aerostructures awarded Airbus contract to manufacture A320 family fuselage skins “The components will be manufactured at Mahindra Aerostructures’ facility in Bengaluru and supplied to Airbus’ manufacturing facility in Augsburg, Germany” “Under the contract, Mahindra Aerostructures will manufacture fuselage skins for Sections 18 and 19, covering the rear fuselage and tail sections of the Airbus A320neo and A321XLR aircraft. The scope includes the manufacture of eight fuselage skins for Section 18 and three fuselage skins for Section 19 of the aircraft. ” So it begins, this will get them ready to be a risk sharing partner in the future for next single aisle aircraft Kudos to Scott for his lifetime achievement. The actual avatar shows you much better than the older one => good decision. Thomas I mis-read he Tik Tok part as a Influencer Toilet. I think its the more accurate take. This trend with older journalists has been going on for a while now, in Australia old mate Peter Ricketts was banned from most aviation related pr events, because he asked tough questions. Scott, best wishes for this next chapter of your life. I only started reading LNA about a year ago, but I took to it almost immediately. What I particularly appreciate is LNA’s ability to connect what is happening today with decades of industry history, and to form a clear view without simply following the prevailing narrative. I also really enjoy your writing style. It feels like hearing from someone who has actually watched this industry evolve. I am a reader from China. I spent more than a decade at COMAC, starting in its early years. I have always felt that a broader, more industry-wide perspective would be valuable for China’s commercial aviation manufacturing sector and its development. You mentioned your March 2023 Airbus article, so I went back and read it. I don’t know why, but I came away with the feeling that Airbus called you in because they sensed that something internally was becoming difficult to control and needed to be dealt with, rather than simply because they wanted to correct the problems you had pointed out. Thank you for your work over the years. Even though I discovered your work relatively late, it has already influenced the way I think about commercial aviation. WYZ “I am a reader from China. I spent more than a decade at COMAC, starting in its early years. I have always felt that a broader, more industry-wide perspective would be valuable for China’s commercial aviation manufacturing sector and its development.” Its interesting to see that Comac has moved away from western automation and tooling companies for the Comac C919 and C929 programs A recent example this past week is AVIC tender announcement for C919 forward and mid fuselage panel automated drilling and riveting production…it was awarded to Hangzhou Aimei Aviation Mfg Equipment. The first production equipment for these C919 sections of the aircraft was from Gemcor in the USA. While Hangzhou Aimei Aviation Mfg Equipment has made some riveting machines (e.g. non commercial aircraft) This is the first venture for Comac commercial aircraft and begs the question, can this company meet the quality and process standards for automated fastening to meet western certification (e.g. EASA) Time will tell! If thy use the same tooling and fixtures are they going to use their machine design or just “try” to make duplication of Gemcor 5 and 7 axis automated fastening machines that are currently running production If so it will be interesting to see how they will manage the Electronic Servo Controlled Roller Screw Technology to squeeze the rivets, the a axis gear box that controls the work frame accuracy and on the G2000 model the gearing accuracy for the inner C Frame Anyone can try to duplicate the iron but making it work is whole different matter. Just ask the US guys trying to duplicate the new Renton WRS Many have tried over the past 60 years and only a couple have succeeded Scott, Congratulations on your move to a Scott-directed life, and thanks for many years of thoughtful reporting and kind direction of this website. Best wishes to you and your family. Thank you Scott for your many good articles, thoughts, analyses considerations. over the last 15? years. Leeham stands out among publications for the combination of analyses and the dept to see trends, developments and remembering past patterns. While staying professional and objective, long term term readers could see between the lines your valuable thoughts and educated expectations. Enjoy your free time Scott, no doubt finally reading those books that have been waiting for you for years, trying some new stuff, having dinners with people that don’t mind what’s on the table, taking time to (re)visit special places. (honestly expecting you to frequent this place for the rest of your life anyway 😉 Full agree. As I wrote, AB is doing share buybacks, despite the 330 series remain a true hole in their product lineup, as LNA also reported the other day. The 787 not only