Ceasefire Collapse Restores U.S. Leverage as Sanctions, Strikes Weaken Iran’s Hand

July 14, 2026 | Policy Brief Ceasefire Collapse Restores U.S. Leverage as Sanctions, Strikes Weaken Iran’s Hand July 14, 2026 | Policy Brief Ceasefire Collapse Restores U.S. Leverage as Sanctions, Strikes Weaken Iran’s Hand The memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran was meant to secure a 60-day ceasefire. Instead, the Islamic Republic has repeatedly attacked commercial vessels operating in or near the Strait of Hormuz and launched missiles and drones against sites used by the United States in multiple Arab countries. In response, Washington sanctioned a key Iranian financier and a network of exchange houses on July 10. These amounted to the first new economic penalties imposed since the MOU was signed, sending a signal that the United States is prepared to use financial pressure, alongside military strikes, in response to Iranian violations of the agreement. The sanctions came hours after President Donald Trump declared online that negotiations would continue even though Washington had told Tehran “in no uncertain terms, that the Cease Fire is OVER!” Then, on July 13, Trump announced the reimposition of a blockade of Iranian ports. Whatever remains of the MOU, negotiations now continue amid active hostilities, giving Washington greater leverage to raise the costs of Iranian intransigence. New Sanctions Target Iranian Kleptocracy, Exchange Houses The July 10 package targeted Ali Ansari, who “made a name for himself by institutionalizing embezzlement within the Iranian regime,” according to the Treasury Department. Figures like Ansari sit atop the regime’s kleptocracy, stealing from the Iranian people and moving billions abroad. Treasury also sanctioned several Iranian exchange houses that each moved hundreds of millions of dollars for sanctioned customers or banks, along with front companies in Hong Kong and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Both jurisdictions are hubs for Iranian sanctions evasion. In April, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said banks in China, Hong Kong, the UAE, and Oman received warning letters about such activity and the secondary sanctions exposure it creates. U.S. Revokes Relief Measure, Strikes Iran To Protect Hormuz Shipping The July 10 sanctions followed Iranian attacks on vessels in the strait, which prompted the Trump administration to revoke a flawed 60-day authorization permitting sales of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, and petrochemicals. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) also struck various Iranian military targets, including missile and drone sites to degrade Tehran’s ability to threaten commercial shipping. In early May, CENTCOM launched the short-lived Project Freedom to facilitate commercial transit through the strait. Concerned about potential Iranian retaliation, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia denied the United States use of their bases for the initiative. Even so, CENTCOM says U.S. forces have helped move more than 800 commercial vessels and 400 million barrels of crude through the Strait of Hormuz since early May. Announcing the renewed blockade on July 13, Trump also stated the United States would collect fees equaling 20 percent of cargo values from ships transiting the strait to support “the job of providing safety and security.” Broader Pressure Will Strengthen U.S. Negotiators Recent sanctions and strikes have strengthened Washington’s position, but they will not produce durable negotiating leverage if confined to retaliation for attacks in the strait. With the ceasefire effectively over, the United States should resume broader economic and military pressure against the regime and its enablers. Washington should establish an allied counter-kleptocracy campaign to identify, freeze, and, where legally permissible, seize assets held abroad by regime insiders such as Ansari. Treasury should also issue a proposed rule under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act requiring enhanced due diligence for transactions through Hong Kong and the UAE with high likelihood of Iranian involvement, while delaying final implementation to give local regulators a last opportunity to act. Military pressure should likewise extend to facilities enabling Iran to rebuild its nuclear and missile infrastructure. Recent satellite imagery reportedly shows repair work at Taleghan 2, a suspected nuclear weapons research facility at Parchin, and activity at Pickaxe Mountain, a suspected underground nuclear site near Isfahan. The administration should make clear that reconstruction at these sites, or elsewhere, will trigger strikes against both the facilities and the firms enabling their reconstruction. Max Meizlish is a research fellow for the Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP) at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). For more analysis from Max, please subscribe HERE. Follow FDD on X @FDD and @FDD_CEFP. Follow Max on X @maxmeizlish. FDD is a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.