outsells the 787 3 or 4 to one, it also fetches a higher price. In the SWOT analysis, this is where AB should have acted, & pushed in an clean sheet of the 330, while the NGSA can be pushed into 2037. A clean sheet 330 can also be used to mature many of the techno-bricks, so the NGSA do not have to take them all. Beside the 330 cleansheet, AB need to strech the 22x, and the 35x, but those are simple projects. That AB does nothing, but let Boeing being able to recover from more profitable WB sales (787 & 270 777x), over its many poor life choices & 50bn$ debt is complacency by Airbus. While leading in th upper NB-321neo is fine, its a second price… Don’t let Germans lead ABs commercial part. A330 neo isnt product hole at all. In previous head to head LNA comparisons reveals that while the Boeing 787 holds a structural and aerodynamic edge for long-range missions, the Airbus A330neo (specifically with its upgraded Maximum Takeoff Weight) narrows the gap significantly on medium-to-long haul flights, presenting a lower-capital-cost alternative. The Boeing 787’s composite frame maximizes fuel efficiency on longer, thinner long-haul routes. The A330neo matches or sometimes beats the 787’s per-seat fuel efficiency on medium-range or dense, high-capacity routes. For existing operators, the A330neo offers massive savings via pilot type-rating commonality and non engine maintenance https://leehamnews.com/2025/08/21/airbus-a330neo-gets-better-and-better-part-3/ looking at the Airbus range simplistically you have 9/10, 8, 6 and 5 across seating choices I see that and note that while the A330NEO continues to sell, its not in the numbers the 787 is. Maybe its the flexibility of having the range if you have routes and can shift around vs a more specific band. Some of those A330NEO are also tankers. If they were continuing with the A330CEO those tankers saws would go to it. An NEO adds nothing to the mix other than the obvious that it creates engine conflicts. Not sure ow many other her wear out updated items not common add to the list but its an annoyance for small fleets. There is a lot of work went into the KC-135R to make it and keep it common. To be clear, the A330 has been a successful workhorse. It put the word success into Airbus as a broad spectrum single aisle/widebody builder. I remember fly an A300 back in the early 80s. My reaction was, well I am not happy with two engines over the Pacific, but this sure is a lot more solid aircraft than the DC-10! I later got to fly a 767 and it was, ok, those two match up really well with each other. Both have that good solid feel you like in an aircraft. The DC-10 was more like a Gooney Bird. I flew an L1011 once as well, same good solid feel. Very few A330 neo are tankers, they were older version. The A350-800 was dropped and the neo part filled that requirement. Reminds me of the Max 7 which meets a specific role for Southwest, which is a 150 seater at their two seating classes and can operate 200 flights a day from short runway Midway and also run high frequency Texas and California internal routes. Airbus would have studied the niche left by the orphan 787-800 and targeted a lower capital cost development of their 8 across airliner with modern engines. IIRC Airbus only starts to offer its A330 MRTT+ very recently, it has already received a firm commitment last year. Going forward, many orders will join, the Spain and Poland are likely customers. @Duke: Interesting breakdown for American Airlines and the recent move to divest the 7770200. An amazingly well done piece for Simply flying. It lays out the pros and cons very nicely. Its only definitive for American and its specific routes and ops. It does not translate into someone else’s. https://simpleflying.com/boeing-jet-already-sitting-american-airlines-fleet-quietly-replace-47-oldest-widebodies/ the point on the A330NEO MRT is that going forward its a production aspect. You can convert an old A330CEO or you get a new A330NEO, there are no old ones to convert. I am amazed at home many converted that were picked up and converted vs new. A few 767s were but one offs for smaller orders. Italy shifted to the A330MRT (not sure NEO or CEO) giving up any commonality with its small 767 tankers. SCOTT. WELL DONE my friend. These past years are among some of my most interesting times and you have been a large part of that. Live long and prosper. Empty the bucket list and remember where your friends are. Report: Boeing, SPEEA will resume negotiations Sept. 8 “On Monday, the union said it had met with Boeing’s negotiating team and decided to resume contract negotiations starting Tuesday, Sept. 8.” I thought both sides are serious and eager to engage in some deep discussion, not just to announce talk will resume next week. It looks like there may be two votes, at most, ahead of Oct 7? According to what I can find online, nine C919 are delivered this year, an 80% increase YoY. It looks like HU has parked all its 787-8s, following the withdrawal of the 787-8 fleet by CZ. OTOH, around 55 Airbus A330-200s are currently operating in China. Its not just the journalists that are finding Airbus is failing it its offerings According to United’s Senior Vice President of Global Network Planning, Patrick Quayle, “Originally when Airbus marketed it, [the range] was a lot further than what it is right now, as constructed and as built.” Not the only airline who feel the capability has been oversold, Iberia publicly stated that with a standard, highly common configuration of 182 seats, the aircraft’s true max range sits closer to 3,920 nautical miles Qantas has already been forced to actively retrofit its A321XLR fleet to alter lavatory space and crew rest areas following negative early operational feedback. Similarly, American Airlines’ crews have heavily criticized the jet’s tight galley space, which severely slows down premium meal services Delta even though an existing large Airbus customer saw through the marketing and refused to order the type Did United cancel the order? Why didn’t United reject the aircraft like what ANA did to the early-built 787s or Emirates and Lufthansa did to some 777-9s? United, like other major airlines, has the capabilty to do its own dd and analysis. Did it rely 100% on what Airbus’ selling? Who’s kidding. So all those airlines are wrong for relying on Airbus marketing for a new type at launch. Engines also come into the story, its quite a thrust bump for the extra weight involved. The contracts wouldnt have walk away clauses. Thats a manufacturers nightmare . Airbus supplies its “” estimates, actual usage may vary”””. Guarantees mostly have been very weak and avoid what is promised in marketing. Remedies can be vague as well. Its in the league of the McDonnel Douglas shortfalls and a lot of money will be spent by Airbus finding small improvements as well as the engine makers Do you have any, uh, evidence to support your claims? Its from a reliable source who has worked for an airframer and an engine maker on customer requirements Do you have better information that is completely different , Id love to hear a different point of view that’s similarly detailed Well, first of all, if, as you claimed, airline customers ordered aircraft “based on Airbus marketing for a new type at launch” and subsequently found out the aircraft does not conform with the baseline specifications in the contracts, I find that’s good reason for such airline customers to reject delivery, no different from ANA’s 787s. But, it’s important to note that, it hasn’t happened. So the fact remains there aren’t any documented cases. The burden of proof is on the claimant(s) to provide publicly verifiable source(s), not others. Last but not the least, airline customers have every right and responsibility to do their own dd, not relying on marketing claims by the seller. Major airlines are well-informed and are fully capable to perform their own analysis before placing any firm commitments. Sometime ago: “Boeing claims the MAX 10 flies farther, cheaper and with just about the same numbers of passengers as the class-leading Airbus A321neo.” But according to analysis by the LNA: “Boeing’s claims on a basic level seem OK. The seating is close to the A321neo. On a higher level it starts to stutter. Our model can’t agree on the 5% better economics.” “It has been pointed out that we could have chosen a more efficient configuration for the A321neo. We could have used two over-wing exits and blocked the third door pair. It would have filled the cabin attendants seats at the third door in the floor plan. The A321neo then takes 16+180 seats = 196 seats. One can also use the same configuration for the MAX 10. Due to the service doors (fore and aft, on the right side) being of lower exit rating than Airbus doors, the cabin then can only be equipped with 189 seats.” “The claim that a MAX 10 would fly farther and cheaper, we have to classify as aircraft OEM marketing rhetoric” https://leehamnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/MAX-10-economics.png “The only problem is that the MAX 10 represents what the MAX 9 should have been in the first place. Boeing should have taken its time to define the 737 MAX product range more thoroughly. Two thirds of the product range (the MAX 7 and 9) was not right, as witnessed by sales. The remake brings a fix, but it’s a late brush up.” If IB decides to put in heavier lie-flat seats, heavier galley equipment (plus necessary fuel reserves for headwind-heavy flights) in the aircraft to chase higher margin, who should be responsible for the range “shorfall”? “Pratt & Whitney shipped its first GTF Advantage engine units to Airbus in May 2026.” It doesn’t look like the only one that United got has the GTF Advantage engines. (Online sources say United’s first A321xlr completed its maiden test flight on April 29.) I read that to account for real-life trans-Atlantic conditions, one needs to deduct at least 250 nm during the summer and 500 nm in the winter. The 737-10 is good for, say, (no more than) 2500 nm in the winter months, not what Boeing claims. P. S. Boeing is said to offer steep discounts on the 737 MAX 10 by up to 60%. It may be a better reflection of the competitive pressure on the Max 10 in the market. The A321XLR’s advertised range was 4,700nm. Because of extra weight taken on as a result of redesigning the long-range fuel tank, it lost range. Airbus is in the process of making improvements to recapture this range. Also, as Bjorn Fehrm has written many, many times, Airbus uses metrics that are (my word) more generous to its airplanes than Boeing does, which are closer to “airline rules” than those used by Airbus. None of this is new to the airlines. Nor should it be new to Airbus, which reads Bjorn’s work and has for years…. The A321 neo standard is very capable plane. Nothing is gained by comparing with the Max 10 standard models This information was about the A321XLR only. Referring back to the MD-11 which was promoted with its specified range was an impressive 12,455 km (6,725 NM) at full load. It seems that McD guaranteed that to its launch order buyers. The launch customers flying, Finnair and Delta, showed this was not so. If the aircraft did fly with a full payload, its range was 12,025 km (6,493 NM). It seems the engines were the main factor. The Pratt & Whitney PW4460 engines burned 6.7% to 8.4% more fuel than promised, while General Electric’s CF6-80C2D1F engines burned 4.5% to 5.3% over specification. https://simpleflying.com/md-11-rise-fall/ There was various aerodynamic improvements to reduce cruise drag. The internal wing box structure was strengthened. This allowed the aircraft to handle a higher MTOW, letting airlines carry back the fuel and payload they initially expected. The PIP ultimately achieved a total performance efficiency increase of about 8% to bring MD-11 back to its guarantees . Its been said that Airbus has raised MTOW also yet the issue remains Much was made of the shortfall at the time. Singapore Air cancelled its whole order before any were built. It seems the XLR range performance shortfall is greater than the MD-11 and that was an already long range plane at its time. Airbus just needs to hire a few Jack Welch acolytes as top executives. I hear we have several available on this side of the pond. Though I reckon they’re comfortably sucking down margaritas somewhere on the beaches of the Caribbean islands they purchased with the money looted from Boeing…. probably not looking for new gigs. The 100% of FCF commitment by Boeing was only for 3 years from 2016. Their major development programs were complete 787, 737 max, 777X was nearing its peak spend and could be financed from R&D spend Bon voyage Scott, happy flying, enjoy yourself, and thank you (claps). For me, you created the best online commercial aviation interest resource. Very well done! And pity about the change in Airbus’ comms. Fingers crossed they soon recognise a dropped ball and pick it up again. Scott warns Airbus about the risk of becoming arrogant and overly confident in its own success — similar to what happened to Boeing between 2004 and 2018. Listening to Boeing’s PR at the time and looking back at how the company assessed market developments and its own programmes, I was surprised many times by the level of clear groupthink that had taken over. The record sales, share buybacks and rising stock price between 2011 and 2018 — despite the drama surrounding the 787 development and the FAA and congressional scrutiny in 2012 — reinforced a feeling within Boeing that it was almost unbeatable. Airbus should be careful not to fall into the same trap. There is a real risk that greed and short-term profitability gradually take precedence over long-term portfolio health, engineering excellence and product quality, while shareholders cheer from the sidelines. In my opinion, a key part of preventing this is to design an executive compensation system that rewards long-term portfolio health, strong financial reserves, sustainable investment, product quality and a robust safety and quality culture. I am not convinced Boeing has fully addressed this issue yet. Stock prices rule. “In 2025, CEO Kelly Ortberg had the highest annual salary, at $1.5 million, and total compensation — usually cash and/or stock awards for meeting internal company performance targets — of almost $24 million. Jesus Malave, the newly appointed CFO, was the second-most compensated, at $20 million, which included an $8 million bonus to his salary of almost $400,000.” Rank importance of safety, R&D, long term reserves, employee & supply chain relations and stock price for an executive.. Boeing ranks in the middle-to-lower tier of the [30] Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) for total chief executive compensation It seems that many have wool over their eyes about what really large US companies executives get paid. Of course it means the VPs below them get paid very well also. The challenges at Boeing are massive so the internal targets for the executive team are also ambitious